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Summary 
The research focuses on the epistemic tension between Western positivist epistemology and 
African indigenous knowledge systems particularly Shona proverbs. The research argues that 
Western epistemological hegemony is both unjustified and unacceptable in the context of the 
pluriversal understanding of knowledge where systems of knowledge are both multiple and 
diverse. After a critique of Eurocentric thinking, the research defends an African epistemological 
paradigm that emerges as an alternative framework for the authentic and legitimate study of 
African knowledge systems and ways of knowing. The approach opens intellectual space for the 
philosophical study of Shona proverbs. Under Shona environmental philosophy, it shall be 
argued that ubuntu respects all aspects of the environment, recognizes the dependence of human 
beings on the environment, sees the land as sacred and affords responsibility for future 
generations by encouraging the preservation and conservation of resources. Three Shona 
proverbs have been used to show how the Shona think about preservation of natural resources, 
conservation of natural resources and the interdependence between humanity and the natural 
world. In the context of Shona philosophy of law, it is argued that ubuntu provides the basis of a 
coherent philosophy of law among the Shona. Shona philosophy of law is a reflection of legal 
elements and the study draws these elements from selected proverbs. These proverbs have been 
used to show the metaphysical basis of Shona legal philosophy, the role of the law in protecting 
the dignity of individuals and the importance of the law in peace building within the community. 
Concerning political philosophy, the study has argued that ubuntu is the political foundation of 
solidarity, oneness and mutual support in politics. Shona political philosophy stresses 
coexistence and relatedness (ukama) within the community. Shona political philosophy 
maintains that authority should be guided by respect, good governance, solidarity and peace. 
Under Shona philosophy of economics, themes of human dignity, respect for hard work and the 
need for moderation in the desire for money are discussed in the context of the Shona 
philosophical worldview. The proverbs under study contribute to alternative ways of 
philosophical reflection in the context of the pluriversality of knowledge. 
 
 
Key terms 
 
Epistemological paradigm, Afrocentricity, Pluriversality, Ubuntu, Shona Proverbs, Community, 
Environmental Philosophy, Philosophy of Law, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Economics. 
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Introduction 
 
African philosophical studies on the use of indigenous culture to address philosophical issues 
reveal a conflict between three positions. The first perspective, which Kwame Gyekye calls 
―cultural revivalism‖ (Gyekye 1997b: 233), defends the African cultural heritage. According to 
this line of thought, the route to addressing contemporary dilemmas, uncertainties and paradoxes 
affecting African countries lies in reclaiming and revitalizing indigenous culture. The African 
indigenous culture has been marginalized, degraded and suppressed in the wake of colonialism. 
Colonialism disturbed African indigenous values and imposed European systems in 
environmental philosophy, philosophy of law, political philosophy and philosophy of economics 
upon the conquered people of Africa. The task of contemporary African philosophy is to 
critically reflect upon these systems of thought. African philosophy must now pursue decisive 
liberation, a ―decolonization‖ of African minds and communities. For revivalists, genuine 
modernization in Africa can only be realized through the revitalization of African cultural norms. 
 
The second perspective challenges the revivalist attitude toward the African indigenous heritage. 
Defenders of this position argue that the revivalist project is unjustified and inappropriate to the 
challenges of contemporary Africa.  The call for a nostalgic return to the past is ill-advised, 
conservative, romantic and unreflective.  Cultural revivalism diverts attention from real African 
philosophical issues concerning the environment, law, politics and economics. Hountondji 
(1996:48) in his earlier position, argues that, Africans must make a ―clean break‖ with the pre-
modern past in order to address the most urgent demands of the present modernisation, for them, 
modernisation requires a mental orientation commensurate with the problems of the present, not 
an attempt to resurrect ideas from societies of the distant past.  
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According to the third position, the critical trend, the first two positions may seem mutually 
exclusive but they fail to realize a third possibility of integrating the two aspects. The first two 
positions commit a fallacy of false dichotomy in different directions. Revivalism argues for a 
total embrace of the African indigenous past while anti-revivalism suggests a total abandonment 
of the past.  It is a mistake to relegate culture to the past since these cultures are still in existence 
today. Indigenous culture carries religion and morality and hence, these values are still in strong 
existence in the contemporary period. The research examines the role of indigenous culture in 
the provision of elements that can be used to address philosophical issues. Ramose (2009:413) 
argues that ―the indigenous conquered people of Africa must construct an epistemological 
paradigm on their own as a means of expressing authenticity and to attain true liberation.‖ The 
study follows Ramose‘s line of thought and it tries to depart from Western epistemological 
paradigm and adopt an indigenous knowledge based approach so as to address philosophical 
issues in Zimbabwe. However, the work should not be understood as a cultural revival project 
but an attempt to look critically into the past heritage and pick out useful elements. Ramose 
(2009:414) maintains that ―tradition should function as a source from which to extract elements 
that will help in the construction of an authentic and emancipative paradigm relevant to the 
conditions of Africa at this historical moment.‖ If Ramose‘s thinking has to be logically and 
consistently applied, then indigenous knowledge systems can function as a source from which to 
draw elements for applied philosophy in Zimbabwe at this point of history.  
 
The first chapter critically examines the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm which has 
historically and systematically disturbed, disrupted, disfigured, dislocated and disregarded 
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indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) such as the Shona proverbs. The critique is important in 
this study because it interrogates, dialogues and explores the assumptions that have been used to  
sideline IKS in general and Shona proverbs in particular. The critique objects to the claims of 
―objectivity, universality and absolutism‖ that have dominated the Eurocentric epistemological 
paradigm.  The first chapter identifies and acknowledges the existence of the African 
epistemological paradigm as an alternative way of knowing.  The critique of abstract 
universalism is a call to overcome the provincialism of Western male epistemology and the 
invisibility it produces on the social historical experience of subjects that have been submitted to 
gender, sexual and racial oppression. The idea is to produce a more comprehensive and rigorous 
critical thought beyond epistemic racism or sexism.  
 
After a justification of the legitimacy of proverbs as souces of knowledge, the research relied on 
a total of 1876 proverbs based on collections made by Hamutyinei and Plannger (2013:1-484). 
Out of the total, about 63 proverbs were initially identified as philosophical in nature. The 
philosophical proverbs were further divided into 21 proverbs which focus on pure branches of 
philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. 42 proverbs were seen as focusing on 
applied philosophical branches and out of these, the researcher picked proverbs that expressed 
elements of environmental philosophy, philosophy of law, political philosophy and philosophy 
of economics. Further, the researcher found it reasonable to select proverbs that highlight 
important themes within the chosen divisions of applied philosophy. The choice of three 
proverbs for each chapter was arrived at using the criteria of (1) cultural basis of the proverb (2) 
widespread usage (3) capacity to address contemporary applied philosophical issues. As a result 
of the usage of the above criteria, some proverbs were dropped because of failure to comply with 
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at least one of the above criteria and the researcher had to settle for three proverbs in each 
chapter. Furthermore, an examination of three proverbs per chapter allowed depth in the analysis 
of each proverb and it made it easier for the researcher to relate the themes addressed by each 
proverb. 
The second chapter shall argue that African philosophy, which has very deep roots in the history 
of pre-colonial, colonial and independent Africa will be used as the basis and example of African 
environmental philosophy. The chapter shall analyse three Shona proverbs that provide evidence 
of environmental responsibility. These proverbs may be used to refute the skeptical view on 
African environmental philosophy in general. The three selected proverbs shall examine Shona 
environmental philosophy that culminates in environmental preservation, conservation and 
nature relatedness. 
The third chapter defends the possibility of an African conception of law that is based on the 
philosophy of ubuntu. The chapter argues on for a Shona philosophy of law basing on three 
selected proverbs. The first proverb shal examine the metaphysical and social foundation of the 
law among the Shona. The second proverb shall explore the role of the law in protecting the 
dignity of persons who may be facing accusations. The third proverb focuses on the significance 
of the law in promoting and building peace within the community. 
The fourth chapter explores the significance of an African political philosophy in general and 
focuses on three Shona proverbs that have important implications for political governance in 
particular. The first proverb in the chapter addresses the significance of co-existence, relatedness 
and mutual respect between political leaders and their subjects. The second proverb shall argue 
for the epistemic role of others in the provision of experience and wisdom in political 
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governance. The last proverb examines the significance of truth telling in reconciliation and 
harmony within the Shona communities. 
Chapter five argues for the importance of an indigenous philosophy of economics basing on 
reflections obtained from ubuntu philosophy.  Three Shona proverbs shall be examined to draw 
implications for Shona philosophy of economics. The first proverb defends the importance of the 
dignity of persons in the context of wealth acquisition. The second proverb examines the 
importance of hard work in economic activity among the Shona. The last proverb shall focus on 
the ethical significance of moderation in the acquisition of riches among the Shona. 
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CHAPTER 1: DEMARGINALISING SHONA PROVERBS: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
EUROCENTRIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter critically examines the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm which has historically 
and systematically marginalised
1
, silenced, stereotyped, dislocated and decentred indigenous 
knowledge systems (IKS) such as the Shona proverbs. The critique is necessary because it 
questions, refutes and challenges unwarranted assumptions that have been used to unfairly 
subjugate IKS in general and Shona proverbs in particular. The chapter shows that critiques of 
positivist epistemology that arise as opposing positions within the Eurocentric epistemological 
paradigm in the form of postmodernism, deconstructionism and structuralism are inadequate 
because they fail to fully address on the fact on colonialism. The critique challenges the claims to 
―objectivity, universality and absolutism‖ that have characterized the Eurocentric 
epistemological paradigm. Positively, the chapter identifies and acknowledges the existence of 
the African epistemological paradigm as an alternative way of knowing. Western philosophy 
pretends to be ―universal‖ but it is historically situated and develops values that are specific to 
Western culture. These values cannot be applicable to all people at all times. Asante (1990:396) 
maintains that the ―unquestioned and unproblematised acceptance of the European perspective as 
‗universal‘ should be challenged.‖ It is within Asante‘s critical perspective that this research 
                                                          
1
 Marginalisation, with reference to indigenous knowledge is defined by Ocholla (2007:3) as 
exclusion, a state of being left out or to be given insufficient attention. Marginalisation has 
retarded the development and integration of indigenous knowledge. Colonialism and imperialism 
are responsible for marginalisation of IKS through the use of language that describes IKS as 
primitive, backward, archaic, outdated, pagan and barbaric (Ocholla, 2007:3). This demeaning 
reference excludes IKS from exchange with other forms of knowledge that had given itself the 
image of being Western, scientific and modern. If a person or community uses IKS, that person 
or community is wrongly labeled as inferior. IKS have been victimized, illegitimated and 
suppressed to the extent of producing generations that do not recognize, appreciate and value 
IKS. 
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questions Eurocentric epistemology. For Grosfoguel (2012:90), abstract universalism in the 
epistemic sense gives a subject that is faceless and placeless in spatio-temporal terms and this is 
problematic. An alternative to abstract universalism is the reality of concrete pluriversality. 
Pluriversality entails excavating history and bringing to the table multiple points of view for 
enrichment and contestation (Maldonado-Torres, 2012:5). Grosfoguel (2012:91), gives 
intellectual work that stands as a serious effort to think pluriversally, not by increasing from a 
single point of view, but by engaging histories and knowledges in different parts of the world, 
particularly paying attention to the plight of the dispossessed everywhere. Pluriversality is a 
critique to abstract universalism to bring an alternative conception of reality. Grosfoguel 
(2012:100) maintains that the notion of pluriversal is developed from the global South and 
represents a democratic decolonial alternative to ―universalism.‖ According to Grosfoguel, 
(2012:101),  the critique of abstract universalism is a call to overcome the provincialism of 
Western male epistemology and the invisibility it produces on the social historical experience of 
subjects that have been submitted to gender, sexual and racial oppression. The idea is to produce 
a more comprehensive and rigorous critical thought beyond epistemic racism or sexism. The 
problem with Western epistemology is that it is imperialist and patriarchal where one cultural 
point of view defines what is good for the rest. The ―pluri‖ as opposed to the ―uni‖ is not to 
support everything that is said by the subaltern subject from below but a call to produce ―critical 
decolonial knowledge that is rigorous, comprehensive, with a worldly scope that is non-
provincial‖ (Grosfoguel, 2012:102). 
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Dussel (2012:50), invokes a pluriletic process in which the Western knowledge system is not left 
behind but given a seat at the table as part of the larger puzzle, one that has to re-understand 
itself to be sure as a particular which is part of a larger formation. 
 
―The affirmation and growth of the cultural alterity of postcolonial communities 
(peoples), which subsumes within itself the best elements of Modernity, should 
not develop a cultural style that tends towards an undifferentiated or empty 
universal cultural identity, an abstract universality, but rather a trans-modern 
pluriversality (with many elements similar in common: European, Islamic, Vedic, 
Taoist, Buddhist, Latin American, African, etc.), one which is pluricultural, and 
engaged in a critical intercultural dialogue‖ (Dussel, 2012:50). 
 
Intercultural dialogue is important for this study because it opens up possibility of mutual respect 
of knowledge from both the Western and the African paradigms. This gives a better position that 
attempts to overcome the narrowness of assumed universality. According to Dussel (2012:55), 
abstract universality ought to be converted to an analogical pluriversal similarity, which is not 
the equivocal incommunicability or the identical univocity, but the concrete pluriversality of the 
analogical similarity with the inevitable distinction of each cultural tradition. Dussel‘s notion of 
pluriversality is therefore inclusive in scope more than it denounces Western universalism. 
Pluriversal similarity becomes the product of deconstruction of knowledge forms. This gives an 
open and flexible approach that provides room for alternative viewpoints for the purpose of 
enriching knowledge.  
On the basis of the above critique of Western abstract universalism, it is argued here that Shona 
proverbs do and must have a place in the pluriversal architecture of knowledge. Shona proverbs 
are given authenticity and validation because they spring from the African epistemological 
paradigm which is an alternative to the Eurocentric one. Shona proverbs authenticate and 
validate because they are local, relate to the people and they are understood by the Shona people. 
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The work makes sense of Zimbabwean experience, specifically Shona experience in the area of 
proverbs by deconstructing the myths created by Western scholars and by challenging the 
exclusion, silencing and marginalisation of IKS. African indigenous thought systems are cultural 
products that were created, pursued, accepted, preserved and maintained to the present by 
successive generations (Gyekye, 1997a:221).  While these have been described by Eurocentric 
scholars as precritical, prereflective (Barry, 1996: 23), prelogical and prescientific (Levi-
Bruhl,1967:21)  the central claim of this study is that proverbs can be a source of critical and 
speculative hypotheses. This chapter falls into five sections. The first section clarifies the 
meanings of epistemology and paradigm. The second section is an exposition of the key 
assumptions, claims, arguments and consequences of the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm. 
The third section is a critique of the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm from a number of 
perspectives. The fourth section defends the actuality of the African epistemological paradigm, 
as a framework within which Shona proverbs can be validated. The fifth section deals with the 
justification of proverbs as sources of knowledge in general and philosophical thought in 
particular. 
1.2 Conceptualising epistemology 
 
Code (1995:190) sees problems in the practice of Western epistemology in the sense that the 
epistemological subject has been construed as abstract, ahistorical, disembodied and faceless. In 
stressing this point, Code writes; 
―Since a theory of knowledge, as I conceive of it, should aim to inform and 
explicate practice – to determine how people can know and act within the specific 
symbolic, cultural, and social structures and institutions they inhabit, and to 
incorporate those understandings into its own articulation – then what matters is 
the practical impact of any theoretical project, and its openness to modification, 
when practice reveals its shortcomings.‖ (Code, 1995: 190–1) 
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This emphasis on the practical aspects of a theory of knowledge is accompanied by a critique of 
scientism in epistemology. In the critique, Code (1995:109-1) identifies six problems associated 
with positivistic epistemology. The fist problem involves the use of physics as the model of 
epistemology. This involves excessive reliance on sense perception thereby excluding other 
forms of knowledge. The second problem lies in the opposition between truth and falsity. 
Epistemology, it is argued, takes its examples and paradigmatic statements almost exclusively 
from the natural sciences, especially from physics (Code, 1995: 189); the examples are stated in 
idealized ―simple perceptual propositions‖ or ―elementary propositions‖ (Code, 1995:189). It can 
be argued that reality is irreducible to physics. As a result, the model of physics, though useful in 
the natural sciences, remains inappropriate for philosophical studies. This involves excessive 
reliance on sense perception thereby excluding other forms of knowledge. There is an overly 
simple opposition between true and false statements postulated (Code, 1995: 189). The third 
problem involves presupposition of an abstract and isolated subject of knowledge  (Code, 1995: 
204). This tendency excludes knowledge forms that are generated by communities and this gives 
problems in the communal dimension of knowledge. In its abstract universalism this form of 
epistemology ―fails to be context sensitive‖ (Code, 1995:187–8). The context of knowledge 
production is culture and as a result plurality of knowledge forms should be as multiple as 
cultures themselves. The fourth problem is that positivistic epistemology presupposes, 
imperialistically, a false homogeneity (Code, 1995: 201, 206) with the ―often coercive view that 
we all see everything in the same way‖ (Code, 1995:201). The positivistic lens of looking at 
knowledge is narrow because of its disregard for alternative viewpoints. Fifthly, positivist 
11 
 
epistemology ―constrains the concept of knowledge‖ (Code, 1995:190). If sources of knowledge 
are multiple, the concept of knowledge should be broad and enriched. Lastly, positivistic 
epistemology relies excessively on the principle of excluded middle that posits knowledge as 
either scientific knowledge or not knowledge at all. Code explicitly opposes ―the old positivist 
credo according to which knowledge is either scientific knowledge or it is not knowledge at all‖ 
(Code, 1995:195). Against this, she advocates ―an epistemology of everyday life‖ (Code, 
1995:xi). The epistemology of everyday life is based on cultural experiences and reflections. 
Code (1995:206), denies the possibility of generalization for an epistemology based on scientific 
examples because of there being ‗no reasons to assume and expect homogeneity across the 
physical and social world‘. The model of physics is seen as inappropriate in the study of how 
people and communities obtain knowledge. Even though Code is writing from a feminist 
standpoint, her contribution is important for this research because it exposes the false 
assumptions of positivist epistemology. 
 
While Code challenges the practice of Western epistemology theoretically, an empirical 
approach is taken by Nisbett et al (2001:290) who suggest the possibility that different groups of 
people might have very different epistemic intuitions. While the theoretical assumption may be 
the same as that of Code, Nisbert and his group constructed their epistemology from an 
observation of cognitive processes. Nisbett et al (2001:291) observe systematic differences 
between East Asians and Westerners‘ cognitive processes such as perception, attention and 
memory. These groups also differ in description, prediction and explanation of events.  
Furthermore, they differ in categorization of objects and in revision of beliefs in the light of new 
arguments and evidence. Nisbett et al (2001:292) maintain that these differences ―can be loosely 
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grouped together under the heading of holistic versus analytic thought.‖ Holistic thought, which 
predominates among East Asians, is characterized as ―involving an orientation to the context or 
field as a whole, including attention to relationships between a focal object and the field, and a 
preference for explaining and predicting events on the basis of such relationships‖ (Nisbett et al, 
2001:292). Analytic thought, observed largely among Westerners, is characterized as ―involving 
detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to focus on attributes of the object in order 
to assign it to categories, and a preference for using rules about the categories to explain and 
predict the object‘s behavior‖ (Nisbett et al. 2001: 293). Westerners also have a stronger sense of 
agency and independence, while East Asians have a much stronger commitment to social 
harmony. In East Asian society, the individual feels ―very much a part of a large and complex 
social organism where behavioral prescriptions must be followed and role obligations adhered to 
scrupulously‖ (Nisbett et al. 2001: 292-293). As a result of these differences, Nisbett and his 
colleagues maintain, there is considerable cultural variation in the epistemic practices in these 
two cultural traditions – people in the two cultures form beliefs and categories, construct 
arguments, and draw inferences in significantly different ways. The importance of above 
empirical research is in refuting the Eurocentric assumption that there is one way of knowing 
thereby opening epistemic space for alternative ways of knowing. However, Nisbett and his 
colleagues have not paid attention to the colonial fact in the practice of epistemology and this 
gap shall be filled by border thinking theorists below. 
Border thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority; that is, of the outside created from the 
inside; and as such, it is always a decolonial project (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 2006:206). Border 
thinking (or border epistemology) emerges primarily from the people‘s anti-imperial epistemic 
responses to the colonial difference – the difference that hegemonic discourse endowed to ‗other‘ 
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people, classifying them as inferior and at the same time asserting its geohistorical and body-
social configurations as superior and the models to be followed (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 
2006:208). These people refuse to be geographically caged, subjectively humiliated and 
denigrated and epistemically disregarded. For this reason, the de-colonial epistemic shift 
proposes to change the rule of the game – and not just the content – and the reason why 
knowledge is produced: de-colonization, instead of working toward the accumulation of 
knowledge and imperial management, works toward the empowerment and liberation of different 
layers (racial, sexual, gender, class, linguistic, epistemic and religious) from oppression, and 
toward the undermining of the assumption upon which imperial power is naturalized, enacted 
and corrupted (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 2006:208). 
A more comprehensive approach in the practice of epistemology is given by Maffie (2012: 1-
21). Western epistemological practice is seen as simply one among many alternatives, contingent 
epistemological projects advanced by and available to human beings. In this manner the 
assumptions, methods, problems, and claims of Western epistemology have to be decentered. 
―Ethnoepistemology rejects what it considers to be the double standard embraced 
by most Western epistemology that exempts itself from the same kind of 
anthropological scrutiny that the epistemologies of non-Western cultures receive 
at the hands of Western ethnographers. And it also rejects the double standard that 
characterizes the epistemological activities of non-Western thinkers as mere 
ethnoepistemologies while characterizing the epistemological activities of 
Western thinkers as epistemology proper‖ (Maffie, 2012:1) 
 
 Ethnoepistemologists contend that there is a dualism that is commonly expressed by the 
assertion that thinkers in other cultures practice mere ―ethnoepistemology‖ or ―ethnophilosophy‖ 
(Maffie, 2012:1). The epistemic practices of other cultures, are dismissed as mere 
anthropological curiosity, and those practicing it are seen as unqualified to take part in the 
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West‘s ―genuinely‖ epistemological undertaking. Ethnoepistemologists argue that there is a 
dualism that is commonly expressed by the assertion that thinkers in other cultures practice mere 
‗ethnoepistemology‘ or ‗ethnophilosophy‘ (Maffie, 2012:1).  If knowledge production is based 
on culture, it is difficult to understand why Western culture assumes a transcultural standpoint.  
―The [customary] use of the term[s] ["ethnophilosophy" and ]"ethnoepistemology" by Western 
philosophers is objectionable to ethnoepistemologists because it assumes that Western 
philosophy is the benchmark by which all other cultures' philosophies and reflective activities are 
to be understood and measured‖ (Maffie, 2012:2). The assumption of Western philosophy as a 
standard of measurement is problematic since it is based on falsity. A pluriversal understanding 
of knowledge places all cultures on an equal platform for the purpose of learning from each of 
them. According to Maffie (2012:1), ―all epistemological activities are instances of 
ethnoepistemology in this broad sense; and all ethnoepistemologies are instances of 
epistemology.‖ 
The use of the term ethnoepistemology has an advantage for this study because the practice of 
epistemology is left open and this accommodates alternative epistemologies. In addition, 
ethnoepistemology has the capacity to recognize a variety of answers to the questions of 
epistemology. Still, ethnoepistemology respects differences among world epistemologies and in 
that way, it becomes less ethnocentric by virtue of accepting alternative views. In the context of 
this study, the above traits open epistemic space for the study of Shona proverbs.  
1.3 Understanding a paradigm 
 
According to Gokturk (2012:2), an etymological analysis shows that the word ‗paradigm‘ comes 
from the Latin word ‗paradigma‘, and it also comes from the Greek word ‗paradeigma‘. The 
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English borrowing of the Latin derivative, paradigma is example. In Greek, paradeigma is a 
compound of two words; the prefix ‗para-‘ meaning ‗alongside‘, and ‗deiknunai‘ meaning ‗to 
show,‘ so the two words together sound as ‗alongside shown‘ or ‗what shows itself beside.‘ 
Historically the word paradigm has been understood as an example or a model.  
 
 Kuhn uses the word paradigm to relate to the exemplary notion of the word as found in the Latin 
etymology. Kuhn makes use of the word ‗paradigm‘ in the context of natural science, where it 
means the category for describing or constructing standpoints in the practice of science.   For 
Kuhn paradigms are interchangeable with what they exemplify. Further Kuhn (1970:23) 
emphasizes the meaning of paradigm thus:  
 
―A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It 
serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what 
rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the 
broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one 
scientific community (or sub-community) from another. It subsumes, defines and 
interrelates the exemplars, theories, and methods and tools that exist within it. A 
paradigm is the specific collection of questions, viewpoints and models that 
define how the authors, publishers, and theorists, who subscribe to that paradigm, 
view and approach the science.‖ 
 
Four points significant for this study may be drawn from Kuhn‘s definition. Firstly, a paradigm 
is a self image that is given by a community of practitioners. Although Kuhn‘s discussion is 
within the field of natural science, this self image can also apply to philosophy and this shall be 
shown in detail in the next section. Secondly, a paradigm plays the role of differentiating one 
view of looking at science or philosophy from other perspectives. This differentiation yields 
serious implications especially in philosophy where racism comes in.  Thirdly, a paradigm is 
responsible for the conceptual definition of terms and the formulations of theories.  Fourthly, a 
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paradigm unites the assumptions, problems, methods and solutions to given philosophical or 
scientific issues. These views may be condensed in Gokturk (2012:2) who technically defines a 
paradigm as; ―a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitute a way of 
viewing reality for the community that shares them, especially in an intellectual discipline.‖ 
Gokturk‘s technical definition is important because it is not necessarily defined within a given 
discipline as in Kuhn but it stands outside specific disciplines and is applicable to both science 
and philosophy. 
1.4 The Eurocentric Epistemological Paradigm and its Consequences 
 
Serequeberhan (2003:64), views Eurocentrism as the ―pervasive bias located in modernity‘s self-
consciousness of itself.‖ Within this bias, there is a model that connects the assumptions, 
perspectives and theories related to knowledge perspectives that can be identified as the 
Eurocentric epistemological paradigm. The Eurocentric epistemological paradigm can also be 
construed as the view expressed by Descartes (1998 [1637]:103-105), Locke (1995 [1689]:26), 
Hume (1975 [1739]:63), Kant(1978 [1878]:23) and Hegel (1998 [1807]:201) that Western 
philosophy, Western European values and culture are the standard through which humanity is 
measured. The assumption is that Western European values, culture and philosophy are 
qualitatively superior to all non-Western philosophical values and culture. The position also 
entails that Western men (in the gendered sense) provide the norm of what humanity is. 
According to Outlaw (1991: 216), ―the western epistemological paradigm is a complex, 
multifaceted, projected (self-) image of the Graeco-Roman or European rational man.‖ The ideas 
are raised to the level of paradigm through the efforts of dominant figures of Western philosophy 
which tries to identify itself with the human essence. Rationality was linked to Enlightenment 
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modernism
2
 which created a self understanding of reason and progress. The construction of the 
self image has sources in the works of Plato and Aristotle and it is revised and continued by 
Descartes (1998 [1637]:95), Kant (1978 [1878]:23) and Hegel (1998 [1807]:201). Philosophy 
gives itself the right, responsibility and capability to see the fundamental realities in terms of 
which this self image was to be articulated (Outlaw, 1991:218). The fulcrum of this multifaceted 
self image is formed around the notion of rationality. Through this concept and with the help of 
other concepts such as truth, goodness and virtue, a fundamental linkage was made between 
human existence and the cosmos. 
―The structure of the cosmos is rational; humans reason, through nous or mind 
and thus set into operation of a dynamic structure whose principles of operation 
are the same as those structuring the universe; hence, the highest and most 
appropriate exercise of human reason or logos is to see and grasp those most 
fundamental structures of principles and to bring human existence into accord 
with them‖ (Outlaw, 1991:218). 
 
The point being made by Outlaw is that since logos is thought to be the code of being, the task of 
philosophy is to elucidate this code. As a result of the above linkage, philosophy becomes 
identified with epistemology. This identification of philosophy with epistemology is clear in 
Descartes (1998 [1637]:103-105), who narrows the self image of humanity into logos or reason. 
According to Grosfoguel (2011: 5), Descartes replaces God as the foundation of knowledge in 
the theo-politics of knowledge of the European Middle Ages with the Western man as the 
                                                          
2
 Modernism can be understood as a Western self-image, a self-understanding coalesced around 
Enlightenment notions of reason and progress. This interpretation of modernity held that there is 
a close link between a scientific culture, a rational legal order, and individual freedom, and its 
goal was to establish a fully rational society. Critics of modernity have pointed out that this self-
conception of modernity was a selective, one-sided, reactivation of Western past ideas. As such 
the modernist idea is internally inconsistent because modernity failed to completely break with 
the past. Enlightenment naturalism and materialism served to unite ‗man‘ and world, and the 
naturalist image of humankind was under the service of reason.  
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foundation of knowledge in Western European modern times. The result is that all the attributes 
of God are transferred to the Western man. The universal truth beyond space and time privileges 
access to the laws of the ―universe‖ and the capacity to produce specific knowledge and theory is 
now placed in the mind of the Western man. The Cartesian ―Cogito ergo sum‖ is taken as the 
foundation of modern Western science.  By producing a dualism between mind and body, 
between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim a non-situated, ―universal‖, God-eyed 
view of knowledge (Grosfoguel 2011:5). This view of knowledge is described by Gomez 
(2003:4) as the point zero perspective of Eurocentric philosophies. For Gomez, point zero is the 
point which hides and conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of view. It is the god-eye 
view that always hides its local and particular perspective under abstract ―universalism.‖     
The first consequence of the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm is epistemological racism. 
Epistemic racism is the view that the ―West‖ is the only legitimate perspective of thought able to 
produce knowledge and the only one with access to ―universality,‖ ―rationality‖ and ―truth‖ 
(Grosfoguel, 2010:29). Epistemic racism considers non-Western knowledge to be inferior to 
Western knowledge. Historically, Eurocentric perspectives have denied any philosophical 
thinking among the Bantu speakers in general and Shona speakers are no exception. Eurocentric 
thinking systematically displaced African
3
 knowledge systems by negating the applicability of 
the concept of rationality to Africans. Locke (1946 [1690]:33) argued that skin colour is an 
essential property in defining humanity. Locke‘s thinking amounts to the view that white skin is 
equivalent to the essential skin, while the black skin is considered to be less important in 
defining humanity.  In addition, Hume (1987:[1753]: 125), maintains: 
                                                          
3
 For Ramose (2010:1) the meaning of the term Africa is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the 
name Africa is not given by the indigenous peoples to describe themselves. Secondly, the 
definition given by the outsider does not refer to African history as related by indigenous people. 
Ramose uses it under protest and in this study, the term Africa is used under the same protest. 
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―I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for 
there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There 
never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any 
individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures 
amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and 
barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, 
have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or 
some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, 
in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction 
betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE 
slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered any symptom 
of ingenuity; tho‘ low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and 
distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA, indeed, they talk of one 
negroe as a man of parts and learning; but ‘tis likely he is admired for very 
slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.‖  
Hume‘s racism has intellectual consequences since colonizers thought that they were rationally 
superior to blacks. This perception serves as the basis of epistemic racism. Kant‘s racism was 
more emphatic, ―humanity exists in its greatest perfection in the white race. The yellow Indians 
have a smaller amount of talent. The Negroes are lower, and the lowest are a part of the 
American peoples‖ (Kant, (1978 [1798]:9). Kant also argues that the order in skin color 
corresponds to mental and general ability. The implication of Kant‘s racism is clear, the black 
person is seen as mentally inferior and could be educated only as servants. Kant (1960 
[1764]:10-11) maintains; 
―The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr 
Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown 
talents and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are 
transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have been set 
free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or 
science or in any other praise-worthy quality, even though among the whites some 
continually arise from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in 
the world. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and 
it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacity as in colour.‖  
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Kant correlates mental capacity and colour between the two races and he goes further to infer 
that reason and rationality are not indigenous to Negroes. Still, Hegel (1975 [1739]:28) further 
complicates racism by totally excluding sub-Saharan Africa
4
 from world history. Hegel denies 
reason, morality and religion to Sub-Saharan Africa. Hegel (1931[1807]:14), argues that 
Africans are incapable of doing Philosophy given the low caliber of their intellect.  
 
The second far-reaching effect of Eurocentric thinking is epistemological hegemony. Western 
epistemology, basing on its racist assumptions, tends to dominate other forms of knowledge and 
this scenario can be described as epistemological hegemony. Grosfoguel (2011:6) argues that, 
―historically, such thinking has the consequence of allowing the Western man (the gendered term 
is actually used here) to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving universal 
knowledge and thus dismiss non-western knowledge as particularistic and thus unable to achieve 
universality.‖ The point being made by Grosfoguel is that the self image of ―universal‖ 
knowledge created by Western epistemology resulted in the dismissal of other forms of 
knowledge as particularistic. Further, European colonial expansion was able to construct a 
hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and thus of superior and inferior people around the 
world. 
                                                          
4
 Davidson (1991:5) maintains ―for while it is true that Sahara has long been placed as a barrier 
between northern Africa and the rest of the continent, and that the great rain forests, further 
south, have sometimes proved to be still a greater barrier in relation to central-southern Africa, it 
is also true that all these regions really belong together, and what is particular to each of them is 
general to them all in their foundation and emergence.‖ There is little sense in studying Africa in 
isolation since there is no cultural separation and difference. While the Sahara desert is seen as a 
geographic line of division to some extent, it was never a complete barrier in historical times but 
a zone for intercommunication and trade. The Sahara desert did not always exist in Africa as 
shown by Zeleza (2006:15) who argues that the conflation of Africa with ―sub-Saharan Africa,‖ 
―Africa South of the Sahara‖ or ―Black Africa‖ offers a racialized view of Africa, Africa as 
biology, as the ―black‖ continent. This view rests on the metaphysics of difference, a quest for 
the civilizational and cultural ontology of blackness (Zeleza, 2006:15). 
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Two significant points can be drawn from Grosfoguel‘s historical analysis. First, the West sees 
itself as the standard not only of knowledge in the epistemic sense but of knowledge related to 
writing, history, development, democracy and human rights. As a result of such a self image, all 
other forms of knowledge and conceptions of writing, history, development, democracy and 
human rights are conceived in negative terms in the sense of being absent and this is a 
consequence of the created epistemological domination. Related to the above, the second point is 
that, Western philosophy in general and Western epistemology in particular gave itself a self-
appointed role of being the guardian of world history and culture. 
 
The third consequence of the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm is epistemological dualism. 
In the broad sense, dualism can be defined as ―the philosophical concept which defines human 
nature by two opposing sets of qualities – good versus evil, egoism versus altruism, vice versus 
virtue‖( Babu 1981: 56). In the epistemic sense, dualism entails division along knowledge related 
concepts such as subject versus object; truth versus falsity; fact versus opinion. Such dualism has 
created an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western 
knowledge and cosmology. The ascribed superiority of European knowledge in many areas of life 
has an important aspect in the coloniality of power5. As a result subaltern knowledges were  
                                                          
5 Quijano (2000:533-40) points out three distinct but related consequences of coloniality. The 
first is racial thinking which creates a false image of epistemic power. This image has to be 
challenged from both a logical and an epistemic perspective.  The idea of race is defined as ―a 
mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the 
more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism‖ 
(Quijano 2000:533).  Racism has caused a related problem which is the hegemonic tendency of 
the West where, ―the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element 
of coloniality‖ (Quijano 2000:533).  This entails that former colonisers tend to dominate their 
former colonies even in the sphere of knowledge production. The third problem is seen in 
22 
 
excluded, omitted, silenced and ignored (Grosfoguel, 2011:23). The dualistic tendency of Western 
epistemology has resulted in the domination, repression and subversion of other systems of 
knowledge and other ways of knowing that are non-dualistic.  
 
1.5 Criticism of the Eurocentric Epistemological Paradigm 
An examination of the weaknesses of the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm shall be made 
using the following theories; deconstruction, reconstruction, decolonisation, Afrocentricity, 
Africanisation and the IKS based approach. The choice of these theories is mainly on the basis of 
their points of convergence. Firstly the theories are all critical of the Western epistemological 
paradigm even if the lines of criticism vary. Secondly the theories see the African 
epistemological paradigm as valuable in challenging Western epistemology as well as in 
broadening the scope of epistemology in a democratic way. However, they differ in what exactly 
should be provided by the African alternative paradigm. Thirdly, the theories take cognisance of 
the African historical, social and cultural circumstances in the production of knowledge. The 
point of divergence lies in the manner of emphasis and the degree to which certain issues are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
―Coloniality of power  based on a Eurocentric system of knowledge where production of 
knowledge is assigned to Europeans‖ (Quijano 2000:540). Any form of knowledge that lies 
outside Europe is dismissed as myth. This creates a margilasation of knowledge systems 
including the African knowledge system in general and the Shona knowledge system in 
particular. The use of Western European ways of knowledge production is prioritized. This 
resulted in a simultaneous denial of knowledge production to the conquered peoples and 
repression of indigenous modes of knowledge production. The last problem involves ―an element 
of coloniality of power is the creation of cultural systems that revolve around a Eurocentric 
hierarchy‖ (Quijano 2000:540).  These cultural systems tend to universalise knowledge from one 
culture instead of seeing knowledge production as plural.  
 
 
23 
 
stressed. A detailed examination of the Eurocentric paradigm shall be made using each of these 
theories in the sections that follow. 
 
1.5.1 Deconstruction Critique 
Derrida (1981: 6), defines deconstruction thus: 
―To ‗deconstruct‘ philosophy, thus, would be to think—in the most faithful, 
interior way—the structured genealogy of philosophy‘s concepts, but at the same 
time to determine—from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable or unnameable by 
philosophy—what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making 
itself into a history by means of this motivated repression.‖ 
From Derrida‘s definition, it can be inferred that deconstruction is a series of moves, which 
include the dismantling of conceptual oppositions and hierarchical systems of thought and an 
unmasking of self-contradiction in philosophy.  Deconstruction may be seen as a way of reading 
philosophical texts with the objective of making these texts question themselves, making them 
take account of their own contradictions, and exposing the oppositions they have ignored or 
repressed. Derrida does not question one kind of philosophy from the standpoint of another, 
more complete, less contradictory system. He does not come from a point of departure outside 
philosophy. Rather Derrida works within the discourse of Western philosophy itself, looking for 
hidden oppositions that jeopardize it. Derrida‘s critique of philosophy is itself basically 
philosophical. By opening philosophy to this questioning, Derrida is being faithful to the spirit of 
philosophy: unquestioning and slavish adulation ultimately makes a mockery of philosophy 
(Newman 2001:2). Deconstruction is, therefore, a strategy of questioning philosophy‘s claims to 
reflexive self-identity. Deconstruction may be seen as a critique of the authoritarian structures in 
philosophy, in particular ‗logocentrism‘ – that is, philosophy‘s subordination, throughout its 
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history, of writing to speech (Newman 2001:2). The privileging of speech over writing in 
philosophical texts is an example of what Derrida calls the ‗metaphysics of presence‘ in Western 
philosophy. It is an indication of how far philosophy is still grounded in the metaphysical 
concepts it claims to have transcended. Derrida points to Plato‘s Phaedrus in which writing is 
rejected as a medium for conveying and recording truth: it is seen as an artifice, an invention 
which cannot be a substitute for the authenticity and immediate presence of meaning associated 
with speech. Where speech is seen as a means of approaching the truth because of its immediacy, 
writing is seen as a dangerous corruption of speech – a lesser form of speech, which is 
destructive of memory and susceptible to deceit. Moreover, speech is associated with the 
authority of the teacher, while writing is seen by Plato as a threat to this authority because it 
allows the pupil to learn without the teacher‘s guidance (Norris, 1987:31). Derrida attacks this 
logocentric thinking by pointing out certain contradictions within it. He shows that Plato cannot 
represent speech except through the metaphor of writing, while at the same time denying that 
writing has any real efficacy as a medium at all. As Derrida (1981:148) mantains: ‗it is not any 
less remarkable here that the so-called living discourse should suddenly be described by a 
metaphor borrowed from the order of the very thing one is trying to exclude from it.‖ Speech is, 
therefore, dependent on the writing that it excludes. Writing is an example of the ‗logic of 
supplementarity‘: a supplement is excluded by presence, but is, at the same time, necessary for 
the formation of its identity. Writing is thus a supplement to speech: it is excluded by speech, but 
is nevertheless necessary for the presence of speech. The unmasking of this logic of 
supplementarity is one of the deconstructive moves employed by Derrida (1981:149) to resist the 
logocentrism in philosophy. Speech claims to be a self-presence that is immediate and authentic 
to itself, whereas writing is seen as diminishing this presence. However, Derrida shows that this 
25 
 
authenticity, this purity of self-identity is always questionable: it is always contaminated by what 
it tries to exclude. According to this logic no identity is ever complete or pure: it is constituted by 
that which threatens it. Derrida does not want to deny self-identity or presence: he merely wants 
to show that this presence is never as pure as it claims to be. It is always open to the other, and 
contaminated by it.  
Derrida provides us with a way of thinking, accounting for and disrupting metaphysical 
foundations, without putting other foundations in their place. Decontruction provides a way of 
undermining truth claims without having to argue from some fixed position (Hepburn, 
1999:649). Derrida wants to avoid centered modes of thinking such as phonocentrism
6
 and 
logocentrism
7
 which arise out of operating with metaphysical certainties. Deconstruction of 
phonocentrism provides a critique of truth as centered within autonomous individuals as seen in 
speech/ writing. Deconstruction of logocentrism provides a critique of Enlightenment rationality 
and principles that arise from it (Hepburn, 1999:649-650). Treating deconstruction as a relativist  
position will not account for deconstruction as a response to endless positing of foundations. One 
is unable to escape or stand outside logocentric thought from some privileged position. 
Deconstruction urges the development of greater sensitivity to the ways that reality and truth are 
constructed. To deconstruct is not merely to highlight one marginalized half of a binary, instead, 
it should not leave a clear line between one side and another. It becomes undecidable which 
‗side‘ is which. The entire principle of the organization of texts through hierarchical oppositions 
                                                          
6
 The belief that sounds and speech are inherently superior to, or more primary than, written 
language. Proponents of this view argue that writing is a derived method of capturing speech. 
7
 The attitude that ‗logos‘, the Greek term for speech, thought, law or reason, is the central 
principle in philosophy and language. It is the assumption that there is a realm of truth that exits 
prior to and independently of its representations by linguistic signs. 
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is subverted (Hepburn, 1999:653). Deconstruction problematises those areas where metaphysical 
assumptions carry their greatest power (Hepburn, 1999:654) 
 
Derrida emphasizes that any text or event has many potential meanings, many possible truths and 
no single meaning remains fixed or stable for all contexts. Every textual interpretation denies or 
suppresses some alternative meaning, some alternative interpretations of the text (Feldman, 
2000: 58). Derrida seeks to highlight the other that hides in the margins of one‘s understanding. 
For Derrida, violence is seen in denial, oppression and exclusion of the other. This violence sets 
a limit to human understanding. In Western discourse the marginalized systems of knowledge are 
seen as opposed to Western epistemology. It might be argued, then, that these epistemological 
paradigms are actually a supplement to pruliversal epistemology, in the same way that writing is 
the supplement to speech. In addition, even though Derrida provides self questioning to Western 
philosophy, the questioning does not, in general, address the colonial factor that shall be included 
in the next section. Derrida‘s thinking can be exploited to develop critical and discursive work as 
shown by Outlaw in the next section. 
According to Outlaw (1991:216), African philosophy should challenge the enterprise of 
philosophy in general to rethink and redefine itself so that African philosophy can be recognised 
as modality and tradition that belongs to a non-European culture. Such efforts of self-critical 
reflection are deconstructive. For Outlaw (1991:216) 
One of the objectives of deconstruction is to critique and displace the absolutist 
metaphysics and epistemology which are thought to identify and provide 
knowledge of a rational order of axioms, first principles and postulates that are the 
foundation of all that is, and of knowing what is. The point of deconstruction is to 
show that all philosophical systematizing is a matter of strategy which pretends to 
be based on a complete system of self-evident or transcendental axioms. Having 
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their bases in philosophical strategies, such concepts are thus constructions, a 
product of numerous histories, institutions and processes of inscription, which 
cannot be transcended by being conceived as absolute, self-evident and axiomatic. 
Outlaw‘s deconstructive strategy is significant in the study of Shona proverbs because the 
assumed ―universality‖ and axiomatic ground of Western philosophy is to be displaced in the 
context of pluriversality. This displacement potentially paves room for the recognition of a non-
European culture such as the Shona culture as capable of providing a valid foundation of 
knowledge through proverbs.  
 
 
1.5.2 Reconstruction 
 
The reconstructive aspects of this challenge are to be found in the self-definition, the 
specification and reappropriation of an African authenticity and legitimacy in disproving and 
displacing of the inventive discourse and most importantly in the efforts to reclaim control over 
African historicity and the interpretation of African history in general and African philosophical 
history in particular. According to Olela (1984:77) African philosophical history influenced 
Greek philosophy as shown by the table below: 
Fig 1: African foundations of Greek Philosophy: 
Philosopher Philosophical Teaching Influence from Egypt 
1. Thales Water is the fundamental stuff 
of the universe 
Egyptians taught that water 
(nun) 
is the origin of all things 
2. Anaximender The basic element is the 
boundless 
Adopted the Egyptian 
boundless (Huk)  
3. Anaximenes Air is the basic stuff Egyptians taught that air (Shu) 
is the life giving spirit 
4. Heraclitus Fire is the basic element Egyptian notion of fire (Atum) 
5. Pythagoras The universe is basically Taught mathematics by 
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mathematical Egyptians 
Theory of transmigration of 
the soul 
Orphic doctrine borrowed 
from Egypt 
6. Xenophanes Doctrine of One God Egyptian idea of monism 
7. Parmenides Being is one Egyptian belief in the 
spherical earth 
8. Anaxagoras The mind (Nous) is the 
initiator of motion in the 
universe 
Egyptians identified Khu with 
the mind 
9. Democritus Atoms as the ultimate 
elements of the universe 
Egypt‘s mystery system about 
atoms and opposites 
10. Plato Tripartite division of society 
into philosophers, soldiers and 
artisans 
Egypt had spectators, athletes 
and peddlers 
11. Aristotle 
 
Doctrine of the Unmoved 
Mover 
Egypt‘s notion of the 
Unmoved Mover 
Doctrine of the soul Egypt‘s idea of the soul 
  
The table, constructed from the views of Olela (1984:77), shows that there is evidence of 
Egyptian influence in ancient Greek philosophy and this evidence must be used in the 
reconstruction of African philosophy. 
 
 According to Obenga (2004:31)  
 
―African philosophy as a historical fact must be understood within a historical 
frame. The origin, evolution, and development of African philosophy follow the 
streams and currents of African history. The long history of African philosophy 
has shown connections with other continents, chiefly with Europe, since the 
Graeco-Roman world. In remote times African philosophy was mainly located in 
the Nile Valley, that is, in Kemet or ancient Egypt, and in Kush (Napata- Meroe). 
Philosophy flourished in Egypt from about 3400 bc to 343 bc and in Kush (also 
known as Nubia or Ethiopia by the Greeks) from about 1000 bc to 625 bc.‖ 
 
The above analysis shows that the serious study of African philosophy from antiquity through 
the present era will reveal that African philosophy has a very wide scope. All the key issues that 
have attracted the attention of philosophers in Asia, Europe and America can be found in African 
philosophy (Obenga, 2004:31). They were explored through many centuries in ancient Egypt, 
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during the great kingdoms of West, Central, and Southern Africa, in modern times and in 
contemporary times. Obenga (2004:31) argues that ―any doubt about reason and rationality in 
Africa was chiefly due to anthropological innuendoes.‖ Philosophy has always been part and 
parcel of the African mind. The fact is that in human history philosophy has been everywhere a 
mark of the triumph of the human mind (Obenga, 2004:31).  
 
Reconstruction addresses the question of meaning of Africans through rehabilitating the African 
mindset while constructing an identity and authenticity thought to be appropriate. While the 
mainstream characterization of philosophy may be in Western Europe, rationality is not the 
birthright of Western Europe, nor of Greece but it is a capacity shown by all humans, their race 
or ethnicity notwithstanding. If rationality is the capacity of all humans, then there is a legitimate 
ground for the African epistemological paradigm in general and the Shona epistemological 
paradigm in particular. There is no Platonic abstract essence in philosophy and there is no single 
style of philosophizing. Any research in African philosophy, as in Shona proverbs, in the current 
study, involves confronting the privileged self-image of the Western model of philosophy. It is 
this confrontation that problematises and forces its deconstruction in its relation of difference 
with the European. Outlaw (1991:232) questions Eurocentric thinking in the following manner: 
 
―Does it mean that philosophy is left without universality and unity? Yes. Does it 
mean that philosophy is without universality and unity? Yes, again, but it never 
had these characteristics in the sense proclaimed by philosophy.‖ 
 
Two points can be drawn from the above examination by Outlaw. First, Western philosophy has 
given itself ―universality‖ and unity within a particular culture. This culture proceeds to draw 
these characteristics and pretends that they are absolute thereby assuming what has to be proved. 
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In other words, it does not necessarily follow that the given cultural portrait is tenable. Secondly 
Outlaw shows that the said characteristics are simply a creation within a historical period and as 
such they are particular and tentative. They are particular since they arise within a given 
historical and cultural setting, contingent because they depend on a possibility and not a 
necessity and tentative because the said characteristics are debatable even within Western 
philosophy itself. 
 
 
1.5.3 Decolonization Critique 
 
By decolonization, I mean divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences 
emanating from our colonial past (Wiredu, 1998:17). For Wiredu, the key word is ―undue‖ since 
it may not be rational to reject everything of colonial past. Colonialism is not only a political 
imposition, but a cultural one as well. Philosophical decolonization is necessarily a conceptual 
enterprise, it is not a critique of doctrine but of fundamental conceptualisation. Philosophy 
becomes a critical examination of the conceptual framework upon which the thought of a culture 
is erected. From the perspective of decolonization, Eurocentric epistemology should be critically 
examined in the context of colonization because the epistemic images given to Africa by the 
West were meant to facilitate colonization not only of the African continent in the sense of 
physical space but of the African mind as well. Grosfoguel (2011:13) argues that, ―one of the 
most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion  that the elimination of colonial 
administrators amounted to the decolonization of the world resulting in the myth of the 
postcolonial world.‖ The fact of the matter is that the formerly colonized are living under 
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Western European exploitation and domination including epistemological domination. The 
domination which occupies intellectual space and mindsets is more dangerous compared to 
economic or political domination. The decolonization critique is significant for this study 
because it challenges colonial assumptions that have been used to sideline African knowledge 
systems such as Shona proverbs.  
Grosfoguel (2011:13) makes an important distinction between colonization and coloniality.  For 
Grosfoguel, colonization allows us to think of the continuity of other forms of domination after 
colonial administration. Coloniality addresses present forms of situations in racist culture and the 
ideological strategies used by Western Europe. It involves rethinking the modern colonial world 
from the colonial difference point of view. Thinking from a colonial difference point of view 
allows us to modify important assumptions of our paradigms. Grosfoguel‘s line of thought gives 
room to rebut the false assumptions of Eurocentric thinking and validate and legitimize Shona 
proverbs as indigenous knowledge systems. The particularist approach is important for this study 
because it accommodates Shona proverbs that constitute the source of philosophy.  
 
Alcoff (2007:80) notes that, ―the epistemic effects of colonization are the most damaging, far-
reaching and least understood.‖ The damaging effect is seen in the destruction of mindsets, 
denial of one‘s own culture, uncertainties and contradictions that characterize colonized minds. 
The epistemic effects of colonialism are said to be far-reaching because they displace one‘s 
epistemological paradigm to the extent of disregarding one‘s indigenous forms of knowledge and 
think like the Eurocentric philosophers. The epistemic effects of colonialism are least understood 
because of the brain washing victimization created by Eurocentric epistemology among Africans. 
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As a result, individuals may fail to think outside the epistemological images  created by 
colonizers. The task of decolonization is to come up with an anti colonial epistemic resistance 
(Alcoff, 2007:80). One way of epistemic resistance is the construction of forms of knowledge 
based on an African epistemological paradigm in general and the Shona epistemological 
paradigm in particular.  
 
Zea (1988:36) acknowledges that, the rationality and the very humanity of the people of the 
conquered world were put on trial and judged by the jury of its conquerors.  The judgement was 
made, not on the basis of reasoned research and evidence, but merely on prejudice. Logically this 
is a fallacious procedure whose conclusions are both hasty and baseless. Paradoxically, Africans 
were not considered to be in a position to present their own epistemic credentials, much less to 
judge the Western European ones. As a result, there was no uniform epistemological platform 
but a one sided analysis of the conquered by the conqueror and this   indicates epistemic 
injustice. Although claims to objectivity were made by the Eurocentric thinkers, they used ethnic 
and racialised identity to judge the epistemic status of the indigenous people of Africa. This 
shows inconsistency in the claims of Eurocentric thinkers.  
 
Colonialism created and developed a hierarchy of knowledge and knowers for the purpose of 
colonizing administratively and even epistemically. An alternative to the above imperial 
epistemology, such as African epistemology, requires the toppling of the cultural hierarchy that 
colonialism enforced. Mignolo (2008:98) maintains: 
33 
 
―Subaltern reason must aim to rethink and reconceptualize the stories that have 
been told and the conceptualization that has been in place to divide the world 
between Christians and pagans, civilized and barbarians, modern and premodern 
and developed and undeveloped regions and people.‖ 
Mignolo‘s thinking shows that the conclusions arrived at by colonizers were based on prejudice. 
By implication, Shona proverbs that have been historically and epistemically trivialised are 
victims of prejudice. As such, the task of subaltern reason is to deconstruct and reconstruct the 
proper image of the conquered people and regions. It is interesting to note that generalizations 
were drawn from mere geographic regions to serious epistemological consequences of the people 
of the concerned regions.  
 
Since Western epistemology is questionable, can Western hermeneutics be trusted? While the 
focus of epistemology is knowledge, hermeneutics studies meaning and understanding. 
According to Mignolo (2000: 90) the weakness of both domains is that they neglect the fact of 
colonial difference. The question of what is meaningful or intelligible is equally subject to 
colonial representation. For Alcoff (2007:89), both epistemology and hermeneutics are judged 
with a European frame of reference. If both have a European frame of reference, it means both of 
them rely on questionable assumptions. The point is that multiplicity must be revealed and 
tension and contradictions must be shown between colonizing and colonized spaces. Panikkar 
(1979:9), suggests the use of pluritopic hermeneutics to signify the way in which hermeneutics 
may be cured of Eurocentricism and provide a real alternative to monological, imperial and 
unified standards of reference. Pluritopic hermeneutics does not assume one unified historical 
culture with which new meaning must be fused. Rather pluritopic hermeneutics assumes no 
central frame or unified tradition and thus opens up the determination of meaning to multiple 
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possibilities even within the same historical horizon. Pannikar (1979:9) warns against 
Eurocentric mistakes as follows: 
 
―To cross the boundaries of one‘s culture without realizing that the other person 
may have a radically different approach to reality today is no longer admissible. If 
still consciously done, it would be philosophically naïve, politically outrageous 
and religiously sinful.‖ 
 
The philosophical naivety observed by Panikkar is a result of lack of facts while there is rushness 
predicated on prejudice. Given the context of colonialism, meaning has to undergo contestation 
and negotiation. Alcoff (2007:90) argues that,  both epistemology and hermeneutics, whether 
monotopic or pluritopic,  have to be transcended since they both presuppose a subject-object 
distinction with epistemology focusing on a de-subjectified object and hermeneutics on a non-
objective subject. This means that while epistemology conceals the subject, hermeneutics 
conceals the object. Mignolo (2000:93), tries to overcome the limitations of epistemology and 
hermeneutics by introducing the concept of border thinking; 
 
―Border thinking is the notion I am introducing now with the intention of 
transcending hermeneutics and epistemology and the corresponding distinction 
between the knower and the known. To describe in reality both sides of the border 
is not the problem. The problem is to do it from its exteriority. The goal is to erase 
the distinction between the knower and the known, between hybrid object and a 
pure disciplinary or interdisciplinary subject uncontaminated by the border 
matters he or she describes. To change the terms of conversation, it is necessary to 
overcome the distinction between subject and object on the one hand and between 
epistemology and hermeneutics on the other.‖ 
 
The above analysis entails the use of non-dualistic thinking because dualistic thinking contains 
the assumptions of epistemological imperialism. Epistemology must be decolonized of these 
assumptions. Knowledge must be disentangled from the snares of colonizing assumptions to 
35 
 
pave way for indigenous knowledge systems. According to Mignolo (2000:93), border thinking 
is not aimed at normative epistemic concerns about justification and belief formulation, but it is 
focused on the way knowledge is normatively defined with reference to others. It specifies the 
location of subaltern knowledge as a border location rather than simply beyond Western 
knowledge. Situating knowers in a context is revolutionary in itself, going against the normal 
procedure of Western epistemology. Border thinking is seen as a double critique with a capacity 
to examine the thinking of both the colonizer and the colonized. Border thinking implies the 
ability to think from both sides. It is dissolution of borders as opposed to border control. The task 
of border thinking is to unmask preconceptions about divisions.  
 
1.5.4 Afrocentric Critique 
 
The Afrocentric perspective (Asante, 1998:1) can be defined as a philosophical paradigm which 
deals with the question of African identity from the perspective of Africans as centered, located, 
oriented and grounded. Afrocentricity gives centrality to African agency, thus creating an 
acceptance of African values and ideals as expressed in the highest forms of culture while 
terminating always in the creative function towards mental liberation (Asante, 2007:15). As 
such, Afrocentricity activates our consciousness as a functional aspect of any revolutionary 
approach to phenomena. The cognitive and structural aspects of a paradigm
8
 are incomplete 
without the functional aspect. There is something more than knowing for the African 
perspective, there is also doing. The functional aspect allows for a revolutionary context to 
                                                          
8  However, although Kuhn‘s (1962) treatment of a paradigm may appear rather comprehensive from a 
Eurocentric standpoint, it is lacking an important dimension as far as Afrocentricity is concerned. 
 A third and critical aspect to the cognitive and structural aspects must be added, namely, a functional 
aspect. 
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change the lives of the oppressed. Asante claims that one must not assume that Afrocentricity is 
the opposite of Eurocentricity because Afrocentricity does not degrade other perspectives but it 
accommodates pluriversality.  
Asante (2007:14) acknowledges two scientific advances made to the Afrocentric theory by Ama 
Mazama. Firstly, she launches the paradigmatic shift in the discourse on Afrocentricity and 
shows how it is a revolutionary concept for the African world. Afrocentricity is revolutionary 
because it casts ideas, concepts, events, personalities, political and economic processes in the 
context of black people as subjects and not as objects basing all knowledge on authentic 
interrogation of location (Asante, 2007:15). Afrocentricity elevates the cultural and historical 
location of the African and uses that as a source of surveying knowledge (Asante, 2007:15). 
Secondly, she infuses the older ideas of Afrocentricity with a functional, actionable, practical 
component that energizes the concept (Mazama, 2007:14).  
The idea of conscientisation is central to Afrocentricity. It is possible for one to practise African 
customs and mores without being Afrocentric. This means that one can lack the conscientization 
related to agency of African people. Being Afrocentric entails being a conscious human being.  
―By way of distinction, Afrocentricity should not be confused with its variant 
Afrocentrism. The term Afrocentrism was first used by opponents of 
Afrocentricity who in their zeal saw it as an obverse of Eurocentrism. The 
adjective ‗Afrocentric‘ in the academic literature always referred to 
Afrocentricity. However, the use of Afrocentrism reflected a negation of the idea 
of Afrocentricity as a positive and progressive paradigm‖ (Asante, 2007:17). 
It is important to note that Asante (1998: x) gives a distinction between Afrocentricity and 
Afrocentrism by presenting the latter as the antithesis of the former. Afrocentrism is a label from 
conservative critics who see the African agenda as a movement to bring disharmony to American 
society by raising the self-esteem of the African American youth (Asante, 1998:ix). These critics 
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see Afrocentrists as replacing documented history with ideology. Afrocentrism is a reinvented 
concept that demolishes responsible scholarship while making absurd or indefensible claims. 
Afrocentrism is a misrepresentation of Afrocentricity by scholars who erroneously define 
Afrocentricity as an attempt to misinterpret historical and scientific claims about Africa. Mazama 
(2001:387) argues that, ―Afrocentricity contends that our main problem as African people is our 
usually unconscious adoption of the Western world-view and perspective and their attendant 
conceptual frameworks.‖ 
  
Asante (1998:1), sees his work as ―a radical critique of the Eurocentric ideology that 
masquerades as a universal view in the field of philosophy.‖ The critique is seen as radical 
because it suggests a turnabout, an alternative perspective on phenomena. Forcing the concept of 
―universality‖ on non-Western people implies that the West is the cultural standard of 
measurement. It is critique which emphasizes the importance of Africans, in culture, economics, 
politics, philosophy, and history. While taking cognizance of the various strands of 
Afrocentricity, the research focuses on Asante‘s ideas of Afrocentricity. The Afrocentric theory 
is appropriate in this study because it gives value and pride to an African epistemological 
paradigm which has been historically marginalized, abused and displaced by the fallacies of 
Eurocentric epistemology.  
 
Dei (1994:3) argues that, Afrocentricity is an alternative way of understanding the world; an 
investigation of phenomena from a standpoint grounded in African-centered values and a call for 
the validation of African experiences and histories as well as a critique of the continued 
exclusion and marginalization of African knowledge systems. Dei‘s analysis is important 
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because it facilitates the validation of an African epistemological paradigm using African 
perspectives and it offers a critique to the flawed argument of white supremacy. Afrocentricity is 
an intellectual theory deriving its name from the centrality of African people and phenomena in 
the interpretation of experience (Asante, 1998:8) 
 
 Shona proverbs, which are the focus of this study, are to be understood in their historical and 
social factors within the broad African epistemological paradigm without generalizations. Semali 
(1999: 307-308), identifies the following about African indigenous knowledge; firstly, 
indigenous African knowledge (IAK) does not derive its origins from the individual but from 
collective epistemological underpinnings and rationalization of the community. Secondly, IAK is 
about what local communities know and do and what local communities have known and done 
for generations. Thirdly, the ability to use community knowledge produced from local history 
forms important literary skills critical for survival in the African context. The above observations 
are important because the collective consciousness of the community is the basis of African 
proverbs in general and Shona proverbs in particular. In addition, the knowledge passed from the 
proverbs is critical for survival.  
 
The use of proverbs is consistent with the African epistemological paradigm. Asante (1998:45), 
defines a paradigm in the African context as, ―a conception that includes a multiplicity of 
theories, as such, it allows us to develop better interpretations, fuller understandings and 
effective articulations of the meanings of human goals and interactions.‖ The words ―better‖, 
―fuller‖ and ―effective‖ are not idle in Asante‘s definition but they are important because the 
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African epistemological paradigm has been ignored, silenced and stereotyped so the task of the 
paradigm becomes both deconstructive and reconstructive.  
1.5.5 Africanisation Critique 
 
 Seepe (2000:119) states that Africanisation of knowledge is a process of placing the African 
worldview at the centre of analysis. Africanisation advocates the need to foreground African 
indigenous knowledge systems to address African problems and challenges. MacGregor  
(1996:5) makes an important distinction between Africanisation of knowledge and Africanisation 
of education
9
.  Knowledge should be relevant to African issues and this can only be done 
through the application of the African worldview. The use of the African worldview 
acknowledges and validates African knowledge systems such as Shona proverbs. Makgoba 
(1997:199) notes that Africanisation is about affirming African culture and identity in a world 
community. Makgoba (1997:177) notes that, knowledge is a human construction which is 
purposeful by its very nature and knowledge cannot be sterile or neutral in its conception, 
formulation and development. The generation and development of knowledge is contextual. 
Knowledge generated in the African context has a purpose in the existence of Africans and it is 
philosophically naïve to overlook this issue as done by Eurocentric thinkers. Shona proverbs are 
valid within the African epistemological paradigm because of their functions within the 
                                                          
9
 Africanisation of education means focusing on problems that have roots and significance 
especially in institutions of higher learning. It entails four related aspects, firstly changing the 
composition of students, academic and administrator bodies; secondly changing the syllabus or 
content; thirdly changing curricula; and fourthly changing the criteria that determine what is 
excellent research (MacGregor, 1996:5). Africanisation of knowledge refers to a process of 
placing the African world-view at the centre of analysis [and] advocates for the need to 
foreground African indigenous knowledge systems to address [Africa‘s] problems and 
challenges‘ (Seepe, 2000:119). 
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community.  Africanisation  becomes relevant because it gives authenticity to Shona proverbs. 
Ramose (1998:64) maintains: 
―Africanisation holds that the African experience in its totality is simultaneously 
the foundation and the source for the construction of all forms of knowledge. On 
this basis, it maintains that African experience is by definition non-transferable 
but nevertheless communicable. Accordingly, it is the African who is and must be 
the primary and principal communicator of the African experience. To try to 
replace the African in this position and role is to adhere to the untenable 
epistemological view that experience is transferable.  Clearly, Africanisation 
rejects this view. It holds that different foundations exist for the construction of 
the pyramids of knowledge. It dismisses the view that any pyramid is by its very 
nature eminently superior to all others. It is a serious quest for radical and 
veritable change of paradigm so that the African may enter into genuine critical 
dialogical encounter with other pyramids of knowledge.‖  
Three points can be drawn from Ramose‘s analysis. Firstly, Ramose points at African experience 
as both the foundation and source for African forms of knowledge. This is significant to the 
present study because it validates Shona proverbs by implication as a source of knowledge. 
Secondly, Ramose gives a flexible position that this stands in contrast with Eurocentricism that 
there are different foundations that exist for the construction of pyramids of knowledge. 
Africanisation gives intellectual space to African knowledge systems. Thirdly, Africanisation 
paves the way for an alternative paradigm for critical dialogue with other forms of knowledge 
and this is fruitful in negotiating and contesting controversial assumptions brought forward by 
Eurocentric epistemology.  
Nkomo (2000:54) emphasizes that, an earnest effort to deconstruct the prevailing Eurocentric 
epistemology must be a primary project. The African reality should be placed at the center of the 
new democratic epistemology.  The centrality of the African reality should not negate  other 
realities that enrich the corpus of knowledge. Formerly silenced African indigenous knowledge 
systems should be brought back to life through renewed African research. In line with this 
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thinking, Ntuli (2000:54) notes that, African renaissance as a rebirth requires us to reexamine our 
knowledge systems anew. A critical examination involves a rebuttal of Eurocentric 
epistemological assumptions while reclaiming African cultural values for development.  
1.5.6 Indigenous Knowledge Systems Based Critique 
 
While Africanisation focuses mainly at institutional transformation in the context of knowledge 
production in higher education, indigenous knowledge systems emphasize on the validation of 
formerly marginalized ways of knowing.  Masolo (2010:21) defines the term indigenous through 
making this contradistinction:  
―Like its cognates (local, native, original, old, or insider) and its antonyms or 
counterparts (migrant, alien, new, settler, or outsider), the term ―indigenous‖ is 
used to define the origin of an item or person in relation to how their belonging to 
a place is to be temporally characterized, especially in comparison to other 
contenders in claiming belonging.‖ 
For Masolo, the term indigenous is not innocent since it is coined by the West in the attempt to 
gaze at other cultures. ―As the gazing subject the European enjoyed the privilege of seeing its 
‗Other‘, the African without being seen for some time and in the process took this opportunity to 
define the African as its negative Other‖ (Viriri and Mungwini 2010:30).  This means that the 
African was misrepresented in the Eurocentric gaze.  
 
Akena (2012:3), defines indigenous knowledge as ―multidimensional bodies of understanding 
that have, especially since the beginning of the European scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century, been viewed by European culture as inferior, superstitious and 
primitive.‖ Indigenous knowledge is a complex accumulation of local context based relevant 
knowledge that embraces history and culture. Indigenous knowledge is seen as a viable tool for 
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reclaiming context relevant ways of knowing that have been deliberately suppressed by Western 
knowledge. Part of the knowledge systems that were suppressed includes the Shona proverbs. 
The dominace of Western ways of knowing should not undermine the value of indigenous 
knowledge. Akena (2012:603) insists; ―when knowledge is produced, conceived as civilized and 
imposed by dominant groups onto others without due consent of the recipient populace, the 
knowledge will tend to favour the producer at the expense of the recipients, hence domination of 
foreign knowledge.‖ This entails that the Western epistemological paradigm imposed its 
assumptions and images on indigenous cultures of the colonized. When people have their 
knowledge displaced, the result is that the one displacing will have an advantage over the other 
person whose knowledge is displaced. ―In the rhetoric of this politics, the defense and promotion 
of the indigenous goes hand in hand with the anti-hegemonic quest for freedom and autonomy, 
so that whatever is indigenous or locally produced is reinstalled at the head of epistemic regimes 
of local or regional cultural interests, where it will have greater political and cultural value than 
what is foreign or imported‖ (Masolo, 2010:22).What is seen by Eurocentric thinkers as rational 
knowledge is disputable among colonized groups such as the Shona. Producing knowledge in 
Africa reveals a deep concern for indigenous knowledge systems as the basis of a legitimate 
concept of development that is historically relevant, socially meaningful, and responsive to need 
(Masolo, 2010:27). 
1.6 A Defence of the Legitimacy of Shona Proverbs 
 
Having shown that the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm is flawed in several ways, the 
research proceeds to create space for and validate the legitimacy of Shona proverbs as alternative 
sources of knowledge in the context of pluriversality. The validation of Shona proverbs shall be 
done through the following steps; problematising the term Shona; elucidation of proverbs; 
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exploring the debate on the link between proverbs and philosophy, contextualizing Shona 
proverbs in their worldview; and examining the style, structure and classification of Shona 
proverbs. 
1.7 The Term Shona 
 
The Shona people are the largest indigenous ethnic group of people in Zimbabwe in terms of 
population. Mberi (2009:253) states that, about 75% of Zimbabwe‘s 13 million people speak 
Shona.  Whilst the term Shona has been taken for granted by a number of scholars, it is 
legitimate to problematise it. The etymology of the term Shona is controversial because a 
number of mutually exclusive theories are postulated to explain its origins. Gombe (1998:22) 
notes that, the term ‗Shona‘ was coined by outsiders and he gives four possible theories. The first 
theory is alleged to come from an Ndebele description of the people of the eastern side of 
Ndebele territory as masvina (those who remove stuff from intestines of slaughtered beasts). The 
second theory is given as a Suthu and Tswana description of people who lived north of the 
Limpopo river as vaTshona. The third theory is that the term was used to label people who 
migrated from Sudan to the west, tshona means west. The last position is that the term was 
coined by Portuguese and Arab traders. Despite the differences in the four possible theories, 
there is agreement that the term was coined not by the Shona themselves but by outsiders. The 
term was popularized by the British colonial government after the unification of Ndau, Manyika, 
Karanga, Korekore and Zezuru dialects by Doke in 1931 as Shona. Doke (1931:79) maintains; 
―Certainly no people in the Shona country (Southern Rhodesia) claim the name 
Mashona as their tribal name and each would prefer to be described by the proper 
name of his particular group…it has been widely felt that the name ‗Shona‘is 
inaccurate and unworthy, that it is not a true name of any of the peoples whom we 
propose to group under the term ‗Shona speaking people‘ and that it lies under a 
strong suspicion of being a name given in contempt by enemies of the tribes…it is 
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pretty certainly a foreign name and as such is likely to be uncomplimentary (like 
the name kafir).‖ 
 
 It is clear from Doke‘s analysis that the term Shona is problematic in two respects. Firstly, the 
term was not coined by the indigenous people of Zimbabwe to describe themselves. Secondly, 
the term has controversial and external origins. As a result of the two problems above, the term 
shall be used under protest. Ranger (1985a:6) argues that, the term Shona is an invention of 
colonialism ―as a deliberate policy to divide and rule.‖ For Ranger, the emphasis on tribal 
dialects prevented a wider sense of Shona identity so there was invention of distinct dialects of 
Shona. In addition, Ranger (1985a:14) suggests that, ―the establishment of supposed dialect 
boundaries was a result of turning a spoken language into a written language.‖ The exercise 
created sub-tribes for Shona for colonial manipulation. Prior to written Shona dialects, Ranger 
observes that there was one spoken language over a wide area.  Emphasis was put on clusters of 
dialects that seem to show differences and this invention was done systematically through tribal 
divisions in work places, missionary activity and colonial administration. This similarity of 
culture was given little attention by the colonial government and overemphasis was given on 
differences in order to accomplish the goal of inventing tribalism. For Magwa (1999:1), the name 
Shona was taken up by the Zimbabwean postcolonial government for official and administrative 
use and it is now acceptable despite its controversial origins.  
1.8 Proverbs 
  
In understanding proverbs, it may be interesting to draw parallels from three indigenous African 
cultures
10
, namely, Yoruba, Akan and Shona.  The Yoruba word for proverb is owe ―meaning 
                                                          
10 A knowledge of situations which proverbs are cited may also be an essential part of 
understanding their implications (Finnegan, 1970:3). 
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something that literally wraps it‖ (Lindfors and Owomoyela, 1973:2). Further connotations in the 
Yoruba language point to ―making qualities observable side by side‖ or to ―intertwine‖ (Lindfors 
and Owomoyela, 1973:2). Three philosophical implications can be drawn from the Yoruba word 
for proverb. First, wrapping gives the image of hiding something and this is a pointer to the 
hidden meaning of proverbs. Observing qualities side by side suggests parallel meanings that can 
be drawn from the images widely used in proverbs. Intertwining suggests tying things together 
and this requires a skilled person to untie knots in the manner skills are required to draw meaning 
from proverbs. 
Gyekye (1975:45) states that the Akan word for proverb is ebe in both singular and plural forms. 
Gyekye (1975:45) traces the etymology of the Akan word for proverb to the palm tree and he 
sees an affinity between the characteristics of the palm tree and the proverb. The products of the 
palm tree include ―palm oil, palm wine and palm soap‖ which are all a result of the process of 
distillation Gyekye (1975:45). For Gyekye (1975:45) the products are ―not immediately obvious 
to the eye but lie deep in the palm tree.‖  Gyekye (1975:46) draws a similarity and argues that 
―proverbs are not immediately understandable but one must go deeply into a statement in order 
to get its meaning.‖  As a result, ―the meaning of a proverb is not obvious or direct, it is profound 
and not superficial, the distillate of a reflective process (Gyekye 1975:46). Proverbs are distilled 
from experience and in turn form one source of the Akan philosophical ideas (Gyekye, 1975:46). 
Akan proverbs are ―pithy sayings pregnant with philosophical ideas‖ Gyekye (1975:46). 
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Chimundu (1980:37) sees two variants in the Shona word for proverb. The first is tsumo which is 
based on the Zezuru dialect and the second is shumo which is based on the Karanga dialect.  
Although the Karanga variant has been discarded in standard writing of Shona, it is still in use 
among speech communities (Chimundu, 1980:37). The Karanga meaning of proverb is 
philosophically interesting since it traces shumo back to ‗something that makes sense‘, 
‗something that is meaningful‘ or ‗that which contains wisdom‘. As products of deep and careful 
reflection, Shona proverbs can be linked to deep meaning and wisdom. 
What can be inferred from the cultural conceptions of proverbs is that the root meanings point to 
the hidden meaning of proverbs and this gives definitional problems among scholars. The term 
proverb is difficult to define because the study of proverbs often falls into an uncomfortable 
range between linguistics and folklore and hence, a precise definition has eluded researchers 
working in the field (Bagwasi, 2003:18). Due to this intersectional problem, scholars tend to find 
their own working definitions (Mieder, 1980:113). However, for Mieder, working definitions 
have not succeeded in enabling one to identify a sentence positively as proverbial but authors 
work on those sentences that are culturally classified as proverbs.  Mieder (1980:119) defines a 
proverb as ―short, generally known sentence of the folk which contains wisdom, truth, morals 
and traditional views in a metaphorical, fixed, memorable form which is handed down from 
generation to generation.‖ Interesting observations can be made on Mieder‘s definition. Firstly, it 
is reasonable to hold that proverbs contain philosophy because proverbs serve as a medium of 
expressing collective philosophy. The philosophy is gathered through ―sharp observation, 
experience and reflection‖ (Furusa 1996:84). Secondly, truth is the ultimate goal of philosophical 
enterprises in the sense that philosophy is concerned with the nature and meaning of truth.  
Thirdly, morals are the subject matter of philosophical ethics. Fourthly, proverbs may be seen as 
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capturing collective consciousness of a people and they are products of reflections based on 
observation of nature and to that extent, indigenous views express indigenous philosophy. 
 
The use of metaphors does not symbolize in a one-to-one relationship to their referents but 
symbolize multifariously (Wanjohi, 1997:72). This points to the fact that proverbs involve some 
degree of abstract thinking which is characteristic of some philosophy. By being fixed, proverbs 
suggest the ability to transcend timeframes from one generation to the next and this classic 
feature is a philosophical attribute. Proverbs are also seen as memorable or worth remembering 
because of their ability to apply to a range of situations. From the above observations, it can be 
logically concluded that proverbs reflect evidence of philosophical features.  
In the light of these findings, Doyle (2001:57) identifies the following as undisputed five 
characteristics of a proverb; ―an old saying, a pithy expression, often metaphorical, occurs in 
tradition, and tends to display the author‘s wit, profundity and moral oracurality.‖ The list 
provided gives the key elements of proverbs and this implies that the characteristics work 
together and if one is missing, it may be difficult to identify a proverb. Magwaza (2004:32) 
observes that proverbs, ―identify and dignify a culture, they bring life into wisdom and wisdom 
into life.‖ This shows that proverbs are intrinsically connected to a culture and they add value to 
a given culture. 
Transmission of proverbs has been done orally in the past. Vansina (1965:3) states that proverbs 
are part of the categories of oral tradition alongside narratives, anecdotes and historical lays. Oral 
tradition becomes reliable if it refers to recent events, if an adequate capacity for critical 
judgement existed at the time it was handed down (Vansina, 1965:6). While Vansina is largely 
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commenting on oral tradition in the context of historical events, proverbs though passed orally 
remain with a capacity for critical judgement. Dossou (1997:281) maintains that oral traditions 
are messages transmitted orally from one generation to another. As part of oral traditions, 
proverbs survive the test of time through repeated usage in different generations (Dossou, 
1997:281). However, it may be important to note that the bulk of Shona proverbs have now been 
put in writing. The knowledge of proverbs was passed without writing and still there is room that 
proverbs that have not been captured in writing can now be expressed in writing. The importance 
of oral tradition is that it enables the transmission of knowledge. Proverbs may not lose meaning 
through this passage because proverbs are functional
11
 short sayings that are easy to remember.  
From the above discussions, a proverb may be understood as a sentence of a cultural group 
which contains wisdom, truth, morals and indigenous views in a metaphorical, fixed, memorable 
form which is handed down from generation to generation within local communities. This 
understanding applies to Shona proverbs.   
1.8.1 Proverbs and Philosophy 
 
Scholars hold two contradictory views on the question of the role of proverbs as a source of 
philosophy. The first view is skeptical and it holds that philosophy cannot be based on proverbs. 
Wimmer (2002:20) represents this position as follows: 
 ―People show an emancipatory interest, if they document the sayings and tales of 
their tradition or reflect on the history and structures of their language. Europeans 
have done so, too, in the period of the beginning of nationalism during the late 
18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. However, these collections of sayings and proverbs, of 
                                                          
11
 Sumner (1999:29) identifies five functions of proverbs namely, cognitive, expressive, 
normative, discursive and cultural. The cognitive involves an understanding of the situation 
depicted by the proverb. The expressive involves approval or disapproval. The normative trains 
morally. The discursive is linked to speech or discourse while the cultural function carries the 
cultural past of the community. 
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tales and myths, and analysis of linguistic patterns and structures hardly provide 
any argument on philosophical matters. Can we ever expect to get arguments in 
favour or against, say, Kantian concepts of time (or of moral duties) by reading 
Grimm‘s tales? It sounds no less absurd to me when I hear that Kant‘s theory of 
the categorical imperative is proved to be invalid by some Gikuyu 
sayings…Proverbs may have taught us to be cautious, they do not teach us the 
way to obtain knowledge. A proverb never ―refutes‖ any (philosophical or other) 
argumentation, as the majority of ethnophilosophers, confined to their respective 
authorities, race, language and ―authentic thinking‖ etc., seem to think.‖ 
 
 
Several issues may be drawn from Wimmer‘s views. Firstly, to say ―proverbs hardly provide any 
argument on philosophical matters‖ shows that Wimmer is unsure but he gives a provision for 
the benefit of doubt because if something harldy provides, it means there is a limited extent of 
provision. Wimmer‘s argument appears to commit a fallacy of ignorance because he moves from 
the position of being unsure to maintain that ―a proverb never ―refutes‖ any (philosophical or 
other) argumentation.‖ The fallacy is seen in that while Wimmer‘s first claim is skeptical, he 
appears to conclude using a definite position and the transition seems inconsistent. It can be 
argued that, proverbs, in themselves may not constitute arguments but they serve as premises and 
conclusions for arguments. It can be shown that proverbs provide the basis for philosophical 
arguments inductively and deductively. Inductively, proverbs act as generalizations from 
experience and they culminate as conclusions of a series of observations. According to Hurley 
(1985:498) an inductive argument is ―one in which the conclusion is claimed to follow only 
probably from the premises.‖ The inductive process consists of a series of logically coherent 
propositions that culminate in one statement as a proverb. The proverb kune chauraya zizi harifi 
nemhepo (something has caused the death of the owl; it does not die of wind). The proverb is an 
expression of the principle of causality. A series of observations that are linked to causality are 
made and the proverb is coined as a conclusion of such observations. Deductively, proverbs can 
be used as syllogistic premises and conclusions. A syllogism is a deductive argument consisting 
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of two premises and a conclusion (Hurley 1985: 497). The general statement that is arrived at on 
the basis of observation can be used as the starting point of a syllogism. If the principle of 
causality expressed in the above proverb is modified, the premise ―All events have causes‖ is 
obtained. If the second premise such as ―Death is an event‖ is supplied, the conclusion ―Death 
has a cause‖ is obtained.  In addition, proverbs can be expressed as premises in propositional 
logic. Hurley (1995:496) defines propositional logic as, ―a kind of logic in which fundamental 
components are whole statements or propositions.‖ Propositional logic, also known as sentential 
logic (Gustason and Ulrich , 1989:79) or statement logic, is the branch of logic that studies ways 
of joining and/or modifying entire propositions, statements or sentences to form more 
complicated propositions, statements or sentences, as well as the logical relationships and 
properties that are derived from these methods of combining or altering statements. This means 
that they can be presented as logical premises that are compatible with the rules of inference.  
Rules of inferences are logical methods of inferential deductions used in proving the validity of 
arguments (Feyami, 2010:5). They are rules because any argument that is capable of being 
reduced to their form (i.e. their correct substitution instance) is intuitively and automatically 
taken as valid. This validity is based on proven internal validity structure (Fayemi, 2010:5). 
Some Shona proverbs are expressed in sentences that are analyzable in terms of propositional 
logic. This points to the view that proverbs can be used as premises or conclusions of arguments. 
These may be implicit or explicit arguments for several philosophical issues. The Shona proverb, 
kana mwezha wapfumba, mumwena mune mbeva (If the mouse‘s path is well trodden, then there 
is a mouse in the nearby hole) takes the form of a conditional statement. The argument that is 
behind this proverb is as follows: (Premise 1) If the path is well trodden, then there is a mouse 
habituating in the nearby hole. (Premise 2)  The path is well trodden.  (Conclusion) there is a 
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mouse residing in the nearby hole. A negation is seen in the proverb, Chisi chako hachibatsiri 
(what is not one‘s possession is of limited usefulness) can be used to construct the following 
argument: (Premise 1) All that does not belong to an individual is of limited usefulness. (Premise 
2) This particular tool does not belong to X. (Conclusion) This particular tool is of limited 
usefulness. A conjunction is expressed in the proverb bveni kuipa zvaro asi haridyi chakafa 
choga (the baboon is ugly but it does not eat what dies on its own). Dropping the left hand 
conjunct gives a valid inference through the rule of simplification. A disjunction is shown in the 
proverb kana shumba yashaya nyama, inodya bundo (Unless the lion fails to find meat, it feeds 
on grass). From this proverb, the following argument is implicit:  (Premise 1) Either the lion fails 
to find meat or the lion feeds on grass. (Premise 2) The lion has failed to find meat. (Conclusion) 
the lion shall feed on grass. Secondly, to ask ―Can we ever expect to get arguments in favour or 
against, say, Kantian concepts of time (or of moral duties) by reading Grimm‘s tales?‖ may seem 
innocent and empirical. However, a closer analysis of the question tends to reveal some bias. 
Even if one may not expect to get arguments, it does not necessarily follow that the arguments 
are absent. Failure to expect may not be a result of empirical investigation but a result of 
personal biases. Wimmer‘s view is factually incorrect and no strong argument can be constructed 
from a false premise. Thirdly, Wimmer claims that ―it sounds no less absurd to me when I hear 
that Kant‘s theory of the categorical imperative is proved to be invalid by some Gikuyu 
sayings…‖ Against this line of thought, it can be argued that  Gikuyu sayings or any other 
African proverbs may not have been directed to the Kantian categorical imperative, as shown in 
the example, but they serve to refute certain claims within the context in which they arise. 
African proverbs in general and Gikuyu proverbs in particular, arise within the African 
epistemological paradigm and it may be unfair to expect them to address issues that arise in a 
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foreign paradigm. In the same line of thinking, Kant‘s categorical imperative does not need to 
refute Gikuyu sayings for it to be relevant. Fourthly, Wimmer accepts that ―proverbs may have 
taught to be cautious…‖ Wimmer implicitly accepts that proverbs are a source of information 
and  knowledge
12
. Teaching implies imparting information and knowledge. This shows that 
Wimmer concedes that proverbs have an educational value as sources of information and 
knowledge. Teaching to be cautious implies knowledge and information. In addition, some 
philosophical insight also accompanies knowledge and information. Indirectly Wimmer sees the 
implicit value of proverbs. Fifthly, Wimmer‘s claim that ―proverbs do not teach us the way to 
obtain knowledge‖ may be refuted on the grounds that some Shona proverbs teach how to obtain 
knowledge. Two examples shall be used to support this point. The proverb chitsva chiri 
murutsoka (new knowledge can be obtained through travelling). Experiential knowledge is 
gained as one travels. The point of this proverb can be seen in that travelling gives new 
experiences and the new experiences can be seen as a source of information and knowledge. The 
proverb zano moto rinogokwa kune vamwe (an idea is like fire, it can be borrowed from others). 
For the Shona, ideas are a key source of knowledge and one can get ideas through interaction 
with others. The analogy of fire is very significant because just as the source of fire is not 
depleted by passing on fire, the source of an idea, the human mind is not depleted by passing on 
ideas to others. Sixthly, to say ―proverbs never refute any philosophical or any other argument‖ 
appears to be an overstatement. While all proverbs may not be used for refuting arguments, some 
proverbs can be used to refute philosophical arguments. Shona proverbs such as badza harinyepi 
(A hoe does not lie) and Mvura haina n’anga (There are no herbs to cure dirty water) clearly 
refute some implied arguments or opposing viewpoints. The proverb, a hoe does not lie, can be 
                                                          
12
 Information refers to data that can be interpreted as a message while knowledge has been seen 
as non-accidental possession of justified true belief.  
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used to refute claims that contradict evidence. Just as the marks of a hoe on the soil is evidence 
of some activity of digging or weeding, evidence that is left in any other context may be difficult 
to contradict. The proverb, there are no herbs to cure dirty water, can be used to refute situations 
where an individual may want to try the impossible. The Akan proverb which goes; when the 
rain beats the leopard, its fur becomes wet but its spots do not wash away is also in refutation of 
a contrary argument or viewpoint that certain activities reveal rather than conceal evidence. 
Seventhly and lastly, it can be argued that Wimmer‘s work (published in 2002) is made about 
five years after  both Wanjohi and Kimmerle made their contributions (with 1997 publications). 
Wimmer overlooks the works of these two scholars who explore the philosophical significance 
of proverbs as shown below. 
 
Proverbs can be a legitimate source of philosophy. This view is held by Kimmerle (1997a:62-67; 
1997b:162-168) and Wanjohi (1998:78). According to Kimmerle (1997a:62), language is a 
medium in which philosophy works. This means that philosophy draws possible questions and 
answers from language. For Kimmerle, (1997a:62-63) language is understood broadly to include 
―grammatical structure as well as the meaning of words and word combinations, and also myths, 
poetry and stories, sayings and proverbs play an important role.‖ Ethnophilosophers examine the 
way in which proverbs ―form the philosophical substratum of the thinking of a people‖ 
(Kimmerle, 1997a:63). Sages formulate their answers about difficult questions through proverbs. 
These answers can easily be remembered if they take the form of terse sayings or proverbs 
(Kimmerle, 1997a:63). Proverbs are distilled from everyday language and they form terse and 
compressed formulations. They are enigmatic (showing obscurity of thought), elliptical 
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(characterized by extreme economy of expression or omission of superfluous elements) or 
cryptic (having hidden meaning). 
 
Kimmerle (1997b:167) observes that, proverbs are a source of African philosophy and the basis 
of justification is seen in the philosophical study of, among other languages, Akan, Yoruba and 
Gikuyu proverbs. For Kimmerle, certain proverbs can underline their importance in the specific 
languages they serve. In other words, Kimmerle‘s point is that proverbs implicitly reflect on 
language as shown in the Gikuyu proverb, ―we speak in proverbs; he who is intelligent will 
understand.‖ This shows the complexity of proverbs as a source of philosophy. Although 
Kimmerle himself does not exemplify his point using Shona proverbs, the maxim mubayi 
wetsumo anowana zvaanoda (one who applies proverbs gets what he or she wants) shows that 
proverbs have argumentative power and consequently, they are philosophical because of their 
implied logical reasoning aspect. Kimmerle (1997b:167), draws lines of convergence between 
African philosophy and Western philosophy of language ―which is concentrated in short 
formulations similar to those in proverbs‖ using two lines of justification. Firstly, Kimmerle 
employs Heidegger‘s saying; language is the house of being to show that ―language, like Being, 
is there already before human beings use it, and will not continue to be there without human 
beings who use it‖ (Kimmerle 1997b:167).  Proverbs are a product of human thought and they 
can be used to express the philosophical content of a given cultural grouping. Secondly, 
Kimmerle uses Wittgeinstein‘s idea of ―language as different language games‖ whereby 
proverbs involve the application of various sets of linguistic rules. This connects proverbs to 
reflective thought and thereby showing their link to philosophy.  The Shona, just like any other 
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ethnic group have intellectual curiosity about their surroundings resulting in keen observation 
and reflection of nature. 
 
Wanjohi (1997:90) argues that, proverbs are a source of philosophy because, firstly they operate 
at the level of second order discourse, meaning that they are critical and reflective of the subject 
matter they are treating. Secondly, Wanjohi maintains that other proverbs are philosophical in 
the way they implicitly refer to the basic and applied branches of philosophy.  In defence of 
African proverbs as a source of philosophy, Wanjohi (1997:91) responds to two standard 
objections. The first objection states that to imply philosophy is not logically the same thing as 
offering philosophy. Against this objection, Wanjohi (1997:91) argues that, ―the bulk of 
philosophical activity consists, not in repeating what the author has said clearly and 
unambiguously, but in what he has left unsaid or not clearly expressed.‖ Proverbs are a source of 
philosophy because their figurative nature gives rise to analytical and critical reflection. 
 
The second objection is that it requires a philosopher to bring out the philosophy found in 
African languages. In response, Wanjohi (1997:91) states that, ―…the communal philosophy of 
African proverbs must have originated with one intelligent individual who was the first to see the 
truth and enunciate it in a short and pithy linguistic form that we call a proverb.‖ For Wanjohi 
(1997:72) the origin of proverbs is inductive generalization and this is a sign of individual and 
reflective thinking. Wanjohi examines the philosophical impact of Gikuyu proverbs and he sees 
proverbs as a ―third degree of symbolization‖ by looking at literal meaning, metaphorical 
meaning and a ―polysymbolical‖ and ―multifarious‖ symbolization. 
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Because of the philosophical nature of proverbs, negativity can be used in proverbs for the 
purpose of drawing out opposites and paradoxes. Sumner (1995:327) identifies negativity in the 
use of Oromo proverbs. Sumner examines sixteen proverbs on the topic of women and almost all 
are wholly negative and only one is positive by making reference to companionship that a wife 
can provide. Of the fifty Oromo proverbs on vice, only eight are on virtue (Sumner 1995:327). 
There is one Oromo proverb on reality while fifteen are on appearances (Sumner 1995:327). 
―The opposite, being well-known does not become the subject of the proverb‖ (Sumner, 
1995:292-293). The use of negativity may be a result of the need to allow focus on what is 
negative, so that the positive may be drawn out in the process. 
1.9 Shona proverbs and their worldview 
 
Wanjohi (1997:38) sees a worldview as ―how an individual, a society, a community, or a 
historical epoch views, sees, conceives or understands the world, and the reaction which follows 
therefrom.‖ Apart from individual worldviews, Wanjohi (1997:39) identifies other worldviews 
such as scientific or philosophical, religious and cultural worldviews. A worldview can be 
studied or portrayed by proverbs. Shona proverbs deal with both unperceivable and perceivable 
reality within the Shona worldview. Unperceivable reality refers to the spiritual world where 
reference is made to Mwari ―God‖ and vadzimu (the living dead). The bulk of Shona proverbs 
focus on the perceivable reality and they make reference to, among other realities,  human 
beings, non-human animals, mountains, trees and rivers. According to Bhebe and Viriri (2012: 
40), ―all this (reference to reality) is an indication of the versatility of Shona proverbs in 
providing a picture of reality as comprehensive as possible, a worldview.‖ This means that Shona 
proverbs can be used to understand the thinking and culture of the Shona people. Shona proverbs 
are generalizations covering virtually all aspects of life. For Bhebe and Viriri (2012: xiv) Shona 
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proverbs represent the wisdom of the past in a new situation to justify current behaviour, 
condition or thinking. This means that proverbs can be used as a source of the history of a 
people. Nyambezi (1990:xii) maintains that, ―proverbs show how observant people are, for the 
habits of birds and animals, and the behaviour of nature in general, do not go unobserved, they 
reveal what it is that a people adore, what it is that they hate, what they respect and what they 
despise.‖  This means that the Shona people‘s wisdom as shown by proverbs, ―represents moral 
lessons, science, philosophy, art, history, religion and social vision- in short, truth that is derived 
from experience‖ (Bhebe and Viriri 2012:xvi).  
 
1.9.1 Use of images in Shona proverbs 
 
To make assimilation of Shona proverbs easy, there is use of metaphors that are appealing to 
imagination (Bhebe and Viriri, 2012:xxiv). The use of animals is common in Shona proverbs as 
shown in the following (1) Nzou hairemerwi nenyanga dzayo (An elephant does not find its tusks 
heavy). (2) Tsuro pfupi haitemi uswa hurefu ( a small rabbit does not eat tall grass). Images are 
significant in the following manner: 
―Images from the animal world concretise ideas that children need to remember in 
order to help their decisions later in life , since children are already aware of the 
animal metaphor through ngano (folktales), they find it relatively easy to extend 
their knowledge through further analysis of animal metaphors‖ (Bhebe and Viriri, 
2012:xxv). 
Beyond the animal world, images used in Shona proverbs can be constructed from the 
phenomena that people have observed in their homes, fields, forests and social interaction. To 
people who dwell in such habitat, communication entails knowing the organic world of the 
speakers. The use of images has the advantage of making Shona proverbs impersonal and 
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objective. According to Pongweni (1989:5),  proverbs ―give speakers a neutral point of reference 
thus minimizing subjective commentary on the case under review and this means that proverbs 
authoritatively and objectively evaluate behaviour.‖   
1.9.2 Style and Structure of Shona Proverbs 
 
Shona proverbs rely on rhythm and figures of speech for vividness (Bhebe and Viriri, 2012: 
xxvi). Most Shona proverbs are in verse structure and this makes them poetic. Poetic balance in 
Shona proverbs is seen through the use of parallelism, cross-parallelism and repetition of 
syllables. For Hamutyinei and Plannger (2013: xvi), paralleliism corresponds to initial linking as 
shown in the following example, chadyiwa nemurombo, chadyiwa nashe (what has been eaten 
by the poor person, has been eaten by the chief). The word chadyiwa (what has been eaten) 
appears first in both phrases and this is where the parallelism lies. In cross-parallelism, similar 
words are not in corresponding but in transposed positions as shown in the following example, 
chinokanganwa ibadza, ivhu harikanganwi (What forgets is the hoe but the disturbed soil does 
not). The element of kunganganwa (forgetting), lies in opposite positions in the proverb. The use 
of double propositions in which the second part is explanatory can also be found in Shona 
proverbs (Hamutyinei and Plannger, 2013 :xvii). The following proverb shows the double 
propositions chirema ndechina mazano, chinotamba chakazendama nemadziro (A lame person is 
clever, he or she dances while leaning against the wall). The use of negation is also found as in 
hapana mvura isina chura (there is no water without a frog). An example of such structural 
balance is shown in the proverb; Kupedza nyota kuenda kutsime (To quench thirst is to go to the 
well). Shona proverbs create symmetry which beautifies logic. The embellishment in Shona 
proverbs makes them interesting utterances. Without this embellishment or decorative detail, 
speech would be conducted in cold logic that is uninteresting and difficult to remember (Bhebe 
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and Viriri, 2012: xxvii). Vividness makes proverbs convincing to listeners who are trained to 
discern logic out of the imaginative language. Some Shona proverbs can be shortened if they are 
well known to both the speaker and the audience as follows: 
―Instead of saying Chitsva chiri murutsoka, magaro haana chawo (The foot leads 
to new things, sitting on buttocks does not); a speaker will end up saying Chitsva 
chiri murutsoka (The foot leads to new things) suggesting that it is redundant to 
complete the cliché, thus saying the obvious‖ (Bhebe and Viriri, 2012:xxvii) 
The capability of Shona proverbs to be shortened makes them flexible figures of speech.  This 
helps to reduce complexity leading to brevity that will make the proverb easy to remember.  
 
1.9.3 Classification of Shona Proverbs 
 
Hamutyinei and Plannger (2013: viii-x) classify Shona proverbs under the following eleven 
categories; wisdom and foolishness; human nature; friendship and enmity; fortune and 
misfortune, honesty and dishonesty; domestic affairs; the circle of life; authority; unity; warning 
and general advice; and miscellaneous.  This classification may make the task of readers easy for 
reference purposes since it groups related proverbs. Contrary to the classification, Bhebe and 
Viriri (2012: xxi) observe, ―this typology in Hamutyinei and Plannger, is not as neat as it might 
appear because life itself does not prescribe proverbial use in one domain.‖ This means that a 
single Shona proverb can be applicable to a variety of contexts and circumstances, beyond the 
obvious application, thereby showing the limit of classification. In the same line of reasoning, 
Bhebe and Viriri (2012: xxi), discourage the use of categories in collections of proverbs because 
―readers require reference to a broader social context than to be blinkered.‖ This means that 
readers should be given the opportunity to apply proverbs to a variety of life situations without 
some rigid guidelines.  
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1.10 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has examined the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm and it has discussed the 
effects of the paradigm such as sidelining, marginalizing, silencing, ignoring and stereotyping of 
African indigenous knowledge. The effects of the Eurocentric epistemological paradigm that 
include epistemological imperialism, hegemony and racism have been challenged and critiqued. 
A multifaceted critique that is based on deconstruction and reconstruction, decolonial thinking, 
Afrocentricity, indigenous knowledge based analysis, and anti-dualistic approach has been 
advanced. Deconstruction has been used to displace absolutist and rigid claims of positivist 
epistemology and arguments that favour the historicity and particularity of knowledge 
perspectives have been advanced. Decolonial thinking has been employed to topple the false 
epistemic hierarchy that had been constructed by the Western epistemological paradigm. 
Afrocentric thinking stands as a radical critique to Eurocentric epistemology and it dismisses the 
alleged universalism in order to provide a cultural footing to the African epistemological 
paradigm. Africanisation calls for the placing of the African worldview at the center of analysis 
and it has argued for the use of African indigenous approaches for addressing African problems 
and challenges. The indigenous knowledge based approach advocates for locally based 
knowledge systems that are not violent and imposing on the recipients but come from grassroots 
to meet the needs of the communities from which knowledge systems develop. Anti-dualistic 
epistemological perspectives argue for pluriversal epistemology and acknowledge the relatedness 
of the knower to the community. The chapter upholds an African epistemological paradigm that 
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comes up as an alternative framework for grounding assumptions, theories and methodology for 
the authentic and legitimate study of African knowledge systems and ways of knowing thereby 
opening intellectual space for the philosophical study of Shona proverbs that shall be examined 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: SHONA ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Environmental philosophy is the inquiry into the nature and justification of metaphysical, 
epistemological and ethical claims relating to the environment. While environmental philosophy 
can take various perspectives, this chapter shall focus on environmental philosophy that has been 
handed down through the generations by cultural transmission; in particular, the Shona culture. 
Firstly, the chapter explores the debate on the conception of African environmental philosophy. 
Some scholars are skeptical about African environmental philosophy on the assumption that 
there is either nothing or very little to be known about African environmental philosophy. Other 
scholars hold the view that African environmental philosophy cannot be possible because 
African philosophy is human centered and does not extend to the environment. In addition, 
Africa is considered as the worst on earth in terms of environmental records and as such, cannot 
be expected to contribute meaningfully to the global environmental responsibility debate. 
Secondly, and contrary to the above view, it shall be argued that African philosophy, which has 
very deep roots in the history of pre-colonial, colonial and independent Africa will be used as the 
basis and example of African environmental philosophy. African environmental philosophy, 
through  ubuntu, emphasizes cosmic interconnectedness, relationality and coexistence. Further, 
the chapter aims to contribute to the articulation of an environmental philosophy based on Shona 
proverbs and inspired by broad African environmental perspectives. This shall be done through 
an analysis of three Shona proverbs that provide evidence of environmental responsibility. These 
proverbs may be used to refute the skeptical view on African environmental philosophy in 
general. The three selected proverbs shall examine Shona environmental philosophy that 
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culminates in environmental preservation, conservation and nature relatedness. Further, the 
chapter shall discuss the significance of environmental philosophy. 
 
Proverbs can be used to construct an indigenous environmental philosophy with the potential for 
global application in the spirit of the pluriversal understanding of knowledge. African 
environmental philosophy  has been described by the natural resources literature as ―a 
cumulative body of knowledge and beliefs, handed down through the generations by cultural 
transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and 
with their environment‖ (Berkes, 1995:100). In indigenous environmental philosophy, 
knowledge of foods and medicinal plants embodies relationships and self-identification with 
places in the use of what nature has offered (LaRochelle and Berkes 2003:366). Campbell and 
Shakeroff (2007:351) identify three aspects that relate to indigenous environmental philosophy 
in general and African environmental philosophy in particular, the first is that indigenous 
environmental philosophy involves symbolic meaning through oral history, place names and 
spiritual relationships. The second is that indigenous environmental philosophy encompasses a 
distinct world view; including a view of the environment different from that of Western science 
by emphasising relationality, dependence and interconnectedness. The third is that indigenous 
environmental philosophy examines relationships based on sharing and obligations toward other 
community members and other beings.  
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2.1 Understanding the Environment 
 
Belshaw (2001:2) identifies four conceptions of the environment. The first account is a human 
centered approach that sees the environment as ―where people live, work and enjoy themselves.‖  
This understanding places emphasis on human beings yet it is very broad to cover offices, 
homes, cities, countryside and open seas. This perspective suggests connection only with human 
life to the extent of excluding wilderness areas, polar regions, remnants of deserts and the bottom 
of the sea from which people are absent. The second view which considers the environment as 
―the natural and non-human world‖ (Belshaw, 2001:2) stresses on nature. This approach sees 
human beings, alongside with their cities, roads, industries and airports, as encroaching into the 
environment and competing with it for space. Human activities are seen as disturbing the natural 
state of the non-human environment. The third view, which can be described as the global 
approach, sees the environment as the component that is spread over the surface of the world. 
According to this view, the environment is one and it existed before humans were found on the 
earth. This conception takes the environment to include zones that are unoccupied by human 
beings. The fourth view is called the localized approach and it takes the environment to mean, 
―home ground, the territory familiar to and supportive of a particular kind of life‖ (Belshaw, 
2001:2). This means that one can make reference to an urban environment, a rural environment 
and a cultural environment, among others.  
While the first view of the environment places emphasis on the human surroundings, it tends to 
exclude the non-human world and as a result, it is a narrow conception of the environment. The 
second view is the opposite of the first and it places emphasis on the non-human environment 
while neglecting the human environment. These perspectives seem to rest on the fallacy of false 
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dichotomy13 by assuming that there is either a human environment or a non-human environment. 
A balanced approach considers the environment as consisting of the human and the non-human 
components. The third view, which is the global approach, fails to convince because it is too 
broad and too general to capture the environment as it relates to specific groups of people.  The 
last view may be significant for this study because it takes an approach restricted to a particular 
territory that can be used to express an environmental understanding by a group of people such 
as the Shona. Restricting the study of the environment to a particular group of people is done for 
the sake of convenience even though the effects of environmental protection or destruction 
remain unrestricted. 
If one has to apply Occam‘s razor14, it may be better to understand the environment as one rather 
than many. An African view holds that, by environment, we mean our surroundings, including 
the life support provided by the air, water, land, animals and the entire ecosystem of which 
human beings are part (Osuntokun, 2001:293). Osuntokun‘s view has two advantages; firstly, it 
is consistent with common usage and this means that it is credible from a common sense 
perspective. Secondly, it suggests that living spaces affect one another as they interact. This 
interaction is a relational perspective that has important implications in understanding African 
environmental philosophy in general and Shona environmental philosophy in particular.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 The fallacy of false dichotomy rests on the mistake of thinking in mutually exclusive 
categories and consider them as exhaustive yet there is a third possibility or alternative. 
14 Occam‘s razor is the principle that holds that when postulating entities, it is prudent to avoid 
unnecessary multiplication of beings by assuming the fewest assumptions. 
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2.2 Defining Ecology 
 
Since the ecosystem is part of the environment, it is necessary to define ecology and show its 
significance to the environment. Etymologically, the word ecology is derived from the Greek 
words oikos meaning household and logos meaning ―study‖; this means that it is the study of the 
environmental house that includes all organisms in it and all functions that make the house 
habitable (Odum and Barrett, 2005:2). Ecology can be defined as ―the study of the interactions 
between living organisms and their environment‖ (Bowler 1992:309; DesJardins, 1993:166). As 
an empirical science, ecology claims that it may not necessarily make a particular commitment to 
preservation or pronouncement of the value of that which it studies.
15
 Even though ecology is 
distinct from the study of the environment, ―in so far as environmentalists aim to understand the 
character of environmental problems that they detect, and hope to uncover the methods for 
preventing or reversing unwelcome change, then they need to draw on ecology‘s resources‖ 
(Belshaw, 2001:8). The point being made by Belshaw is that ecology informs thinking about the 
environment with specific details that may enable sound and informed decisions. The 
convergence between environmental studies and ecology is seen in the deep ecology movement16 
                                                          
15 However, Allchin (1988:1083) argues that science cannot be value free on the basis of three 
reasons. Firstly, science relies on epistemic values such as reasonableness, explanatory 
adequacy, predictive power, simplicity and coherence while it disvalues fraud, error and 
pseudoscience. Secondly, scientific enterprise is always embedded in some particular culture and 
ethical and cultural values enter science through individual practioners whether consciously or 
not. Thirdly, scientific values emerge from science both as a product and process and may be 
redistributed in society. Science may be seen as successful or powerful and things associated 
with science can be given authority or value. Science may be taken as the image for problem 
solving and a means for objectivity. 
16  Naess‘ position is regarded as deep ecology because of the extent to which it examines 
humanity‘s relationship with the natural world to arrive at philosophically profound conclusions 
as opposed to ecology as a branch of biology. 
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(Belshaw, 2001:8). Naess (1973:151) argues that, ―the idea that a human being is such an 
individual possessing a separate essence, radically separates the human self from the rest of the 
world. The separation leads to selfishness towards other people and induces human selfishness 
towards nature.‖ As a counter to egoism at both the individual and species level, Naess 
(1973:152) proposes the adoption of an alternative relational image of the world. According to 
this relationalism, organisms (human or otherwise) are best understood as knots in the 
biospherical net (Naess, 1973:154). The identity of a living thing is essentially constituted by its 
relations to other things in the world, especially its ecological relations to other living things. If 
people conceptualise themselves and the world in relational terms, the deep ecologists argue, 
then people will take better care of nature and the world in general. Naess (1973:155) maintains 
that, the deep satisfaction that we receive from identification with nature and close partnership 
with other forms of life in nature contributes significantly to our life quality. Naess‘ position has 
important implications for this study because it sees nature as central and the human being is 
seen as depending on the natural world and this is in line with the African view of environmental 
philosophy.  
2.3 Contextualising Environmental Philosophy 
 
Brennan (2009:8) observes that, various schools of philosophical thought arise from diverse 
methodologies in approaching environmental philosophy. The analytic or Anglo-American 
tradition in philosophy emphasizes conceptual clarity, logical rigour, empirical soundness, and 
scientific validity of arguments (Brennan, 2009:8). In its approach to environmental philosophy, 
the analytic school focuses on the analysis of environmental concepts. By contrast, continental 
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philosophy 17 is more critical of claims of scientific rigour. It is more open to exploring the 
historical and cultural context of ideas, and is more inclined to explore larger philosophical 
themes such as the nature of being, existence, and consciousness (Brennan, 2009:8). 
Contemporary environmental problems are complex; they involve issues of public health and 
social justice, attitudes to nature, and deep disagreements about matters of science, policy, rights, 
and ethical obligations (Brennan, 2009:10). These complexities apply to many areas of 
contemporary environmental debate: drought, changing weather patterns, the loss of habitat and 
species, the burden of caring for environmental refugees, the effects of consumerism, and the 
health problems associated with various forms of pollution. The resolution of such conflicts and 
ambiguities demands increased interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophers, political 
theorists, legal experts and scientists. Such a cross-disciplinary approach would require 
environmental philosophy because it borrows from both theoretical and applied philosophy. 
While the above trends may represent Western environmental philosophy, they are hardly 
exhaustive because they do not, in general, discuss environmental debates within African 
historical and cultural contexts. African environmental philosophy in general and Shona 
environmental philosophy in particular are part of marginalized knowledge systems. The 
perspective of pluriversality gives room and legitimacy to the examination of African 
environmental philosophy as seen in the section that follows. 
 
 
                                                          
17
 So named because it arises from the work of philosophers from the European continent, most 
prominently France and Germany. 
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2.4 African Environmental Philosophy Debate 
 
Three distinct positions can be identified in the African environmental philosophy debate. The 
first view is comparative, holding that ―scholars have kept quiet or what they have said about 
Africa is rather thin compared to what they have said about Native Americans, Asians and 
Australian Aborigines‖ (Kelbessa, 2005:20). This shows that Africa has been a neglected zone in 
terms of environmental philosophy. In addition, certain scholars tend to totally disregard Africa 
and focus on other regions as shown below; 
―An open-minded comparative study of Eastern environmental attitudes and 
values will enable Western environmental philosophers better to recognize and 
criticize their most ingrained and otherwise unconscious assumptions inherited 
from the long and remarkably homogeneous history of Western thought‖ 
(Hargrove, 1989: xx). 
 
The second position sees Africa contributing to environmental philosophy in a weak sense. The 
weak sense is based on the anthropocentric understanding of African ethics in particular and 
African philosophy in general; 
―Apparently, therefore, Africa looms as a big blank spot on the world map of 
indigenous environmental ethics for a very good reason. African thought orbits, 
seemingly, around human interests. Hence one might expect to distill from it no 
more than a weak and indirect environmental ethic, similar to the type of 
ecologically enlightened utilitarianism.‖ (Callicott, 1994: 273). 
 
Some will object that, empirically, Africa has one of the worst environmental records on earth 
(as exemplified by widespread deforestation, pollution and soil degradation) and obviously 
cannot be expected to contribute very much to global environmental responsibility. Africans are 
seen as incapable of overcoming their own environmental crisis.  But a closer look at African 
history shows that the real issue is not so simple. One has to examine how and why Africa has 
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faced an environmental crisis before concluding that Africans are environmentally unfriendly. 
This examination may show that colonialism and its ills are largely responsible for the African 
environmental crisis. As a result an African perspective of studying African environmental 
problems becomes necessary. 
 
The third position affirms the existence of a meaningful African environmental philosophy. 
Opuku (1993:77), commenting on African culture writes, ―there is community with nature since 
man is part of nature and is expected to cooperate with it; and this sense of community is 
expressed in terms of identity, kinship, friendliness and respect.‖ Three issues can be drawn from 
Opuku‘s analysis. Firstly, human beings are part of nature and this means the community extends 
beyond human beings to include environmental issues. Secondly, the ethical expectation to co-
operate with nature means environmental responsibility that involves protection, conservation 
and respect of the environment. Thirdly, the respect for fellow human beings means taking care 
of the environment.  
 
Commenting on African environmental ethics, Murove (2004:195-196) notes, ―this is an ethic of 
the interdependence of individuals within the larger society to which they belong and to the 
environment on which they all depend.‖ Murove (2004:196) posits society and environment and the 
interrelation of the two is made possible through an ethical concern. The ethical concern cares 
for fellow human beings as such and it also cares for them through the care of the environment.  
Africans aim to promote harmonious existence between the past, present and future (Murove, 
2004:196). This entails that African ethics recognizes the bond between the humans and their 
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environment, the debt that members of any generation owe to their forebears and their 
consequent responsibility to posterity (Murove, 2004:195). 
 
Tangwa (2004:839) writes, ―the indigenous African metaphysical outlook implies recognition 
and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and 
humans. The dichotomy between human beings, non-human animals and plants is slim and very 
flexible‖. The metaphysical outlook that Tangwa refers to is significant for epistemology and 
ethics thereby providing the foundation of environmental philosophy. Metaphysics plays an 
important role in the construction of a sound African environmental philosophy. 
 
 The Oromo of Ethiopia consider not only the well-being of humans but also other nonhuman 
animals (Kelbessa, 2005:21). In a defence of African environmental thinking, Kelbessa 
(2005:22) writes; 
 
 ―But the Oromo are not exclusively pragmatists. The bonds between the 
environment and the rural people are not only material but also spiritual and 
moral. Normative principles are implicit in the thought and practice of the Oromo 
people. For them, land is not only a resource for humans‘ utilitarian ends, but also 
it has its own inherent value given to it by Waaqa (God). For the Oromo Waaqa is 
the guardian of all things, and nobody is free to destroy natural things to satisfy 
his or her needs. The Oromo believe that the law of society is based on the laws of 
Waaqa as given in nature.‖ 
 
The material bond with the environment gives methods of how to manage, conserve and exploit 
the environment. Reflection upon such knowledge at a philosophical level, paves way for an 
environmental epistemology. The spiritual bond with the environment entails metaphysical 
forces in the protection and control of the environment. The moral bond with the environment is 
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a clear indicator of an environmental ethic among the Oromo. Since the Oromo are part of the 
indigenous cultures in Africa, the existence of an environmental philosophy among the Oromo 
helps to refute the skeptical view that Africans have no environmental philosophy. 
 
Furthermore, Kelbessa (2005:24) suggests, that the moral code of the Oromo people of Ethiopia  
―does not allow irresponsible and unlimited exploitation of resources and human 
beings…it reflects  deep respect and balance of various things. The Oromo do not 
simply consider justice, integrity and respect as human virtues applicable to 
human beings but they extend them to nonhuman species and mother earth.‖ 
 
A moral code that applies to the exploitation of natural resources is a clear indication of an 
environmental ethic. The balance of various things that Kelbessa refers to allows an 
environmental philosophy that is based on a broad ecological perspective that respects the 
different levels of being within the environment. Humans are conceived not as masters of the 
universe but they are friends, beneficiaries and users (Mbiti (1995) cited in Kelbessa, 2005:23). 
 
Basing on the above scholars, it can be inferred that African environmental philosophy is the 
study of the environment in relationship to human beings from an African point of view. African 
environmental philosophy is based on a metaphysical dimension that recognizes the different 
levels of beings in the universe. The African metaphysical perspective recognizes a kinship 
between humans and nature. The metaphysical perspective informs an environmental 
epistemology that involves experiential and practical knowledge about ecological preservation 
and conservation. The knowledge is acquired through experience, transmitted orally within a 
community, and is validated by its relevance to the daily life. Both the ontological assumptions 
and the epistemological claims provide a basis of an African environmental ethical concern that 
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includes co-operation with nature, friendliness, respect, unity of purpose, interconnectedness, 
interdependence and peaceful co-existence as shown in the philosophy of ubuntu in the next 
section.  
 
2.5 Ubuntu and African Environmental Philosophy 
 
Ramose‘s exposition of ubuntu shall be selected to provide justification for ubuntu as a 
legitimate point of departure for an African environmental philosophy in general and Shona 
environmental philosophy in particular. Ubuntu is the root of African philosophy. Ubuntu is a 
wellspring flowing with ontology and epistemology (Ramose, 2005:35) it is an indigenous 
philosophy that is simultaneously the foundation and the edifice of African philosophy (Ramose, 
2005:35). Just as the environing soil, the root, stem, branches and leaves together as a one-ness 
give meaning to our understanding of a tree, so is it with ubuntu. The foundation, the soil within 
which it is anchored, as well as the building must be seen as one continuous whole-ness rather 
than independent fragments of reality (Ramose, 2005:35). The argument for ubuntu as the basis 
of African philosophy is based on three premises. 
 
In the first premise, Ramose makes reference to ontology and metaphysics through establishing a 
connection between the two. In the African context, human existence is understood at three 
levels namely, the living human being, the living dead and those yet to be born (Ramose, 
2005:45). Since two of the levels pertain to beings which are either unknown or unseen, we may 
refer to them as ontology of invisible beings (Ramose, 2005:45). The ontology of invisible 
beings is the discourse of the unknown from the standpoint of the living (Ramose, 2005:45). The 
unknown remains unknowable from the side of the living (Ramose, 2005:45). However, the 
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belief in the unknown has a direct influence in the life of the living. In this sense, the belief in the 
unknown and unknowable is metaphysics (Ramose, 2005:45). Metaphysics becomes a claim, 
based upon belief, to knowledge about beings outside the domain of the world of the living 
(Ramose, 2005:45). The ontology of invisible beings is the basis of ubuntu metaphysics. 
The nature of human relations in the world of the living is based upon and influenced by the 
onto-triadic conception of being (Ramose, 2005:46). Umuntu cannot attain ubuntu without the 
intervention of the living dead (Ramose, 2005:46). By implication human beings cannot 
adequately manage the environment without the intervention of the living dead. The living dead 
are important to the upkeep and protection of the family of the living. For this reason, it is 
important that leaders and elders of the community must have good relations with the living dead 
(Ramose, 2005:109). This speaks of ubuntu understanding of cosmic harmony which must also 
translate into harmony with the environment.  
“Ubuntu has to be discussed in a comprehensive ontological horizon. It shows 
how the be-ing of an African person is not only imbedded in the community, but 
in the universe as a whole. This is primarily expressed in the prefix ubu-of the 
word ubuntu. It refers to the universe as be-ing enfolded, containing everything. 
The stem -ntu means the process of life as the unfolding of the universe by 
concrete manifestations in different forms and modes of being‖ (Ramose, 
2005:109). 
 
 Thus social interconnectedness is a more particular expression of a universal connectedness of 
being, which sets African thought sharply in opposition to the atomistic ontology of 
‗Enlightenment‘ modernism, although not to other non-western intellectual traditions. In 
contrasting African and modern Western conceptions of being, we find an understanding of the 
interconnectedness of all levels of being contrasted with an atomistic materialism. This 
interconnectedness is something more than that of the mechanically interconnected systems that 
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the modern worldview found itself able to comprehend and work with. African understandings of 
being are premised on social and cosmological connectedness, and this participatory way of 
being. 
 
The second premise in Ramose‘s argument is based on epistemology. Ubuntu epistemology is 
characterised by an insistence on the interconnectedness of the world, the unity of the knower 
and the world, and the relatedness of the knower within a community. This process includes the 
emergence of the speaking and knowing human being. Thus -ntu stands for the epistemological 
side of be-ing. This is the wider horizon, in which the inter-subjective aspects of ubuntu have to 
be seen. Mutual recognition and respect in the different inter-subjective relations are parts of the 
process of unfolding of the universe, which encompasses everything, in the speaking and 
knowing of human beings. This process in itself leads to the forms of inter-subjective relations 
that have been mentioned above. Ramose (2005:109) underlines the oneness and the whole-ness 
of this ongoing process.  The affirmation of interconnectedness, as well as the consequent denial 
of the ontological autonomy of objects or things and of the human observer, leads to a 
participatory epistemology.  
 
The third premise of Ramose‘s argument is anchored on ubuntu ethics. The ethical side of 
ubuntu can be seen in humanness. For Ramose (2005:105), the proverb motho ke motho ka batho 
is a Sotho proverb that means to be human is to affirm one‘s humanity by recognizing the 
humanity of others and on that basis establish humane relations with them. Being human 
(humanness) and having a respectful and polite attitude constitute the core meaning of the above 
proverb. The notion of ubuntu, hunhu or botho (humaneness) is particularly in use in Southern 
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Africa. In West and East Africa, we come across the notion of communalism, by which the inter-
subjective aspects of ubuntu are expressed in a similar way, although the more comprehensive 
philosophical horizon of ubuntu is missing here. There is an ethics of mutual help and of caring 
for each other.  
 
According to Ramose (2005:104), ―Motho ke motho ka botho is a Sotho proverb found in all 
indigenous languages of Africa. It means to be human is to affirm one‘s humanity by recognizing 
the humanity of others and on that basis, establish humane relations among them.‖  The proverb 
calls for respectful and polite attitude towards other human beings. To care for one another 
therefore implies caring for physical nature as well. ―Without such care, the interdependence 
between human beings and physical nature would be undermined‖ (Ramose,2005:109). 
Moreover, human beings are indeed an intrinsic part of the physical nature although possibly a 
privileged part (Ramose, 2005:109). Accordingly, caring for one another is the fulfillment of the 
natural duty to care for physical nature too.  
 
The concept of harmony in African thought is comprehensive in the sense that it conceives of 
balance in terms of totality of the relations that can be maintained between and among human 
beings as well as between human beings and physical nature (Ramose, 2005:109). The quest for 
harmony is the striving to maintain a comprehensive but specific relational condition among 
organisms and entities. It is the constant striving to maintain a balance between human beings 
and physical nature.  
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The principle of wholeness applies to the relation between human beings and physical objective 
nature (Ramose, 2009a:309). The concept harmony in African thought is comprehensive in the 
sense that it conceives of a balance in terms of the totality of the relations that can be maintained 
between and among human beings, as well as between human beings and physical nature 
(Ramose, 2009a:309). The task of human beings is to constantly strive to maintain a balance 
between human beings and physical nature (Ramose, 2009a:309). 
 
Human dignity can be understood in terms of relations with other human beings as well as 
relations with physical nature (Ramose, 2009a:309). The universe is seen as enfoldment of the 
interaction and interdependence of all things (Ramose, 2009a:312). The insight of mutual care 
arises, not only between and among human beings, but also between human beings and physical 
nature (Ramose, 2009a:312). 
 
Reductionist, fragmentative and empirisistic rationality continues to make great progress in the 
sphere of technology (Ramose, 2009a:312). These advances have resulted in serious disturbance 
of ecology (Ramose, 2009a:312). This disturbs the balance between human beings and the 
environment. Technological advancement continues to reaffirm the need to restore Ubuntu 
because humanity is faced with the threat of catastrophic ecological disaster (Ramose, 
2009a:313). The evidence of ecological disaster is seen in air pollution, climate change and 
destruction of the ozone layer (Ramose, 2009a:309). The rational option is a call for the 
restoration of ubuntu  (Ramose, 2009a:313).  
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The research has examined Ramose‘s understanding of ubuntu since it is a broad perspective of 
ubuntu that appears to be credible and balanced. It is credible because it captures the realistic 
dimensions of African philosophy and it is balanced because it takes into account all the major 
philosophical aspects that define ubuntu. This study has considererd ubuntu in the broad sense 
because this perspective informs environmental philosophy fully and it has broad implications 
for environmental responsibility. Ramose‘s argument paves way for African environmental 
responsibility as shown by Bujo in the section that follows: 
 
While arguing for an African environmental responsibility, Bujo (2009:281-282) maintains that 
the point of departure in African environmental philosophy will be an analysis of the antithesis 
between life and death as precursor to describing what Africans see as the proper relationship 
between the human person and the cosmos. Africans believe that life is the most sacred but life is 
permanently threatened by death (Bujo, 2009:282). The task of the human person is to identify 
the enemies of life to defeat death (Bujo, 2009:282). All beings in the universe possess vital 
force of their own: human, animal, vegetable or inanimate (Bujo, 2009:282). The human person 
and the cosmos complement each other to such an extent that they only exist interdependently 
(Bujo, 2009:282). The world of force is like a spider web where disturbance of the vibration of 
one single thread causes the shaking of the whole netweb. (Bujo, 2009: 282). Within the 
hierarchy of forces, the human person appears as the synthesis of the whole universe (Bujo, 
2009:282). All beings, organic and inorganic, living and inanimate, personal and impersonal, 
visible and invisible, act together to manifest the universal solidarity of creation. 
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The African person can only be understood as being characterized by interrelationships (Bujo, 
2009:285). The network of these relations includes the entire cosmos and God himself  (Bujo, 
2009:285).  Through a consideration of this relationship, people should become aware of the 
fragile nature of human existence (Bujo, 2009:285). Human existence could break down if the 
cosmos is neglected (Bujo, 2009:285). Human greed and blind confidence that anything could be 
achieved, however unnatural, is likely to lead to the destruction of the cosmos (Bujo, 2009:285). 
By failing to distinguish between life friends and enemies, the human person can lead himself 
and all humanity to death and destruction (Bujo, 2009:285). This position paves way for 
inclusivity that makes environmental responsibility possible. Bujo‘s point that all forces depend 
on each other like a web is important for environmental responsibility because if one part of the 
web is disturbed, the whole web is disturbed. This idea is significant for environmentally 
responsible human activity 
 
For Bujo (2009:288), technology does not necessarily contribute towards making the world more 
human. Western technology has to be revised to relearn the language of nature (Bujo, 2009:288). 
Technology has to respect other cultures. The future of those values that promote culture will 
shape the future of humanity (Bujo, 2009:288). Only the values that promote culture are capable 
of rescuing humanity. Without such values, there is no future even for technology (Bujo, 
2009:288). The ecological scandal makes it clear that the world with its high level of technology 
should be humanized (Bujo, 2009:289). The dramatic consequences of technology should remind 
Africans to keep their heritage and technology should be accepted critically (Bujo, 2009:290). 
The return to African indigenous environmental thinking calls for the liberation of life in all its 
manifold facets (Bujo, 2009:290). The significance of Bujo‘s analysis is that it justifies the use of 
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indigenous environmental philosophy in addressing environmental problems that are currently 
facing Africa. Human relations with the environment must be based on an understanding of the 
cosmos as continual strife for harmony. It is such anchorage that gives authenticity and 
legitimacy for an African environmental philosophy in general and Shona environmental 
philosophy in particular as shown in the next section. 
 
2.6 Shona Environmental Philosophy 
 
An understanding of Shona environmental philosophy can be achieved through an analysis of 
three key related dimensions, namely, Shona environmental metaphysics, epistemology and 
ethics. The Shona conception of being includes belief in the existence of Mwari (Supreme 
Being). The belief in Mwari becomes the basis of Shona metaphysics.  This metaphysics 
provides a foundation for an epistemology and an ethic that results in environmental 
preservation, conservation, management and exploitation that takes into consideration both the 
living dead and the yet to be born. The relatedness of these three dimensions is obtained through 
the philosophy of ubuntu which is the basis of African philosophy in general and Shona 
environmental philosophy in particular. 
For Tangwa (2004:389), the African metaphysical outlook involves recognition and acceptance 
of interdependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans. 
Africans are cautious in their attitude to plants, animals and inanimate things and the various 
invisible forces in the world. The metaphysical separation among plants, animals and inanimate 
things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, and the communal and the 
individual, is a slim and flexible one (Tangwa, 2004:389). Shona metaphysics can be understood 
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as the totality of the Shona people‘s perspectives of observing, interpreting and making sense of 
reality. Metaphysics is important in understanding environmental issues because it supplies the 
assumptions and justifications that form the basis of environmental reflection.  
 
In the Shona metaphysical worldview, the mhondoro is the spirit of the founder of a clan. The 
chief is in most cases the medium of the territorial spirit. The role of the mhondoro is to protect 
the fertility of the land and to control rainfall (Taringa, 2006:198). The Shona perform rituals to 
them to get rid of pests, bless seeds before a new crop is sown to ensure a successful harvest and 
to thank and celebrate successful harvest seasons (Taringa, 2006:198).  As noted above, the 
mhondoro is the ultimate owner of nyika. Nyika also refers to the area associated with the history 
of the founder of the clan as the first person to settle in a particular area (Taringa, 2006:198). 
 
The family vadzimu are guardians of the extended family. They are spirits of each family or 
small extended family lineage. So they are mostly concerned with the peace and welfare of 
individual family units. What is important to note is that mudzimu is associated benevolent 
experiences such as rain, forest fruit, the harvest, domesticated and friendly animals. Overall at 
both territorial and family level it means the human ancestors possess spiritual power and thus 
participate in sacred reality. Even though they inhabit the world of spirits they are still present in 
the human community as guardians of the family traditions, providers of fortune, and punishers 
of those who break accepted mores. So like in most African communities, among the Shona the 
vadzimu are crucially important for the continued welfare of the family and the community 
(Taringa, 2006:199). 
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Within the Shona metaphysical framework, being is understood hierarchically. This hierarchy 
starts with Mwari on the top, followed by vadzimu18 (the living dead), then comes living 
individuals, followed by those to be born, the last is the level of plants and animals. The 
ontological hierarchy is significant for this study because it gives an understanding of the 
environment that is based on ubuntu in the sense reality is seen as relational and based on co-
existence not only with the living but also with the living dead. The environment is seen as 
sacred because of these metaphysical forces that are behind it for sustenance. 
 
Although Matikiti (2007: 218) does not use the term Shona environmental epistemology, he 
describes knowledge claims that relate to the environment as ―the collective knowledge of an 
indigenous or local community about relationships between people, habitat and nature.‖ Shona 
environmental epistemology refers to knowledge systems that can be used for the benefit of the 
environment. Such an epistemology is largely based on observation and reflection of the 
environment. Conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the environment, to give knowledge that 
relates to the environment. These principles give knowledge that can be used for environmental 
responsibility. The Shona have grounded their knowledge to environmental concerns in order to 
understand, manage and exploit the physical environment.  Indigenous knowledge empowers 
local communities and promotes sound management of local resources (Matikiti, 2007:226).The 
significance of indigenous knowledge systems in environmental management programmes is 
                                                          
18
 The word vadzimu cannot be readily be translated into an English equivalent because it refers 
to the living dead. The living dead are persons who have departed earthly life but continue to 
influence events among their communities and as such, they are treated with respect and 
reverence. In English language, an ancestor is someone who has died but follows the chain of 
succession in the sense of a descendant. The term ancestor is philosophically narrow and cannot 
capture the philosophy of the Shona with respect to the dead. 
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neglected yet it is vital if local communities have to fully participate in environmental 
conservation (Rusinga and Maposa, 2010: 206).  
 
The Shona possess ethical norms, principles and codes that govern their relationship with the 
physical environment. The bulk of Shona environmental ethics, as derived from proverbs, is 
conservation ethics that allows the Shona to take care of the natural environment basing on the 
virtues of ubuntu. The idea of Shona environmental ethics is that, taking care of the environment 
is an indirect way of consideration to fellow members of the community (who also use the 
environment) and it also involves taking care of future generations who are to use the same 
environment.  Shona environmental ethics covers concepts of duties, rights, codes, care and 
respect, all in relation to the physical environment. Matikiti (2007:219) writes; 
 ―Closeness to nature deepens the natural impulse for gregariousness and sense of 
community among the Karanga people. Community is both a society, as well as, a 
unity of the visible and invisible worlds; the world of the physically living on the 
one hand and the world of the ancestors on the other. By observing common rules 
of respect in an area the people develop a single identity.‖ 
 
While Matikiti refers to the Karanga people, who are a sub-culture of the Shona, the observation 
he makes still applies to the Shona culture in general. Despite Matikiti‘s usage of the problematic 
term ancestors, instead of the term vadzimu or the living dead, the point he makes is important 
because ethics is connected to the living dead, the living and the environment. In Shona 
environmental ethics, care is a key concept which sustains the present state of the physical 
environment. Damage of the physical environment is seen as disrespect to fellow human beings 
and to the vadzimu. Taking care of the environment is a sign of respect both to fellow human 
beings and the living dead. The Shona have respect for the physical environment and this has 
important implications for environmental ethics since this promotes an attitude of care.  
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Chemhuru (2014:81) argues that ukama (relatedness) provides the ethical anchorage for human 
social, spiritual and ecological togetherness. The significance of relatedness links human beings 
to the environment at large (Chemhuru, 2014:81). Being human (kuva munhu) cannot be realized 
without first realizing others or the community of others who in essence could encompass the 
environment at large (Chemhuru, 2014:84). This entails that the community is ethically prior to 
individuals and the communal basis of ethics also extends to non-human animals. It is part of 
being morally upright to take care of non-human animals and nature as a whole (Chemhuru, 
2014:85). A complete and good human being is defined by the way one relates to other human 
beings, non-human animals and the environment. Unhu entails promoting well-being not only of 
oneself but that of other human beings and that of the environment (Chemhuru, 2014:85) 
legitimizing an African ontology-based environmental ethics is a viable perspective in ecosophy.  
 
2.7 Shona Environmental Philosophy as shown in Selected Proverbs 
 
While Shona proverbs may make reference to human or non-human animals, within the Shona 
experience, the interpretation of the proverbs goes beyond the images used by the proverbs to 
give a broader application. While Hamutyinei and Plannger may be credited for collection and 
classification of proverbs, the classification they give may be problematic in several respects. 
The authors appear to focus more on the anthropocentric interpretation of proverbs in the sense 
that the meanings of proverbs are given largely in the context of human nature and behaviour.  
This may give a false impression that Shona proverbs have no reference to environmental issues 
yet there is a flexibility in application that allows reference to environmental aspects. Hamutyinei 
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and Plannger (2013: xxi) acknowledge the limitation of their own classification as they write; 
―the broad content classification we have chosen could certainly be more detailed.‖ Viriri and 
Bhebhe argue against such classification insisting that life itself is unclassifiable into such 
categories. The point being made by Viriri and Bhebhe  (2012: xxi) is that Shona proverbs are 
meant to apply to different aspects of life without necessarily following some form of 
categorization. 
 
Three proverbs shall be explored to show implications on environmental philosophy. The three 
proverbs chosen are linked to the preservation of natural resources, conservation of natural 
resources and human relations with the natural environment within the Shona context.  
 
2.7.1 Preservation of natural resources 
 
Preservation, in the Shona context of environmental thinking, involves attempts to maintain, 
areas untouched by human influence in their present condition. The proverb gombo rine chitsva 
ndiro rine kudya (it is virgin land that provides more yields)19 (Hamutyinei and Plangger 
2013:340) can be used to draw environmental implications. In this broader context, the proverb 
may be taken to mean that the natural state of the soil, forests and air are conducive and 
necessary for improved outputs. Virgin land is land that is covered by natural vegetation and has 
                                                          
19
 While Hamutyinei and Plangger (2013:340) classify the above proverb under the general title 
of ―unity,‖ there is a sense in which the sub-title may be appropriate and inappropriate for this 
discussion under different respects. In the context of Hamutyinei and Plangger‘s anthropocentric 
interpretation, the point is that in order for virgin land to give abundant harvest, there is need for 
unity in tilling the land. This can be summarized in the statement, ―the harder the work, the 
greater the reward.‖ However, it may be argued that the application of the proverb goes beyond 
the sense identified by the two authors in a much more richer and flexible way. 
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not been brought under cultivation. This type of land contains more humus, nitrogen, better soil 
texture, better compactness and better water holding capacity. Virgin land is rich in terms of 
humus content, water holding capacity, aeration and polarity resulting in higher crop yields 
compared to previously cultivated land. Conscious of this point, the Shona can apply the proverb 
to environmental preservation. Among the Shona, the principle of the natural state as the best 
scenario guides environmental preservation. This means that preservation efforts are aimed at 
achieving the natural state of the environment which is arguably the better scenario in 
comparison to cultivated land. The argument behind preservation is the pursuit of the ideal 
undisturbed land that is the most suitable for ecology. Preservation of land resources is important 
because it gives the land a natural state that promotes favourable environmental outputs. 
The Shona have practices of preserving animals, tree species and water bodies.  These practices 
are consistent with the proverb gombo rine chitsva ndiro rine kudya in the sense that 
preservation ensures that there is elimination of threat of extinction to animal and plant species. 
Ordinary people are not allowed to kill the haka (pangolin) that is considered an endangered 
species (Rusinga nad Maposa, 2010:205). The haka is under the protection of indigenous chiefs 
and it is a punishable offence under the chief‘s laws to kill the animal. Taboos are enforced to 
maintain the value of and respect for animals such as pythons and pangolins (Risiro et al, 
2013:22). These taboos help to reinforce the need to preserve the environment as implied in the 
proverb  gombo rine chitsva ndiro rine kudya. Animals are also protected from extinction 
through various totems, each clan has an animal which the clan would not kill and eat (Risiro et 
al, 2013:19). The net result is that within a given Shona clan, there is an animal species that is 
preserved and this contributes to animal preservation in general. 
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According to Risiro et al (2013:20) Bvuma mountain in Zaka district, a predominantly Shona 
district, is kept with its dense forest both for the preservation of the natural environment and for 
undertaking cultural ceremonies. Visiting, cutting down trees and hunting are prohibited in 
sacred forests (Chemhuru and Masaka, 2010:128). Muchakata, muonde and mukamba trees are 
dedicated to the living dead and they are preserved thereby helping to preserve these species as 
well. Muzhanje, mutamba and mutohwe trees are not used for firewood for the purpose of 
preservation (Chemhuru and Masaka, 2010:129). Mutarara (gardenia globiflora) is prohibited 
from construction usage. The muhacha tree is not cut down even in contemporary times because 
it is considered as sacred (Chemhuru and Masaka, 2010:129). Indigenous fruit trees like 
muzhanje (uakapa kirkiana), mutamba (strychnos), mutohwe (azanza garkaena) and munhengeni 
(ximene) are not used as sources of firewood to protect the tree species and ensure a constant 
supply of fruits  (Duri and Mapara, 2007:105). Mubvamaropa (pterocarpus angolensis) and 
muzimbani (lippie javanica) are preserved for medicinal properties that treat wounds and coughs 
respectively (Duri and Mapara, 2007:105). Among the Shona, it is a taboo to cut down a mukute 
tree (syzygium cordatum). The tree grows on wetlands or along river banks. The reason is for the 
preservation of the tree and protection of water sources from drying up (Duri and Mapara, 
2007:105). 
 
With regard to preservation of water sources, springs and swamps are protected because they 
sustain the life of river systems (Chemhuru and Masaka, 2010:126). Barring agricultural 
activities in catchment areas and prohibiting streambank cultivation (Maposa and Mhaka, 
2012:27) also help to preserve the life of rivers.  
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The above preservation strategies are important because they express the environmental 
philosophy that is contained in the proverb gombo rine chitsva ndiro rine kudya . The strategies 
are home-grown and they have survived the test of time (Mapira and Mazambara, 2013:90). The 
result is that the preservation efforts become reliable and trusted among the Shona communities 
in particular and the global environment in general.  
 
2.7.2 Conservation of natural resources 
 
The proverb, rwizi rukuru rwukapwa, mombe dzinomwepi? (if the big river dries up, where will 
cattle drink water from?) (Hamutyinei and Plannger 2013:281) can be used as a source of 
environmental philosophy among the Shona. Asking reflective questions on the situation that is 
obtained after the depletion of natural resources is a philosophical procedure. The question 
demands environmental reflection to address causes of environmental problems at different 
levels. The question allows individuals to imagine a scenario where the community is weak and 
vulnerable after the depletion of a key natural resource. The solution to such a scenario is beyond 
the powers of individuals. To avoid such a scenario, an appeal is made to the living dead so that 
the environment is blessed with adequate rain to reduce the dangers of environmental disasters. 
The search for answers to the profound question gives rise to conservation measures. These 
measures relate to the three levels of being. The living dead are involved through rituals that are 
done to enforce taboos that conserve resources. The living munhu takes care of resources for the 
benefit of the present community and for the sake of those yet to be born. A consequentalist 
argument is behind the question that is asked. The notion of dependence identified by 
Hamutyinei and Plannger, can be extended and applied to the dependence of the Shona on the 
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environment. If the big river in the proverb is used as a symbol of the environment, the question 
in the proverb can be further extended to mean, if the environment as the source of air, food, 
warmth and water is destroyed, what will people depend on? The environment is an important 
aspect of human life that requires practical conservation measures in several ways. 
The common miombo woodland species such as Mnondo (Julbernadia globifora), Musasa 
(Brachystegia spiciformis) and Mupfuti (Brachystegia boehmii) which are sources of firewood 
are used sparingly. Individuals are allowed to cut branches from selected trees without dropping 
down the entire tree to allow the tree to continue to survive and grow new branches (Rusinga and 
Maposa, 2010:205). The practice allows the trees to regain and this ensures a constant supply of 
firewood for present and future generations. 
 
In the conservation of grassland ecosystem, cattle are often loaned to other areas for a number of 
reasons, one was which to avoid overstocking and overgrazing. By spreading livestock over a 
large area, range ecology was preserved. This system of loaning cattle is called kuronzera  (Duri 
and Mapara, 2007:103). The grassland management strategy helps to keep ecological balance in 
grasslands. In addition to the above, culling is done to preserve grassland ecosystems. 
In the management of river ecology most fishing nets were designed in a way that allowed small 
fish to escape leaving out the big ones (Duri and Mapara, 2007:107). The use of fish poison 
(mutika) was prohibited because it killed all types and sizes of fish in a wide area even extending 
many kilometers downstream (Duri and Mapara, 2007:107). These practices help Shona 
communities to maintain aquatic ecosystems. 
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 2.7.3 Human relation with the environment 
 
The proverb simba rehove riri mumvura (the strength of fish is in water)20 (Hamutyinei and 
Plannger, 2013:437) can be used to defend ecological balance. The environmental application of 
the proverb is that the vital connection between water and fish can be compared to the link 
between human beings and the environment. If water is taken away from fish, the fish dies and 
similarly; if the environment is taken away from human beings, humanity does not survive. This 
shows relationality, dependence and interconnectedness. The relatedness with the environment 
ukama is an important dimension that gives status and respect to the environment. Water 
symbolizes the environment and fish represent communities that depend on the environment. 
The environment becomes a source of strength since it gives economic, cultural, social and 
religious benefits. The life of human beings depends on the air, water, wood and soil that are 
essential for human survival. Without the environment, human life is impossible since the 
environment is the source of air, water, food and warmth that are essential for survival.  
The practical dimensions of the proverb simba rehove riri mumvura, is seen in Shona 
environmental practices that enhance ecological balance. The Shona have ways of keeping soil, 
water, forest and animal ecological balance. Zero tillage (manje) reduces soil erosion in 
cultivated areas (Risiro et al, 2013:33) marozhi (stone ridges) are used to reduce soil erosion in 
hilly slopes. The Ziwa terraces of Nyanga, a Shona community of Eastern Zimbabwe, are 
believed to have been built before the fifteenth century. The Shona people built the terraces in an 
effort to reduce loss of soil from slopes and preserve fertility. The practice is still applicable even 
                                                          
20
 Hamutyinei and Plangger classify the proverb under ‗miscilaneous‘ which means that it may 
not fit in to the categories they identified. 
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in contemporary times (Duri and Mapara, 2007:103). The reduction of soil erosion ensures 
minimum disturbance of soil ecosystems.  
Among the Shona, evidence of human relations with wild animals is seen through mitupo 
(totems). According to Mangena (2013:40) mutupo accords moral status and relations with the 
natural world. The mutupo (totem) principle focuses on fostering the primary relationships 
between animals and humans, animals and the deity, humans and humans, deity and humans, 
nature and humans, the dead and the living (Mangena 2013:40). The mutupo principle attempts 
to enumerate or approximate the ideal mode of life which assures a sustainable future for all 
existence. An analysis of the fundamental elements of the mutupo principle reveals that it is a 
principle which seeks to create a cosmology that takes the existence of non-human entities 
seriously (Mangena 2013:40). If one‘s totem is nguruve (pig), one cannot eat pig meat and this is 
meant not only to protect pig species from extinction through arbitrary killing for meat but also 
to show that pigs and human beings are related (Mangena 2013:40).  For a person of the pig 
totem, eating pig meat will be more like eating oneself. By extension this means that all persons 
of the pig totem will accord moral status to pigs (Mangena 2013:40).  
 
Rotational cultivation is a sustainable resource use because all its resources such as tree branches 
and ash are ploughed back to the soil (Duri and Mapara, 2007:102). Adequate time for up to 
three years is given for land to recover and vegetation to regenerate. The technique was used on 
sandy soils which are less productive. On basalt and alluvial soils, more time of up to six was 
taken before rotation was done. The use of artificial fertilizers is prohibited in wetlands to ensure 
that the soils in such areas do not dry up thereby preserving wetland ecology. 
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Inter-cropping was a technique in which grains, beans, pumpkins and root crops are grown 
together. The technique has the advantage of soil protection, improved soil structure, moisture 
retention, and suppression of weeds and pests (Duri and Mapara, 2007:103). The practice 
introduces a form of biological diversity that is found within natural vegetation. Agro-forestry 
refers to mixed cultivation of multi-purpose trees and plants in cultivated areas to improve 
productivity, kill pests, provide nutrients and prevent soil erosion (Duri and Mapara, 2007:103). 
2.8 Objections and replies 
 
Selected Shona environmental proverbs are considered unsuitable as a platform for 
environmental philosophy because the insights provided by Shona proverbs are based on small 
communities and their practical link to national conservation strategies are limited. It can be 
argued however, that the strategies for preservation and conservation of resources start at a local 
level. Shona environmental philosophy starts among Shona communities and it can be extended 
to other areas within Zimbabwe. 
The second objection is that Shona environmental proverbs are based on wasteful mentality in 
the use of resources. Notions of shifting cultivation and abandonment of tracts of land embedded 
in one of the proverbs are connected to wasteful mentality in the use of resources. It can be 
argued that the context of shifting cultivation was suitable in the past because of small 
population densities and in the contemporary times, there is a tendency towards rotational 
cropping and rotational grazing to allow the soil to regain its status. 
The third objection is that Shona environmental proverbs lack ideas of sustainable use of 
resources. Against this objection, it can be argued that the idea of sustainable resource use is 
evident in the sense that the Shona consider the environment as linked to three levels of human 
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beings, namely, the living beings, the living-dead and the yet to be born. If resources are used 
with the three levels of human beings in mind, it follows that the element of sustainable resource 
usage is present.  
The fourth objection is that the use of Shona environmental proverbs as a foundation of 
environmental philosophy is a theoretical approach that is devoid of practical application. While 
it may be partly true that proverbs are a theoretical reconstruction of experience, it may be 
wholly untrue to characterize proverbs as merely theoretical because they are based on 
experience. In addition, to state that Shona proverbs lack practical application is false because 
the insights from the selected proverbs are used in environmental conservation, care and 
preservation of natural resources.   
 
 
2.9 Significance of Shona Environmental Philosophy 
 
While Shona environmental philosophy shares similarities with the broad African environmental 
philosophy, it can be argued that the content of Shona environmental philosophy is shaped by 
Shona people‘s experiences on and reflections about their physical environment. The savanna 
climate that characterises most locations of Shona communities, is marked by hot, wet summers 
and cool dry winters. The average annual rainfall of nearly 600mm per year, interrupted by dry 
spells and droughts in some cases, influences vegetation growth, the type of wild animals that 
survive under these conditions and the seasonal flow of rivers. The type of environmental 
philosophy that arises out of Shona communities would be different from what can be obtained 
the equatorial regions for example, where water conservation may not be a critical issue 
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The discussion of Shona environmental philosophy as shown in Shona proverbs reveals that 
there is a justification for the retention of indigenous Shona preservation and conservation 
practices in the context of Western technology that threatens the environment. Focusing on the 
African environmental philosophy at large, Bujo (1997:216) argues, ―Western rationality can be 
revisited to relearn the symbolic language of nature. It is only when the technologically oriented 
world listens to the symbolic language, that it will become once more able to promote life 
instead of death.‖ When there is destruction of nature, indigenous culture closely linked to nature 
is also destroyed. Bujo (1997:216) quotes the following proverb from New Guinea, ―the forest is 
our skin and if one removes the skin of the human being, the end result is death.‖ In Africa, 
forests are preserved because forests are where life originates and develop (Bujo, 1997:216). For 
Bujo, (1997:218), ecological scandals make it clear that the world and its high level of 
technology needs humanization. ―The return to African indigenous culture calls for the liberation 
of life in all its manifold facets‖ (Bujo, 1997: 219) African communities should be aware of the 
dangers of technology transfer. ―Only reconciliation and peaceful co-existence can guarantee 
peace for the active creation and transform the human person from being a ruler into a guardian 
of the cosmos.‖ (Bujo, 1997:220) Today humankind is looking for an ethic which makes the 
earth permanently habitable (Bujo, 1997:221). 
While Shona environmental philosophy contained in proverbs could have been expressed before 
United Nations environmental conventions, it may be argued that Shona environmental 
philosophy contains elements that can be integrated with these conventions. The inclusion of 
metaphysical and physical well-being linked to an ethical dimension in environmental concerns 
gives a holistic approach to environmental philosophy. The advantage of the holistic 
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environmental approach is that it fosters a greater care of the environment compared to Western 
fragmentary approaches to environmental issues. The non-fragmentary perspective gives honour 
to the living dead who have preserved the environment in the past, demands environmental 
responsibility for present generations and ensures sustainable resource exploitation for future 
generations.  
The reliance on Shona indigenous philosophy for environmental issues constitutes efforts in line 
with the Rio earth summit whereby, principle 22 of the Rio earth summit states: 
―Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a 
vital role in environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support 
their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the 
achievement of sustainable development.‖ 
 
The involvement of indigenous ecological knowledge to global environmental responsibility 
allows the Shona to participate in a way that respects their own knowledge. The approach is 
culturally sensitive and acceptable to Shona communities. Foreign approaches are not only 
difficult to comprehend, but they tend to be inconsistent with inherited environmental 
philosophy. Shona proverbs serve as a participatory approach to environmental responsibility by 
harnessing the indigenous knowledge of the communities through proverbs. 
It can be argued that Shona environmental philosophy is compatible with the United Nations 
Convention on biological diversity due to its preservation and conservation efforts. Biological 
diversity means the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are 
part: this include diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992:3). Biological resources includes genetic resources, 
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organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual 
or potential use or value for humanity (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 
1992:3). Article 8j of the Convention on Biological Diversity states 
―Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement 
of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices‖ (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 
1992:6) 
 
 
Shona environmental philosophy shows evidence of adapting to climate change at least at a local 
level because of its attempts to maintain hydrological cycles, forest resources and water bodies 
that help to reduce the impact of climate change on temperature and precipitation. Evidence to 
fight climatic change is seen using environmentally friendly methods of sustaining forests and 
water bodies
21
. The United Nations Convention on climate change promote the development and 
strengthening of indigenous capacities and capabilities to participate in international and 
intergovernmental efforts, programmes to do with climate change (Article 5 of the Convention 
on Climate Change). Shona environmental philosophy shows capacity to fight climate change 
because of its emphasis on environmental responsibility in several ways that have already been 
discussed.  
 
Shona indigenous environmental philosophy is consistent with the indigenous rights to 
 
―maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional 
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of 
                                                          
21
 Instead of joining the capitalist mentality that destroys the environment for economic gains 
Shona environmental philosophy fights climatic change through preserving, conserving and 
sustaining the environment. 
97 
 
their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, 
seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, 
literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. 
They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual 
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional 
cultural expressions‖ (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Article 31, 2007). 
 
Article 6 of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat ensures that those responsible at all levels for wetlands management shall be informed 
of, and take into consideration, recommendations of such Conferences concerning the 
conservation, management and wise use of wetlands and their flora and fauna (UNESCO,  
1976:248) This convention has recommendations that are consistent with indigenous Shona 
environmental philosophical ideas on wetland conservation and preservation.  
 
 
The Shona indigenous approach to the environment emphasizes a practical application of 
knowledge and skills. The epistemic basis to environmental issues trusts in inherited wisdom that 
links environmental quality to the quality of human life. The practical approach helps every 
member of the community to participate in environmental conservation and preservation. The 
practical approach helps members of the community to participate in part, in the global concern 
for environmental responsibility. 
Shona environmental philosophy is connected to life. The connection to life is significant since 
the recognition of the life web between humans on one hand and forests, rivers, air and the soil 
on the other hand allows the Shona to respect the environment. The respect of the environment is 
an important virtue that can be used in other African countries for both the conservation and 
preservation of the environment. 
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Shona environmental philosophy contributes to global sustainability by virtue of experience in 
living sustainably on the land. The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro signed the legally 
binding convention on Biodiversity and emphasized the critical role of indigenous people and 
their knowledge for achieving sustainable environmental and resource management. Science and 
technology, taken on their own, cannot extricate the world from the current environmental crisis 
and indigenous ecological knowledge becomes a viable alternative approach that integrates with 
science yet it remains current, relevant and viable in indigenous communities. The indigenous 
approach overcomes the limits of scientific viewpoints to environmental aspects by inclusion of 
metaphysical dimensions to environmental philosophy.  
Chemhuru (2014:87) argues that Shona perspectives bring alternatives to global ethical reflection 
in an enriching and informative manner for sustainable development. Concepts used in Shona 
environmental philosophy are understandable at local level and this provides a basis for 
participation in global environmental responsibility. Shona environmental philosophy provides a 
culturally relevant understanding of environmental protocols and this justifies the retention of 
Shona indigenous environmental practices even today. It also provides pathways for recognition 
of interdependence between people and nature. Shona environmental philosophy fosters 
conditions for creating relationships with NGOs that promote both indigenous culture and 
conventions. In order to protect indigenous ecological knowledge, the people themselves and 
their way of life must be protected. Implementation of protocols becomes user friendly and 
culturally adaptable. 
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2.10  Conclusion 
 
The chapter has examined various conceptions of the environment and it has argued for an 
African conception of the environment which places emphasis on relationality, 
interconnectedness and interdependence where the human element is seen as part of the 
environment. The debate on the possibility of an African environmental philosophy has been 
explored and the research has defended an African environmental philosophy. The chapter has 
shown that ubuntu philosophy is the basis of African philosophy. An environmental philosophy 
based on ubuntu respects all aspects of the environment, recognizes the dependence of human 
beings on the environment, sees the land as sacred and affords responsibility for future 
generations by encouraging the preservation and conservation of resources. Three proverbs have 
been used to show how the Shona think about preservation of natural resources, conservation of 
natural resources and the interdependence between humanity and the natural world. The 
significance of Shona proverbs in the context of global environmental responsibility has been 
shown. 
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CHAPTER 3: SHONA PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter defends the actuality of African philosophy of law in general and Shona philosophy 
of law in particular. While the debate on the possibility of African philosophy appears to be over, 
the debate on distinct branches of African philosophy is still persisting (Idowu, 2005:66). 
Commenting on the tendency of Western scholars to marginalize African jurisprudence
22
, 
Murungi (2004:519) writes: 
―Construing the Africanness of African jurisprudence as marginal to 
jurisprudence or construing the Africanness of African philosophy as marginal to 
African philosophy is equally contestable. To see why this may be contestable 
one can imagine the absurdity of construing what it is to be human in a manner 
that marginalizes individual human beings. If one were to try to turn away from 
individual human beings and try to focus attention on human being as such, one 
would be focusing on nothing.‖ 
Murungi‘s approach is important for this study because African jurisprudence, cannot be 
conceived as marginal to jurisprudence in a pluriversal perspective. Jurisprudence is an integral 
component of philosophy of law and African philosophy of law may not be understood as a 
peripheral philosophy. African ideas and models of law, which derive from African societies 
rather than foreign cultures, are best suited for social control in African societies (Nonso, 
2006:37).  Mapaure (2011:151) argues that African law is a feasible means by which to advance 
                                                          
22 While there is a common ground between jurisprudence taken as the elucidation of legal 
concepts and normative theory from within philosophy of law, there is legal theory that is non-
philosophical that jurisprudence considers. There is an intersection between the two but the two 
terms are not interchangeable. Legal theory is a much broader and encompassing term, 
encompassing the philosophy of law and jurisprudence as well as theorizing from a variety of 
other perspectives, including economics and political thought (Sulum, 211:421). 
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an Afrocentric approach to African integration in a globalizing world of hostile jurisprudential 
viewpoints. There is need to approach philosophy of law from a broad perspective that respects 
other cultures. Concerning the need for an open-ended approach, J.S. Mill (1947 [1859]:41) 
writes; 
 ―The only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole 
of a subject is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion 
and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise 
man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this.‖  
 
In this citation, J.S. Mill is arguing for openness to other viewpoints in the process of 
constructing one‘s own approach. Philosophy may contradict itself through marginalization of 
other views because such an approach is inconsistent to the acquisition of wisdom. In this regard, 
Friedrich (1963:7) observes that only by taking account of all the different kinds of experience 
can one give an image of law that is adequate to reality. 
Firstly the chapter makes a conceptual analysis of both law in general and African law in 
particular. Secondly, it examines the debate on African philosophy of law. Thirdly, the work 
articulates an African conception of law that aims at social harmony, solidarity, peace and 
responsibility that are integral aspects of ubuntu philosophy. Fourthly, the research explores 
Shona philosophy of law that flows from Ubuntu philosophy and it aims at promoting the virtues 
of peace and harmony among the Shona. Shona philosophy of law is seen in the administration 
of justice at different levels of matare (indigenous Shona courts). Fifthly proverbs shall be used 
to show the metaphysical and social basis of law, the role of Shona law in promoting individual 
dignity and the application of Shona law in peace building. Sixthly, the research reflects on the 
significance of Shona philosophy of law.   
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3.1 Understanding law 
 
Madhuku (2010:1) defines law as rules and regulations that govern human conduct or other 
societal relations and it must be enforceable. For Harris (2002:3) rules may give a common sense 
view of law but this approach fails to provide an adequate account of law because there are other 
system of rules apart from law. These systems of rules may be moral rules or religious rules. 
Harris states that while it may be immoral to tell lies, it may not be unlawful to do so. Law can 
be understood as a system of rules and guidelines that are enforced through social institutions to 
govern behaviour.  
Curzon (1993: 219) defines law as 
 ―the written or unwritten body of rules largely derived from custom and formal 
enactment which are recognized as binding among those persons who constitute a 
community or state, so that they shall be imposed upon and enforced among those 
persons as appropriate sanctions.‖ 
 
Curzon‘s understanding of law has important implications for this study because it appears to be 
based on pluriversality in three ways. First, Curzon recognizes the point that law can be written 
or unwritten and this broad conception accommodates the type of law that has been historically 
marginalized by Western conceptions of law. Prior to Curzon, Ibekwe (1975:297) had already 
noted that:  
―European laws are written, because the art of writing and reading had long 
become part and parcel of their civilization. Regrettably enough, our own 
indigenous law is unwritten. It was handed down the ages from generation to 
generation. Like a creed, it seems to live in the minds of the people.‖ 
Secondly, law can bind communities or states and this justifies the existence of law in cultural 
circumstances. Thirdly, law can be derived from custom or formal legislative body. The first 
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disjunct gives the basis of a culturally specific conception of law and this opens room for an 
analysis of an African conception of law as shown in the next section. 
3.2 African Law  
 
To Africans, law comprises all those rules of conduct which regulate the behaviour of 
individuals and communities, and which by maintaining the equilibrium of society are necessary 
for its continuance as a corporate whole (Driberg, 1934:231). This analysis shows that law is part 
and parcel of the community and it has practical significance.  
For Driberg (1934:231),  
―African law is positive and not negative. It does not say " Thou shalt not," but " 
Thou shalt." Law does not create offences, it does not make criminals; it directs 
how individuals and communities should behave towards each other. Its whole 
object is to maintain an equilibrium, and the penalties of African law are directed, 
not against specific infractions, but to the restoration of this equilibrium. There is 
no written code, but the law is an organic growth, inherent in the body politic and 
accepted just because it is organic and coherent. A crime is the disturbance of 
individual or communal equilibrium, and the law seeks to restore the pre-existing 
balance.‖ 
Three issues can be drawn from Driberg‘s observation. First, African law aims at corrective 
measures to both the individual and community without stressing much on conviction of 
offenders. Second, African law achieves justice by maintaining social balance. Third, African 
law is organic and coherent in the sense that it is lived and it is practical.   
 It appears theoretically impossible for a community member to commit an offence against a 
fellow-member which would lay him or her open to a private suit, it is obvious that there must be 
some machinery to protect the community from an habitual offender (Driberg, 1934:234). The 
principle of group responsibility makes this essential, as one who is constantly involving the 
community in costly extra-clan disputes is wasting the property of the community without 
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contributing an equivalent to its economic prosperity (Driberg, 1934:234). The offender in such a 
case, while under no liability to an individual of his group, is nevertheless making it impossible 
for his or her group to maintain its group status or equilibrium in relation to the other groups of 
the community he or she is jeopardizing the principles which ensure the stability of the society.   
The habitual offender is accordingly outlawed by his or her clan: he is publicly put out of status; 
he or she cannot claim the protection of the clan and the clan disowns all further responsibility 
for his or her actions. This sentence may be followed by the maximum penalty of execution, 
which is frequently the fate of the habitual offender; but whether this is so or not, the result is 
much the same, as without the protection of the clan all economic activities are closed to the 
individual and he will either die of starvation or by assassination, his murder being of no concern 
to anyone, now that he has no membership in a protective group. This treatment of the habitual 
offender emphasizes the cardinal principle of African behaviour that the individual has 
communal responsibilities and obligations, only by discharging which is he entitled to any of the 
benefits which member-ship of a society confers (Driberg, 1934:234). 
Without prisons and a police force it is assumed that there can be no sanctions such as would 
give law the requisite validity (Driberg, 1934:237). It is at this point, I suspect, that we differ 
most widely. The penal sanctions are the least important of them all, chiefly because the law is 
positive and not negative, and because it is solely interested in maintaining the social equilibrium  
(Driberg, 1934:237). I shall try to sum up the sanctions which are universally valid in Africa as 
briefly as possible, only remarking that in certain areas, particularly in West Africa, secret 
societies tend to operate as a sanction for the observance of the law. Many of them, like the Oro 
and the Ekemeku, are police societies which act as guardians of public morals and punish 
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offenders. In them we find the nearest approach to our system of punitive justice (Driberg, 
1934:237). 
The law has the moral support, not only of the living members, but of all the members who have 
ever lived and died (Driberg, 1934:238). This reference to the departed, is in itself a very potent 
force in securing due regard for the law. It introduces a religious sanction, which is perhaps the 
most potent factor of all (Driberg, 1934:238). No compensation for an offence, no reparation, is 
complete without sacrifice. Every offence has to be legally compensated and ceremonially 
purged, and till both are done the offender and his community are in danger of spiritual 
retribution. It is this religious nexus which gives African law an authority sufficient to dispense 
with the mechanics of enforcement (Driberg, 1934:238) 
It is the duty of every member of the community, owing to the fact that he is one of a collective 
responsibility, to report any breach of the public law, of which the chief should thereupon take 
cognizance (Driberg, 1934:241). As it may take some time for the processes of law to be put into 
action, there is an obvious danger that the culprit may suffer summary justice at the hands of the 
injured party; but provision is made for this by the establishment of sanctuaries, where an 
accused man may await in security the slow movements of the law. This indeed is probably the 
chief social function of sanctuary in African societies. The institution of private suits is not 
necessarily a simple matter and, as we have seen in some communities, recourse has to be made 
to indirect methods. The central authority may only be concerned with certain specified cases, 
the public causes, and it may be necessary for the aggrieved party in a private suit to commit one 
of these major crimes, in order that in the subsequent public inquiry into his conduct his private 
complaint may be indirectly investigated (Driberg, 1934:241). 
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Ayinla (2002:151) defines African law as ―an instrument of maintaining social equilibrium with 
emphasis placed on distributive justice rather than formal justice.‖ For Ayinla (2002:151) law in 
Africa aims at maintaining peaceful, harmonious, inter-personal relations among members of the 
society as a whole. The object of the African system of law is to foster communal well being and 
harmonization of different interests likely to result in social conflict (Ayinla, 2002:151). The 
laws are accepted as binding upon various members of different communities (Ayinla, 
2002:151). African law rests on collective responsibility and the conscience of individual 
members of the community (Ayinla, 2002:151). African law cannot be separated from the 
culture of African people in that it is in-built in the life of Africans since it permeates the totality 
of the facet of their life (Ayinla, 2002:151). The maintenance of equilibrium is the principle that 
underlie African conception of law (Ayinla, 2002:153). ―Law comprises of all those rules of 
conduct which regulate the behaviour of individuals and communities and which by maintaining 
the equilibrium of society are necessary for its continuance as a corporate whole.‖ (Ayinla, 
2002:153). The group or collective responsibility extends to criminal offence like killing of a 
fellow villager. In such a case, all the family members of the slain party demand compensation 
and not only the immediate relatives (Ayinla, 2002:155). Legal personality is interwoven in the 
sense that it presupposes collective responsibility and a kind of interdependence.  
3.3 African Philosophy of Law Debate  
 
According to Idowu (2006:35), the debate concerning African philosophy of law has four distinct 
positions.  These varying positions have their corresponding justifications. In the first place, 
there are scholars who hold that there is nothing like African philosophy of law. The second 
position states that there may be African philosophy of law but no one is sure what it really 
consists of. The third position states that African philosophy of law is not very different from 
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Western philosophy of law. The fourth response posits that there is an African philosophy of law 
with a particular cultural context and content.  
3.3.1 The Skeptical Argument 
 
In the first place, there are proponents of the view that there exists no African philosophy of law.  
Holleman (1974: 12) also states that there is nothing like an African philosophy of law.  
Holleman‘s view is premised on the position that Africans lack a conceptual analysis of the 
notion of law. Further, Holleman (1974:12) insists that, even if Africans have indigenous 
systems of social control, they lack any trace of legal elements. The attack on the idea of African 
philosophy of law has been reduced to the idea that African rules of societal control and norms 
cannot be distinguished from rules of polite behaviour. The basis for this assertion and the denial 
of African philosophy of law can be explained in the light of three reasons: firstly the absence of 
a legislative system, with formal courts system and legal officials; secondly, the absence of a 
recognised system of sanctions; and thirdly, the presence of authoritarianism which is not subject 
to and controlled by law.  
 
It can be argued that African philosophy of law has a particular history and context. The 
historical circumstances leading to the marginalization of African indigenous knowledge claims 
have already been handled in chapter 1. It can be argued that the attempts to marginalize the 
reality of African systems in general and African philosophy of law in particular has a peculiar 
history. But then it is sufficient to state, as a conceptual and intellectual response, that regardless 
of the state of a given society, Idowu (2005:76) notes that it is human and logical to expect that 
survival of this kind of society is a sufficient indicator of the existence of some form of 
enlightened thinking on the part of its members. 
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Bewaji (2002:1) argues that 
 ―when we make a critical examination of  the diversity of human beliefs in 
various parts of the world, it seems clear that even the simplest-looking belief 
system must be acknowledged to have developed from some form of critical 
examination of events, things, beliefs. Without such philosophical presuppositions 
and, indeed, expostulations, on the part of members of these societies, it is 
difficult to see how such cultures and societies could have survived.‖  
From Bewaji‘s observation, it can be argued that the critical examination of events, things and 
beliefs forms the philosophy of a group of people. It becomes difficult for Africans to have 
continued to enjoy the progress they have even in the face of civilisation if they could not think 
and reflect on law.  
3.3.2 The Ignorance Argument 
 
Secondly, there are those who contend that there is something reminiscent of law that can be 
labelled African philosophy of law but the problem is that one cannot be sure of what the 
substance is or what it consists of. In this view, it is held that at best what Africans refer to as 
their philosophy of law or legal concepts are ingrained in customs thereby lacking in reflective 
significance. Hartland (1924: 5-6) rendered this point in ethnocentrically un-mistakable terms 
when he opined that ―primitive law is in truth the totality of the customs of the tribe.‖ Scarcely 
anything elides its grasp. ―The savage lives more in public than we do; any deviation from the 
ordinary mode of conduct is noted, and is visited with the reprobation of one‘s fellows‖ Hartland 
(1924:6). However, it can be argued that Hartand‘s attempt to dismiss the reality of African 
philosophy of law commits the fallacy of appeal to ignorance. From the fact that one is ignorant 
of African philosophy of law, it does not necessarily follow that such a philosophy of law is non-
existent. 
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3.3.3 The Non-Difference Argument 
 
The third position on African philosophy of law consists of scholars who are of the view that 
African philosophy of law is not different from Western philosophy of law.  The question on 
whether there exists an African philosophy of law becomes unnecessary. The purpose of the 
third position has been to interpret and apply the schools of thought in mainstream philosophy of 
law in the context of the African legal concepts. Okafor (1984:157), Taiwo (1985:197) and 
Nwakeze (1987:101) attempt to legitimize and justify African legal systems. They hold that 
African philosophy of law is consistent with the Western philosophy of law. The approach taken 
by the above scholars is that of picking Western concepts of law such as rule of law, justice, 
punishment, crime, penalty, responsibility and related concepts before validating them in the 
African context. 
3.3.4 The Reality Argument 
 
The fourth position is that of scholars who argue that African philosophy of law embodies a 
significant aspect of African life. African philosophy of law not only exists but also displays a 
basic reality that is authentic. The arguments on the existence and reality of African philosophy 
of law consist in an indirect form of attack on the denials of African philosophy of law. Elias 
(1956: 6) posits that except for the differences in social and cultural environment, law knows no 
differences in race or tribe as it exists primarily for the settlement of disputes, and, the 
maintenance of peace and order in all societies. Elias (1956: 33) writes; 
―the two chief functions of law in any human society are the preservation of 
personal freedom and the protection of private property. African law, just as much 
as for instance English law, does aim at achieving both these desirable ends.‖  
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 In line with this position,  Gluckman (1972: 173) writes that the denial of the African conception 
and system of laws is a great mistake stemming from a tradition imbued with enough ignorance 
about how the law works among Africans. In his words, ―Africans always had some idea of 
natural justice, and a rule of law that bound their kings, even if they had not developed these 
indigenous conceptions in abstract terms.‖ While Gluckman‘s position that Africans have the 
notion of natural justice is correct, the position that their indigenous conception of law has not 
been developed in abstract terms is false. Having established the reality of African philosophy of 
law, the work proceeds to examine the definition and content of African law. 
 3.5 African Philosophy of law 
 
According to Ayinla (2002:147) African philosophy of law, is the pursuit of wisdom or 
knowledge of law as obtained in indigenous African societies. This approach has an advantage 
because law is related to the belief systems of Africans, it respects the community and it makes 
people responsible to fellow human beings. Furthermore, Ayinla (2002:148) argues that African 
philosophy of law is the elucidation of law from branches of African philosophy such as 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and logic. Metaphysics debates on the existence and nature of 
African law, epistemology focuses on the grounds of knowledge about African law; ethics 
examines the relevance of ethical principles of law while logic examines the reasoning, proof, 
thinking and inference used in law (Ayinla, 2002:148).   
 
In Murungi‘s view, a genuine understanding of African legal philosophy should include the 
historical context of African law. African legal philosophy is a victim of European conception of 
what is rational (Murungi, 2013:2). African legal thinking is trashed as superstitious, irrational 
and unscientific. Europeans have also associated rationality with civilization, this association 
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leads them to declare Africans uncivilized (Murungi, 2013:2). Under the delusion that Africa is 
lawless, Europe has taken up the mission of sending missionaries of law to Africa (Murungi, 
2013:2). For Murungi (2013:2) the Europeans suffer from the illusion that what law means has 
already been universally settled and what remains is to have everyone recognize and implement 
it.  This illusion is consistent with both enslavement and colonization of Africa. It provides 
justification for the inhuman treatment of Africa.  
African legal philosophy is ―a sense of law or domain of law in Africa, a domain where African 
has a say by being African‖ (Murungi, 2013:7). African legal philosophy ―seeks to articulate and 
bring in Africanness about law‖ (Murungi, 2013:7). To think of African legal philosophy is to 
take the being of the African into account (Murungi, 2013:7). According to Murungi (2013:8) 
African legal philosophy is a branch of African philosophy. It sets aside other studies of African 
law which are non-philosophical. In Murungi‘s view, African legal philosophy must bare an 
African conception of philosophy and it must necessarily challenge European dogmatism. 
 African legal philosophy is an intersection where branches of African philosophy meet 
(Murungi, 2013:9). Its integrity is preserved by the internal unity of philosophy (Murungi, 
2013:9). It articulates indigenous African legal philosophy. It prepares for and reinforces a 
genuine philosophical dialogue between Africans and non-Africans (Murungi, 2013:13). The 
task of African legal philosophy is to find African thinking about law that divorces African 
thinking from dictatorial and paternalistic tendencies of Western philosophy (Murungi, 2013:13). 
It takes into consideration how to think in an African way (Murungi, 2013:13). Thinking in 
African way examines what Africa is and what an African is (Murungi, 2013:16).  
―Authentic African legal philosophy is a philosophy that affirms and empowers 
the humanity of every African, a philosophy which the material expression of the 
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dignity of every African is recognized and affirmed. This is the landscape of 
African legal philosophy‖ (Murungi, 2013:20).    
The above observation suggests that African legal philosophy must take an Afrocentric 
position for the restoration of African dignity. Genuine African legal philosophy is in 
part, the struggle to stem aside the destruction of the Africanness of the African 
(Murungi, 2013:24). The objective of African legal philosophy is to decolonize the 
African mind (Murungi, 2013:24). This decolonization addresses the thinking within 
African legal philosophy so that it becomes free of colonial mentality. It is a self-
reflective exercise where the African reflects about how he or she thinks about the law. 
According to  Murungi (2013:24), ―we must not make the assumption that indigenous 
African legal sensibility is without fault or that it is entirely without merit.‖ This demands 
a critical assessment that sees both the strengths and weaknesses of indigenous African 
legal philosophy.  
A call for the Africanness of African legal philosophy is a call to awaken Africans to the 
condition under which they live so that they can identify and remove whatever stands in 
their way to being members of the African community - a community where no one 
human being lives at the expense of another human being, and in which where no one 
human community lives at the expense of another human community (Murungi, 
2013:24). 
In Africa, there is a home for philosophy, a home not only for Africans but for the 
humanity of all human beings (Murungi, 2013:2). This points to the fact that African 
philosophy in general and African legal philosophy in particular, is accommodative of 
other viewpoints in the context of pluriversal thinking. When law is taken up in African 
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philosophy, it is about securing this home (Murungi, 2013:24). African legal philosophy 
is a human story being told in an African context (Murungi, 2013:27). For Murungi 
(2013:27) the context is ―our autobiography and a webiography that does not consist of a 
collection of individuals that exists independent of one another but as members of an 
organic community.‖ 
―Whenever we associate law with lawyers, judges, jurists, lawmakers, law 
professors, and law enforcement officers, we miss out on what is law. What is 
essential to law is what constitutes us as human beings, and what defines us as 
such. In such a view of law, none of us is a stranger to any one of us. Such a view 
of law is what is pursued under the umbrella African legal philosophy‖  (Murungi, 
2013:27).  
The point being made by Murungi is that the essential ingredient of African law is that law 
becomes part of life and it ceases to be abstract as shown in the ubuntu conception of law below. 
3.6 African Philosophy of law and Ubuntu 
 
The African view of law is not abstract as in the Western conception but it is a lived experience 
(Ramose, 2005:84). While the Western legal subject lives in or within the law, the African legal 
subject lives the law (Ramose, 2005:84). The former represents the law and the latter takes law 
as manifestation of thought. Ubuntu law is a combination of rules of behaviour that are contained 
in the flow of life (Ramose, 2005:84). Ubuntu legal philosophy must be understood on the basis 
of an onto-triadic structure where being is seen in terms of three interrelated dimensions, namely, 
the living, the living dead and the yet-to-be born (Ramose, 2005:88).  
3.6.1 Metaphysics of Ubuntu law 
 
According to Ramose (2005:84), ubuntu law has a metaphysical conception of being as an onto-
triadic structure. This means ubuntu law involves three levels of being, namely, the living human 
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being, the living dead and those yet to be born. Recourse to protection by supernatural forces 
constitute the metaphysical basis of African law. The constant communication between the living 
and the living dead speaks of the rheomodic character of African law (Ramose, 2005:80) where 
rheomodic language is understood as a conscious endeavor to be at one with reality as a 
wholeness as opposed to fragmentation of reality that that result in fixations of the mind that lead 
to false images of reality (Ramose, 2005:88). Wholeness and oneness is made up of the triad of 
the living, the living dead and those yet to be born (Ramose, 2005:88). The underlying 
metaphysics of being as an onto-triadic structure means that ubuntu has got a transcendent 
dimension (Ramose, 2005:88). The law has to be communicated to the living dead (Ramose, 
2005:88). The communication of the law to the living dead becomes the metaphysical basis of 
the authority of ubuntu law. This metaphysical structure ensures communication among the three 
levels of being. On the basis of this structure, justice determined by the supernatural forces is 
declared on their behalf by the living who are in authority. Orientation towards the supernatural 
forces is the abstract dimension of  ubuntu law. Its quest for justice is not focused in the world of 
the supernatural forces. Instead, it is directed immediately towards the world of the living in the 
first place and, the yet-to-be-born in the second place. This determination by the supernatural 
forces is consistent with the metaphysics of ubuntu law. This consists in a triadic structure of the 
living, the living dead (the supernatural forces) and the yet-to-be-born. 
3.6.2 Ethics of Ubuntu law 
 
Ramose (2005:72) argues that ubuntu may be seen as the basis of African law. African law is 
about the philosophical family atmosphere prevailing among the indigenous peoples of Africa. It 
is also a body of legal rules applicable to a particular group of African people at a particular 
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place and time (Ramose, 2005:72).  Justice in ubuntu philosophy entails the exchange and 
sharing of these forces of life (Ramose, 2005:85).  
―The authority of law is derivative, law is dependent upon the prior active 
presence of umuntu. Without the living ubuntu, law cannot arise. The experience 
of the living umuntu leads to the idea that law is desirable. Accordingly, law is by 
no means a pre-established necessity. It is always a desideratum arising from 
concrete experience at a particular place and time‖ (Ramose, 2005:85). 
 
Another feature of ubuntu law is that it is linked to morality. The flexibility of ubuntu law 
speaks to the idea that it is law without a center. This is because ubuntu philosophy holds that 
being is one continuous wholeness rather than a finite whole. On this reasoning, the legal 
subject cannot be the center of the law. This does not deny the importance of the legal subject 
in law. Law consists of rules of behaviour contained in the flow of life (Ramose, 2005:84). 
Justice harmony and peace are the aim of ubuntu law. The idea that life is a constant flow and 
flux means that it cannot be decided in advance that certain legal rules have an irreversible 
claim to exist permanently (Ramose, 2005:84). It is believed that if and only if the law 
enhances harmony in human relations, the living dead have given their approval to it 
(Ramose,2005:88). Umuntu must be the embodiment of ubuntu because the fundamental 
ethical, social and legal judgement of human dignity and conduct is based upon ubuntu 
(Ramose, 2005:88). Ubuntu is the principle that we act humanely and with respect towards 
others as a way of demanding the same from them (Ramose, 2005:89).This belief connects the 
metaphysical basis of law with the moral dimension of law thereby providing a coherent 
philosophy of ubuntu. Justice is determined by the supernatural forces. Their determination 
seeks to restore harmony and promote the maintenance of peace. Justice as the restoration of 
equilibrium is a central element of the ubuntu philosophy of law. The ubuntu understanding of 
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justice as the restoration of equilibrium means that law as a continually lived experience 
cannot reach a point of finality. 
For M‘baye (1974:147), prescription is unknown in African law. This means that ―the African 
believes that time cannot change the truth‖ (M‘baye 1974:147). Just as the truth must be taken 
into consideration each time it becomes known, so must no obstacle be placed in the way of 
the search for it and its discovery (M‘baye 1974:147). It is for this reason that African judicial 
decisions are not authoritative. They must always be able to be called into question resulting in 
flexibility without a compromise to reasonableness. The broader understanding of African law 
enables the research to situaute the Shona conception of law in the next section. 
3.7 Law among the Shona 
 
Gombe (1998:59) observes that for the Shona, mutemo or murao  (law) is made up of a set of 
rules and regulations that have been handed over by madziteteguru
23
 (the living dead) and 
administered by chiefs and their councilors for the good of the community. This shows the 
metaphysical foundation of law among the Shona since law is based on some spiritual entities 
that have influence on the living. This view is in line with Idowu (2004:53) who maintains that 
―a people‘s system and conception of law is clearly connected and rooted in their history.‖ Law, 
among the Shona cannot escape Shona history and cultural context.  For the Shona, law is part of 
life and the community observes laws for social harmony. According to Gombe (1998:58), 
―A human being is not like an island that exists lonely but is found in the 
community that sets regulations and rules for the sake of peace, co-existence, 
solidarity, harmony and friendliness among the members of the community.‖ 
 
                                                          
23
 Madziteteguru is a synonym of vadzimu (the living dead) with emphasis on their advisory role. 
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The Shona indigenous court (dare) is responsible for cases that involve breaking of the law 
(Gombe, 1998:51). Breaking the law (mhosva) is taken seriously among the Shona and it affects 
not just the offender and the offended, but the whole community at large. Gombe (1998:51) 
identifies three types of courts in the Shona indigenous system of law. The first one is the family 
court (dare repamusha). This involves a private court session between members of a single 
family or between two families of the same extended family. The male family head or aunt 
presides over the case for the purpose of bringing justice to feuding parties without involving 
members of the wider public. The involvement of the male family head or aunt is deliberate 
since it is part of gender sensitivity among the Shona. If a case involves males and issues to be 
discussed may require the exclusion of females, the male family head presides over the case. 
Similarly, if a case involves female issues that may not be easily disclosed to males, the aunt 
presides over the case. For the Shona law is in the first place, is about a family atmosphere 
prevailing among the indigenous people. The purpose of law and hence the related court system 
is to build unity, togetherness and harmony which are clear traits of the family atmosphere. The 
second type is the local court (dare remumana) which presides over cases involving two or more 
different families. This court handles smaller crimes such as thefts, fights and adultery. For 
Gombe (1998:53), local courts are the foundation of law and ethics among the Shona. The aim of 
the local court is to instill social harmony among the disputing parties. In addition, the court also 
encourages the complainant to understand that wrongdoing is part and parcel of human nature to 
facilitate the forgiveness of the accused and promotion of social harmony. The third type of court 
is the higher court (dare repamusoro) which involves the settling of cases by chiefs and sub-
chiefs. In this type of court, the chief presides over the case with the help of advisors who were 
chosen on the basis of intelligence, knowledge and eloquence of speech. In most cases, the 
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advisors are either philosophic sages or folk sages who demonstrate a vast amount of wisdom 
about Shona law. All the three types of courts are significant for this study because they show the 
various levels at which law is interpreted for the administration of justice. 
3.8 The link between Shona proverbs and philosophy of law 
 
 The use of Shona proverbs makes language lively and vivid because proverbs make use of 
various mental images (Gombe, 1995:151). Proverbs make one think seriously about what is 
being said because they challenge one‘s reflective capacity to come up with the deeper meaning 
involved. Proverbs are used euphemistically which means that harsh and distasteful terms are 
substituted with mild and more morally acceptable language. In line with this thinking, Gombe 
(1995: 162) asserts, ―it can be said that the majority of these expressions are used in a context 
where a speaker does not want to use blunt or offensive terms.‖ Polite and less offensive terms 
are culturally acceptable in a gathering that may involve elders or even young people. In the 
context of the present research, the use of proverbs with reference to offences is less offensive. 
When a member of the community breaks the law, it is prudent to use less offensive proverbial 
language that does not hurt. Proverbs are considered as reflecting the Shona people‘s philosophy 
of law. Proverbs are a result of inductive generalizations that have been tried and tested with 
experience. As a result, proverbs can be used to capture different situations that have a direct or 
indirect bearing to law. Proverbs are significant in relation to the Shona conception of law 
because they can be used to resolve disputes in the court (Mandova and Wasosa, 2013:871). 
Proverbs are used in Shona courts because they interpret the law and they can be used to 
articulate a philosophy of law. 
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3.9 Shona Philosophy of law 
 
The functionality of the Shona legal system finds concrete manifestation in the concept of dare 
which means a place for the administration of justice (Chimuka, 2001:28). For the Shona, the 
metaphysical that relate to the law are non-individualistic but they embrace a social dimension. 
This means that the law (mutemo) does not only affect the culprit or wrong doer but it also 
affects the community as a whole including the living dead. The metaphysical basis of law 
through the belief of vadzimu can disapprove or approve the law is useful in challenging 
positivist conceptions of the law that see the human being as the creator and assessor of the law. 
The appeal to a transcendent foundation of law facilitates the link between law and morality. The 
law must pass the moral test to gain approval by vadzimu. Members of the community shoulder 
moral responsibility upon themselves so that there is approval by vadzimu. 
The Shona indigenous justice paradigm is based on a holistic philosophy and the world view of 
the Shona. The holistic philosophy connects everyone involved with a problem or conflict on a 
continuum, with everyone focused on the same center.  The connection includes the living, the 
living dead (vadzimu) and those yet to be born.  Shona law takes into consideration underlying 
issues that need to be resolved to attain peace and harmony for the individuals and the 
community. The Shona justice system starts with disclosure of problems related to breaking of 
the law, to discussion and resolution within the Shona indigenous courts (matare), to making 
amends and restoring relationships. The methods used are based on concepts of restorative and 
reparative justice and the principles of healing and living in harmony with all beings and with 
nature.  
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Among the Shona, restorative principles refer to the process for renewal of damaged personal 
and communal relationships since what affects individuals affects the community as well. The 
victim (mukanganisirwi) is the focal point, and the goal of Shona law is to heal and renew the 
victim's physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual well-being. Shona law also involves attempts 
to make the offender to regain dignity and trust, and to return to a healthy physical, emotional, 
mental, and spiritual state.  
Within the Shona justice system, reparative principles refer to the process of making things right 
for oneself and those affected by the offender's behavior. To repair relationships, it is essential 
for the offender to make amends through apology, asking forgiveness, making restitution, and 
engaging in acts that demonstrate a sincerity to make things right.  The mending of relations is 
very important among the Shona because the communal aspect allows for crime to be viewed as 
a natural human error that requires corrective intervention by families and elders or indigenous 
leaders.  Offenders among the Shona remain an integral part of the community because of their 
important role in defining the boundaries of appropriate and inappropriate behavior and the 
consequences associated with misconduct. 
The indigenous approach requires problems to be handled in their entirety. Conflicts are not 
fragmented, nor is the process compartmentalized into pre-adjudication, pretrial, adjudication, 
and sentencing stages. These hinder the resolution process for victims and offenders and delay 
the restoration of relationships and communal harmony. All contributing factors are examined to 
address the underlying issues that precipitated the problem, and everyone affected by a problem 
participates in the process. This distributive aspect generalizes individual misconduct or criminal 
behavior to the offender's wider kin group, hence there is a wider sharing of blame and guilt. The 
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offender, along with his or her kinsmen, are held accountable and responsible for correcting 
behavior and repairing relationships 
3.10 Selected Shona Proverbs as Expressions of Shona Philosophy of law 
 
The research shall select three Shona proverbs that have implications to Shona philosophy of 
law. These implications border around the metaphysical and social dimension of law which is 
based on the Shona understanding of human reality; the dignity of the individual person despite a 
strong bias on collective responsibility in law and the function of the law in peace building. 
These implications are connected in the sense that both the metaphysical basis of Shona law and 
the protection of individuals by the law are aimed at peace and harmony within the community.  
3.10.1 The Metaphysical and Social dimension of law 
 
The social dimension of law is demonstrated by the Shona proverb; changu ndoga isadza 
mhosva ndinodana vamwe (what belongs to me alone is sadza, but as for an offence, I invite 
others). For the Shona, social ontology is the basis of understanding crime. The law is 
understood as a social instrument of order and mhosva (breaking the law) has a social dimension. 
If Urayayi (not his real name) kills Sinjonjo (not her real name) the Shona maintain that it is not 
just Urayayi who is the offender but the whole nuclear and extended family of Urayayi is guilty 
of a serious offence. Similarly the entire extended family of Sinjonjo becomes the complainant. 
If Urayayi‘s family fails to compensate Sinjonjo‘s relatives for the loss of their daughter, it is 
believed that the revenge takes a metaphysical dimension in the form of ngozi (avenging spirit). 
In its administration of justice, the avenging spirit kills the family members of Urayayi before 
finalizing the kill with the real culprit. If the offender is a poor person who fails to compensate 
the offended family, his or her family members are supposed to help by contributing because if 
122 
 
they fail on this duty, the consequences of the revenge will be undesirable and destructive. In 
addition, court sessions involve family members of both the offender and the offended. For the 
Shona, a crime should not be understood in the Western, positivistic and individualistic sense but 
it should be seen as affecting the community at large. As a result, there are no individual egoistic 
boundaries that relate to crime but there are social grades that are tied to crime. This means that 
one offender can disturb the whole social web and as a result administration of justice equally 
shoulders on the community.  
Since no single individual can claim expertise over weighty and intricate cases, the strategy of 
Shona indigenous court practices is to pull epistemic tools together (kuita maonera pamwe). This 
means that the chief and his judges help each other by putting their ideas together to judge the 
merits of a case. This practice is consistent with the sociality of knowledge among the Shona. 
Knowledge is shared communally and in the context of legal epistemology, there is a team work 
approach to knowledge. The communal nature of legal epistemology is meant to ensure that 
epistemic tools come from several individuals so as to overcome the dilemmas, complexities, 
paradoxes and contradictions that may be involved when dealing with court cases. Pulling 
epistemic tools together is democratization of knowledge and it is an effective strategy in the 
sense that it is internally self corrective and evaluative. The implication is a participatory, 
democratic and social approach to knowledge of law, there is emphasis on team work and team 
building and this makes it easy to democratize knowledge of law. The democratization of legal 
knowledge helps in the recognition of the limits of individual efforts. 
 
In the Shona court sessions, plenty of time is given to the witnesses to say out their opinions. The 
perspectives of members of the public are also seriously taken into account to give greater 
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flexibility and a wider range of opinions. As a result, there is openness towards dialogue and 
truth in the Shona legal epistemology. The diversity of opinions is epistemically healthy because 
it allows the judges to compare the diverging opinions and come up with the most reasonable of 
opinions. Competing truth claims can be used to overcome false claims and as a result, it 
becomes relatively easy for the judges to decide over intricate cases. 
Shona practices that give evidence to the proverb discussed above include the involvement of 
others people right from the time the law is broken. This involvement takes three levels. First, 
living individuals are consulted on the nature and extent of law breaking. These other people 
comprise of members of the nuclear family, members of the extended family and other members 
of the community at large. These people help in giving ideas, especially to the offended member 
of the community, that help to interpret the law and how the justice system may be carried out. 
The second level is the involvement of the living dead in the administration of justice. Just laws 
must be approved by vadzimu while unjust laws are believed to anger vadzimu
24
. The third level 
is made up of those yet to be born. While this category has no direct bearing with the law, the 
law is used to clear offences that may result in avenging spirits ngozi that may affect future 
generations if justice is delayed. 
3.10.2 Law as protecting the dignity of individuals 
 
In the Shona ontological conceptual scheme, a human being is considered sacred and is always 
treated with respect (Gombe, 1998:132). The offender is seen as an otherwise good person who 
                                                          
24
 While it is a fact that laws are created by human beings, such laws are subject to moral 
evaluation by both the living and the living dead. For the good of the community, laws must pass 
the moral test and among the Shona, it is believed that breaking the law can result in punishment 
from vadzimu in the form of misfortunes that can be evidenced by ill-health, failure to make 
progress and urombe (poverty). 
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has made a mistake. As a result, an ontological distinction is made between the person who has 
committed an offence and the offence. Because of this essential distinction, there is a possibility 
of hating the offence and not the offender. The proverb, dare harizvondi munhu, rinozvonda 
mhosva (the court does not despise the person but the offence) serves to show the said 
ontological distinction. The Shona understanding of law allows this distinction. In its literal 
meaning, the first part of the proverb assumes this ontological distinction because a human being 
is seen as having intrinsic value owing to his or her possession of mweya (soul). This ontological 
value is based on ubuntu which articulates that the value of the human being comes from  
Musikavanhu (Supreme Being) and no individual can take away this value. At the same time the 
living human being is believed to be under the custody of his or her vadzimu and hence the 
value. Law is understood in the context of the ontological hierarchy that includes not just the 
living, but the living dead and Musikavanhu (Supreme Being). 
Shona practices that show the above proverb is that the accused is respected before the law. This 
respect accords fair hearing to the accused so that the law can be used to determine the offence, 
if any. The protection of individual dignity also helps to handle false accusations. Even if the 
accused is found guilty, there is still respect for that person since the person still possesses the 
potential to do good. When one is found guilty, a team of elders explains the nature of the 
offence in the context of the law with the aim of rehabilitating the individual. For the sake of 
harmony within the society, the offender and the offended, are encouraged to restore relations 
and possibly forgive each other. In cases that involve a dispute arising out of the impregnation of 
one‘s daughter by a young man, there are high tensions that characterize the family of the 
daughter and the young man involved. However,  the skillful application of the law may result in 
125 
 
the two rival families respecting each other as in-laws after some negotiated settlement arrives at 
a marriage plan in the process of solving the dispute. 
 
3.10.3 Law as an instrument of peace 
 
In the Shona legal philosophy, the peaceful settlement of court cases is always valued. Peace is 
seen as important because it facilitates social harmony it helps in the management of potential 
conflict at grassroots level. Even if the offended may be very angry to the extent of thinking of 
fighting the accused, the Shona encourage peaceful settlement of conflict. Emotional episodes 
may burst but the Shona encourage peaceful settlement of such cases. It is the moral duty of the 
chief and his or her panel of judges to ensure peaceful and fair trial of cases. This perspective is 
captured by the proverb, mhosva haitongwi nekurwa (an offence is not settled through fighting). 
Peaceful dialogue is therefore the proper way of dealing with crime among the Shona. Logically, 
fighting does not solve the problem but it worsens the conflict. For the Shona, it is ethically 
desirable to engage in peaceful dialogue so as to manage conflict. If conflict is not managed well, 
it may lead to security threats. This thinking derives from the philosophy of ubuntu. 
 
Peaceful settlement gives room for forgiveness. The advantage of the system is that forgiveness 
helps in community social harmony by building trust in individuals. Forgiveness is based on the 
broad concept of hunhu (Chimuka, 2001:26) and the practice helps to restore social harmony. 
The communal nature of Shona life makes forgiveness important because grudges cannot be 
sustained where people live together. Outside this context, the proverbial implication has 
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capacity for application in situations of conflict and violence where truth telling is required so as 
to achieve fairness and justice in society.  Law is subordinated to peace. 
The administration of Shona indigenous law is seen in indigenous courts (matare). Matare are 
used as tools for dialogue between two disputing parties. Law is applied for a negotiated and 
peaceful settlement. Dialogue opens up light for the two parties using the law. Despite some 
harsh episodes that may occur especially among the accused, law among the Shona is used to 
instill discipline so that a peaceful settlement is reached. Negotiated settlements ensure that 
justice is achieved in a peaceful context. The law is seen as an instrument of peace within the 
community and the administration of peace must be consistent with justice. 
 3.11 Objections and Replies 
 
The use of Shona proverbs to construct philosophy of law can be seen as anachronistic. 
According to Wiredu (1980:1) anything which is anachronistic ―outlasts its suitability.‖ For 
Wiredu (1980:1) anachronism becomes the failure to perceive that things need to be discarded or 
modified as the case may require. If Shona proverbs are anachronistic because they need to be 
discareded, then the claim falls away because they are still being used in the language. 
Furthermore, if Shona legal proverbs are to be discarded because they require modification, then 
the objection again falls off because legal philosophy reconstructs their application to suit 
contemporary needs. Critical reflection on proverbs provides innovation and reconstructive 
application that provide new life to the Shona legal proverbs. It can be argued that some Shona 
proverbs provide insights for human dignity and peace in the context of the law within the 
community. 
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The second objection is that Shona proverbs that give rise to philosophy of law may not apply 
outside small communities and their influence on the nation may be trivial or insignificant. 
While it may be true that the selected Shona proverbs were coined within the context of small 
communities, it does not necessarily follow that they lack trans-cultural application. The ability 
of Shona proverbs to cross cultural settings implies their applicability even outside Shona 
communities. In addition the philosophy of ubuntu from which the proverbs are derived is trans-
cultural. As a result the main thrust of the objection becomes untenable.  
The third objection is that Shona legal philosophy is based on collective wisdom rather than 
concepts of trained jurists. The objection is based on a questionable and narrow understanding of 
legal training. The questionable view of legal training assumes that there is one culture that gives 
legal training and the assumption becomes narrow and unrealistic in the context of pluriversality. 
Legal philosophies must be seen as diverse and multiple in proportion with the number of 
cultures across the globe.  
The fourth objection is that the use of selected Shona proverbs as the foundation of insights in 
legal philosophy is exclusivist within Zimbabwe because Shona language is only one among 
Chewa, English, Koisan, Nambia, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Sign language, Tonga, Tswana, 
Venda and Xhosa.
25
 While the observation about the multiplicity of languages is true, the claim 
about exclusivism does not necessarily follow. Due to language contact and change, languages 
tend to influence each other and a cross-cultural comparison of proverbs show that insights from 
one language can still be expressed in another language. 
 
                                                          
25
 The Constitution of Zimbabwe, (2013:6). 
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3.12 The Significance of Shona indigenous approaches to philosophy of law 
 
The use of Shona indigenous philosophy of law is consistent with and validates the following 
United Nations international instruments: 
―Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous 
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the 
community or nation concerned. No disadvantage of any kind may arise from the 
exercise of such a right.‖ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
(Article 9). 
 
The instrument gives a platform for the Shona communities to exercise their right to pursue 
traditions and customs. It is within these traditions that proverbs find place since this is part of 
the intellectual traditions of the Shona. The exercise of intellectual traditions gives room for 
critical reflection and reconstruction of the implication of Shona proverbs within the 
contemporary period. 
 
―Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop 
the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures as well as the right to 
the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken 
without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and 
customs‖ (Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 12). 
 
To practice and revitalize cultural traditions entails the use of proverbs in philosophical thinking 
and this becomes part of ‗developing the past‘. The word ‗develop‘ is appropriate since it 
includes selecting what is useful and reconstructing it to meet the needs of contemporary 
situations. Proverbs cut across the cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property of the 
Shona people.  
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―Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands and 
territories, including the total environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, 
sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources which they have traditionally owned 
or otherwise occupied or used. This includes the right to the full recognition of 
their laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the 
development and management of resources, and the right to effective measures by 
States to prevent any interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these 
rights‖ (Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 26). 
 
 
The use of proverbs for philosophical thinking is consistent with the full recognition of 
indigenous laws. The full recognition of indigenous law among the Shona includes the 
philosophical reflection upon the justification, purpose and meaning of law and this culminates 
in a philosophy of law. The state should promote indigenous law and the philosophy behind to 
facilitate the exercise of this right. 
 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Section 174 (b) recognizes the existence of ―customary law courts 
whose jurisdiction consist primarily in the application of customary law.‖26 Although the use of 
the term customary law is problematic, the point is that the use of indigenous law helps to 
preserve important cultural practices among the Shona. 
 
The use of Shona indigenous approaches to law ensures not only consistency with the above 
international and domestic instruments but it also leads to a participatory approach to the 
administration of justice. Wide participation means ordinary people are involved in the 
application, procedure and outcome of the law.  Ordinary people become part of a law process 
                                                          
26 The term customary law is problematic in the following ways (1) it subordinates African law to 
foreign law (2) it displaces or marginalizes the African epistemological paradigm from which 
African law is derived (3) it negates the idea of legal pluralism in the spirit of pluriversality.  
 
 
130 
 
that allows them to own and understand law decisions and the punishment within an indigenous 
justice framework. As a result, law becomes lived and practical rather than abstract and 
theoretical. The participatory process is just as important as the result of the case, involvement of 
as many villagers as possible implies that excessive bias, corruption and miscarriage of justice 
are avoided. In the final analysis, offenders, village youth, future elders, go-betweens and 
adjudicators all learn about indigenous law by implementing it. The participatory framework 
makes it easier for elders and women to understand and speak within the law process thereby 
ensuring a wider participation within the community.  
  
The Shona philosophy of law, as shown by the selected proverbs, provides an alternative 
conception of understanding justice and the law. This gives a broad framework that is achieved 
in the spirit of pluriversality. Anyone in the village has the right to join in when a case is being 
heard and there is a wide debate in the village over guilt, degree of seriousness of the offence, 
and the appropriate level of punishment and compensation.  
 
Among the Shona, the objective of the law is to promote peace, solidarity and harmony within 
the community. Conflicts can be dealt with quickly to reconcile the two parties, restore harmony 
and social cohesion. A serious problem becomes a little problem since the community is placed 
before the law. Shona possess grassroots tools of peace building through reconciliation that 
involves dialogue and critical discourse. Dialogue is the basis of solving conflicts and avoiding 
feuds. In the African set up, tribal conflicts and ethnic wars paradoxically exist in a geographical 
zone which has the tools of humane and dignified conflict resolution efforts. The significance of 
Shona philosophy of law is that local thinking can be used to bring about regional and even 
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global peace. Peace building efforts are therefore part and parcel of Shona thought systems and 
this means that the Shona have the tools to contribute towards world peace 
 
The advantage of the Shona law perspective is that it places potentiality of goodness on the 
shoulders of the offender in the administration of justice and it helps in the formulation of 
dignified and humane corrective measures. Globally this has promise to challenge the inhuman 
treatment of human beings in prisons of war or in ordinary prisons where there is a materialistic 
view of persons which is devoid of any immaterial entity. The spirituality imbedded in the Shona 
ontological framework transcends the limitations of materialistic conceptions of persons who 
have committed offences. Cross culturally, the said Shona understanding has potential to 
promote sound rehabilitation philosophy. 
 
 
In the context of the offender, Shona philosophy of law focuses on the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of the offender into society. This makes the law victim friendly while discouraging 
offences at the same time. As a result, law among the Shona is lived, practical and meant to 
improve the moral standing of members of the society.  
 
Shona legal metaphysics is significant as it stands as an alternative to the individualistic or 
atomistic approach to legality that is championed by Western legal systems. It serves both as a 
critique and a promise for social ontological harmony. It is a critique because it comes as a 
standpoint of a historically marginalized thought system that has been thrown away not on the 
basis of criticism and scrutiny but on the basis of fallacies and prejudice. It serves as a promise 
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because it has potential for balancing society through participatory conflict resolution and peace 
building. 
3.13 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has argued for the reality of an African conception of law that is based on the 
philosophy of ubuntu. The Shona philosophy of law draws from the broad African perspective 
that cherishes the philosophy of ubuntu. Ubuntu provides the basis of a coherent philosophy of 
law among the Shona. Shona philosophy of law is a reflection of legal elements and the chapter 
draws these elements from selected proverbs. These proverbs have been used to show the 
metaphysical basis of Shona legal philosophy, the role of the law in protecting the dignity of 
individuals and the function of the law in peace building within the community. The chapter also 
explores the significance of Shona philosophy of law  in offering an alternative way of thinking 
about law. 
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CHAPTER 4: SHONA POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
The chapter argues for an African political philosophy in the broad sense and Shona political 
philosophy in particular. Shona proverbs shall be used as the basis of an epistemological 
paradigm of a culturally rooted political philosophy. Several lines of justification can be used to 
support the need for an indigenous African political philosophy. Wamba-dia-Wamba (1992:67) 
argues that the content of democratization in Africa must be redefined in terms of a mode of 
politics in crisis towards a new mode of politics. The politics in crisis is imported Western 
politics and a new mode of politics lies in the African indigenous political paradigm. The African 
philosophical paradigm must refute the social epistemology of domination (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 
1991:12). The refutation and dislodgement of the epistemology of domination will pave the 
ground for an indigenous philosophy that articulates and defends African values. 
 
Ramose (2005:93) argues that indigenous conquered people of Africa must construct an 
epistemological paradigm of their own as a means of expressing their authenticity in order to 
attain true liberation. The position that Western-style democracy is the answer to political 
organization in contemporary Africa is flawed for two main reasons. It is metaphysically 
erroneous because it does not take seriously the principle of contingency of being by being 
subject to historical determinism (Ramose, 2005:96). Secondly, it is inauthentic expression of 
African political culture because it is an imposition. For these reasons, in Ramose‘s view, 
Western-style democracy fails to be emancipative and this justifies the search for African 
indigenous political insights.  
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Commenting on the potential contribution of indigenous political systems, to contemporary 
African political systems, Wamala, (2004:441) argues that, multiparty politics, although 
conceivably good for alternative policy advancement in individualistic societies, has tended to be 
very problematic in communalistic societies. The problem that Wamala sees is the adoption of a 
foreign epistemological paradigm whose ontological assumptions, epistemological framework 
and ethical values are inconsistent with the host culture. Salami (2006:69) maintains that 
democratic values in indigenous Yoruba social and political society established a participatory 
democracy as it employed different models of involving citizens in governance which allows for 
political representation of diverse interests. This useful approach cannot be neglected in 
contemporary African political philosophy because it involves consultation and involvement of 
communities in political decision making. In the same line of thinking, Chemhuru (2010:180) 
maintains that governance, peace and development, if ever they are to be achieved in Zimbabwe, 
it is imperative to consider the socio-political and economic order of traditional
27
 Zimbabwean 
societies instead of relying on borrowed liberal democratic principles. Ciaffa (2008:127) argues 
that indigenous African societies displayed a humane ethical orientation and a communalist 
political philosophy that can be mobilized in the contemporary setting, serving as powerful 
                                                          
27 Tradition is used in the positive sense to refer to indigenous thought systems in the sense of 
cultural products that were created, pursued, accepted, preserved and maintained to the present 
by successive generations (Gyekye, 1997:221). Another view of tradition represented by 
Hountondji (1996:48) sees tradition as the past that is misguided and ill-suited to address the 
challenges of contemporary Africa. Hountondji (1996:48) calls for a ―clean break‖ with the past 
and suggests that African philosophy and culture lie before us, rather than behind us. The 
problem with this rejectionist stance is twofold. First, the moral and political spheres of 
traditional life have much to offer as Africans deal with the challenges of political 
modernization. Second, thinkers who view the African past with varying levels of disdain and 
skepticism are often guilty of overemphasizing the scientific aspect of modernization at the 
expense of the political aspect. 
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antidotes to political authoritarianism and the growing influence of Western individualism and 
consumerism. These ideas must be reclaimed and revitalized, not ignored.  
 
 The importance of the community is emphasized in the African Charter. Article 20 (2) states 
that colonized or oppressed people shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of 
domination resorting to any means recognized by the international community. An African 
political philosophy is necessary to dislodge mental oppression and colonization because it 
articulates African ideals and approaches in debates (Heyns, 2006:15). Bujo (2009:391) argues 
that an abrupt break with African indigenous approaches, in favour of Western-style democracy, 
would be unwise because the Euro-American
28
 models originate in their historical and cultural 
space and adopting them without questioning would be problematic. 
 
This chapter is organized into five main sections. The first section examines various definitions 
of political philosophy and defends a conception of political philosophy that tries to approximate 
the ideal of pluriversality. The pluriversal definition is chosen because it provides a platform for 
African political philosophy in general and Shona political philosophy in particular. Other 
definitions of political philosophy shall be criticized for narrowness in the sense of excluding 
alternative views of thinking about political philosophy. The second section highlights African 
political models that currently obtain in various countries. These models help to show the extent 
to which indigenous political ideas are included or marginalized in state governance. It is 
important to note that chapter 15 of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, which is now in use, 
officially recognizes indigenous political roles from chiefs and this makes the study of Shona 
                                                          
28
 Euro-American refers to the Americans with European ancestry and this excludes Afro-
Americans and native  Americans. 
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political philosophy relevant and appropriate. The third part examines the applicability of ubuntu 
philosophy to political thinking in Africa. It is argued that ubuntu is important for political 
thinking because it is a source of friendliness, solidarity, togetherness, oneness, sameness and 
groupness that give identity and common ground for an ethically justifiable political philosophy. 
Ubuntu provides political philosophy with an epistemology that has been tested in the collective 
wisdom of African culture. The fourth section looks at how Shona political philosophy has been 
organized in the past. This organization exhibits metaphysical assumptions of ubuntu because it 
credits vadzimu with political vision and goals. The living, represented by the chief, are held 
together by the chief in a family atmosphere to achieve peace and harmony within the society. In 
section five, Shona proverbs are used to provide elements of Shona political philosophy as a 
means of expressing authenticity. These proverbs are used to provide alternative thinking that 
can be used to dislodge Western political paradigms. 
 
4.1 Understanding Political Philosophy 
 
Strauss (1959:12) defines political philosophy as, ―the conscious, coherent and relentless effort 
to replace opinions about the political fundamentals with knowledge about them.‖ Furthermore, 
Strauss suggests that political philosophy is the attempt ―to know the nature of political things 
and the right, or the good, political order‖ (1959: 12). According to Miller (1998:1) political 
philosophy can be defined as philosophical reflection on how best to arrange collective life - 
government institutions and social practices, such as economic system and the pattern of family 
life. Political philosophers aim at to establish basic principles that will justify a particular form of 
state. This involves analysis and interpretation of ideas like justice, authority and democracy and 
then applying them in a critical way to the social and political institutions that currently exist 
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(Miller, 1998:1). Both Strauss and Miller‘s definitions, while they may pick essential attributes 
of political philosophy, appear to be narrow since they fail to accommodate views of 
marginalized political philosophy.  Khan (2001: 215), writing in an Islamic context, argues that 
political philosophy must be a critical enterprise. Political philosophy must articulate a critique 
of imperialism, Westernization and the de-Islamization of society. In the context of this research, 
political philosophy must be critical of the West for the marginalization and sidelining of 
indigenous political systems of thought without adequate justification.  
 
Leca (2010:525) construes political philosophy in the following manner: 
―Political philosophy is that area of philosophy dealing with politics and 
government, that unstable mix of war and foedus, conflictual division and 
authoritative union. As ‗philosophy‘ it is part of the vita contemplativa, which is 
pure thinking; as ‗political‘ it has always something to do with vita activa, that is 
action and praxis in a world that exists with its own rules and language games 
before any philosophical attempt to make that world the embodiment of a theory 
as Plato did. Philosophy, like science, is about truth whereas politics is about 
power or, more accurately, ‗the constrained use of social power.‘ This formulation 
reintroduces truth into the possible constraints alongside rhetoric, persuasion, 
compromise and negotiation.‖ 
The point being made by Leca is that political philosophy, as a discipline, reflects upon empirical 
issues of governance which may not be necessarily systematic and neat and this makes political 
philosophy rely upon political science for its data. However, Leca‘s definition appears circular 
since it brings back the word ‗politics‘ which is supposed to be clarified. 
Tully (2002:534-535) identifies six ways in which political philosophy is critical. First, it starts 
from and grants a certain primacy to practice. It is a form of philosophical reflection on practices 
of governance in the present that are experienced as oppressive in some way and are called into 
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question by those subject to them (Tully, 2002:534). Second, the aim is not to develop a 
normative theory as the solution to the problems of this way of being governed, such as a theory 
of justice, equality, or democracy, but to disclose the conditions of possibility of this historically 
singular set of practices of governance and of the range of characteristic problems and solutions 
to which it gives rise (Tully, 2002:534). Third, this practical and critical objective is achieved in 
two steps. The first is a critical survey of the languages and practices in which the struggles arise, 
and various theoretical solutions are proposed and implemented as reforms (Tully, 2002:534). 
The second step broadens this initial critique by using a history or genealogy of the formation of 
these specific languages and practices as an object of comparison and contrast (Tully, 2002:534). 
Fourth, the approach seeks to establish an ongoing mutual relation with the concrete struggles, 
negotiations, and implementations of citizens who experiment with modifying the practices of 
governance on the ground (Tully, 2002:535). Fifth, these philosophical investigations thus stand 
in a reciprocal relation to the present, as a kind of permanent critique of the relations of meaning, 
power, and subjectivity in which we think and act politically and the practices of freedom of 
thought and action by which we try to test and improve them ( Tully, 2002:535). Sixth, it applies 
the critical methods beyond and against its Eurocentrism by testing and going beyond limits on 
the basis of continuous critical dialogue with a contrasting metaphysical thinking oriented to 
discovering and overcoming limits. (Tully, 2002:535). The last point of critical activity is 
important for this study because it gives room for alternative and pluriversal perspectives in 
thinking about political philosophy.  
 
4.2 Political Models in Africa 
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The debate on whether African indigenous political philosophy must be given priority gives 
dilemmas to post-colonial African governments resulting in different forms of indigenous
29
 
political institutions. The models serve as an empirical justification of the extent to which 
indigenous political systems have been adopted in different African countries. The differences 
show the extent to which Western models of governance have influenced African states. The 
dualisation of indigenous systems of governance and foreign models has led to tension and 
controversy both at the level of policy and administratively. Political models are a source of 
administrative dilemmas for post-colonial African states since the decision to maintain 
indigenous forms of government or abolish them altogether is problematic. These institutions can 
exist side by side with the state or they can exist on their own. Hinz (2008:61) identifies five 
models that show the interplay between indigenous political governance and Western model 
governance. Hinz (2008:61-63) calls these models strong modern monism, unregulated dualism, 
regulated dualism, weak modern monism and strong modern monism. Although Hinz uses 
problematic terms such as tradition and modernity
30
, these models shall be adopted for the sake 
                                                          
29 According to Dei (2002:12) indigenous past reflects the history, customs, cultural practices, 
ideas and values handed down from one generation to the next. It is this past that constitutes the 
group‘s cultural identity. An important question is how do we define the ‗real past‘ if we accept 
that culture is not a ―passively inherited legacy‖, and also, that cultures and traditions are 
constructed in particular social and political contexts? (Linnekin 1992: 249-250). Recognition of 
situational, contextual, historical and political embeddedness of culture should lead us to the 
understanding that the indigenous is not an undifferentiated category. It is a term that is contested 
and articulated in multiple ways, none of which implies that we cannot speak of the ‗indigenous‘. 
 
30 Gyekye (1997: 233), argues that the key to addressing contemporary political problems lies in 
reclaiming and revitalizing indigenous systems that have been degraded and suppressed in the 
wake of colonialism. Colonialism violently disrupted African cultural ideals and imposed, with 
varying degrees of success, European forms of thought and social organization upon colonized 
peoples. Having achieved political independence, postcolonial Africans must now pursue a more 
decisive liberation, a ―decolonization‖ of African minds and societies. 
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of showing the interplay between indigenous political structures and Western style political 
structures before giving a critique of these models. 
 
 4.2.1 Strong Modern Monism 
 
In the model of strong modern monism, African indigenous political structures which Hinz 
(2008:62) calls traditional structures are abolished from the formal government structures. Where 
the model of strong modern monism is adopted, the society may be familiar with indigenous 
political leaders despite the fact that the indigenous leaders will be politically powerless.  From 
the political viewpoint however, they would be at no other level than other stakeholders and 
opinion leaders in the society (Hinz, 2008:62). Indigenous leaders would not form part of the 
overall governmental structure of the society (Hinz, 2008:62). The reason for the use of strong 
modern monism becomes clear because there is a heavy bias towards Western style model of 
governance which marginalizes the indigenous political structures to the level of mere opinion 
leaders.  
 
4.2.2 The model of unregulated dualism 
 
In the model of unregulated dualism, the state tolerates indigenous political structures without 
formally confirming or recognizing their existence, performance and acceptance (Hinz, 
2008:62). Western style of governance dominates but indigenous political structures are allowed 
to make their own political decisions which the state allows to bind. 
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4.2.3 The model of regulated (weak or strong) dualism 
 
The model of regulated dualism involves the state confirming indigenous political governance 
taking its own place apart from the authority structures of state government. In other words, the 
overall political system would be a dual, or better, plural system with the state-run system on the 
one side and a plurality of indigenous political systems on the other. Dual or plural systems are 
systems in which indigenous political governance is officially recognized. Whether a given 
dualistic situation will be called weak or strong, will depend on the degree of autonomy the state 
accepts to grant to those semi-autonomous social fields (Hinz, 2008:63). Indigenous political 
governance is given room to exist semi-autonomously
31
.  
 
4.2.4 The model of weak modern monism 
 
The state takes note of the existence of indigenous political governance but does not 
acknowledge its existence in the model of weak modern monism by giving it a semi-autonomous 
status as in model 3 above. Instead, the state provides for a set of rules that integrate indigenous 
authority into the overall state system (Hinz, 2008:63). Indigenous leaders could become civil 
servants and thus be fully responsible to the state as any other civil servant. They would be 
entitled to perform official functions not because of their indigenous legitimacy, but because of 
the legitimacy of the state.  
                                                          
31
 Zimbabwe is an example of a country where indigenous leaders are officially recognized. Sections 280 
-287 of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe recognise the existence, duties and roles of chiefs in political 
governance. 
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4.2.5 The model of (strong) traditional monism 
 
In the model of traditional monism, African indigenous political characteristics will prevail at the 
level of the state. The government of such a state would have the form of indigenous authority. 
Swaziland is the only African example that comes close to model 5. In the model, political 
authority follows the path that has been passed on from past generations. 
4.2.6 Critique of African political Models 
 
The strongest recognition of the importance of the African indigenous system of government lies 
in the model of ―strong traditional monism.‖ Although the inclusion of the term traditional is 
problematic in the sense that it gives a conservative and backward implication, the model shows 
the greatest extent of indigenous political autonomy. The subordination of the indigenous 
political system to the state is not only a continuation of colonial mentality but also an expression 
of skepticism over the significance of the indigenous institution of governance. The skepticism is 
based on the questionable assumption that the West has a superior system of governance. The 
assumption is questionable because it is based on prejudice rather than fact. Humane elements of 
peace, harmony, solidarity and oneness provide evidence of community oriented political goals 
within the African indigenous political system. The trivialization or the complete abandonment 
of the indigenous political system is culturally unjustifiable because it allows the dominance of 
foreign models in political affairs. The indigenous political model is healthy to any African state 
because it provides checks and balances to the adopted foreign models. While it can be argued 
that it may not be possible to go back to the past, the humane elements that are present in the 
indigenous political systems may not be overthrown as well.  
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Sogolo (1993:185) argues that, reflective thought that is associated with philosophy is evident in 
African indigenous culture. In the context of this study, the reflective capacity of the African past 
is seen in proverbs across African cultures in general and in the Shona culture in particular. The 
false claim that the African past was deficient in the ability to reflect critically can be ignored as 
―false impression of human imagination‖ (Sogolo, 1993:185). Claims based on observations that 
deny critical reflection in the African indigenous past are ―not factual and if they are, the 
interpretations given are incorrect‖ (Sogolo, 1993:185). If the claims are based on falsity and 
inaccuracy, then they are unreliable in constructing the foundation of African political thought. 
According to Sogolo (1993:185), most of the work produced by African thinkers is intended as 
revivals of indigenous social forms. In searching for an African political framework, Sogolo 
(1993:186) observes that colonialism is unquestionably regarded as one historical fact that had 
the greatest effect on African political institutions as well as intellectual orientations towards 
political organizations. African thinkers have to search for political ideas that go beyond mere 
political and economic freedom from colonizers to address questions of conflicts among 
colonized groups themselves (Sogolo, 1993:186). The necessity for an African political 
philosophy is seen in the fact that Africa is still caught between the conflicting ideologies of the 
so-called politically developed nations of the world. Ideologies from both the West and East are 
―incongruent with the social structure of indigenous Africa‖ (Sogolo, 1993:186). The 
incongruency gives rise to the need for ―an African political framework as a basis for 
determining the social and political destiny of its people‖ (Sogolo, 1993:186). In searching for a 
viable political framework for Africa, it is important to take into consideration the ideals of 
freedom, democracy and justice that are part of indigenous social structures (Sogolo, 1993:192). 
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4.3 Why an African political philosophy? 
 
An African political philosophy is necessary since it gives a basis of critiquing Western political 
philosophy models that have been imposed by colonialism on the conquered people of Africa. 
This is done by challenging assumptions about democratic principles and governance. An 
African political philosophy can be used as a platform for evaluating arguments advanced by the 
West on African political philosophy by refuting false premises and challenging unwarranted 
conclusions about African indigenous political culture. This kind of criticism opens space for an 
alternative indigenous African political philosophy epistemological paradigm that is 
understandable to African communities. The epistemological paradigm becomes a source of 
insightful aspects that provide concepts and principles for humane political governance in 
contemporary Africa. In the next section arguments that justify the need for an African 
indigenous political philosophy shall be explored. 
4.4 The African political philosophy debate 
 
Wingo (2003:450) sees African states as existing in the middle of two forces. The first force can 
be traced to African indigenous political culture as carry-overs from the pre-colonial past 
(Wingo, 2003:450). The second force comes from the oppressive colonial regimes and 
imposition of the foreign version of democracy (Wingo, 2003:450).  In most African states there 
is a myriad of indigenous systems of government with superimposed foreign structures. Faced 
with this state, some African political theorists take a fundamentalist stand: either a total return to 
the African past or a total unmitigated acceptance of Western political arrangements (Wingo, 
2003:450). Such a view commits a fallacy of false dichotomy since there is possibility of a third 
alternative that integrates elements of African indigenous political thought with elements of 
Western political ideas. Neither of these approaches is viable and it shall be argued later in the 
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chapter that innovative reconstruction of African indigenous philosophy is the way forward. This 
innovative reconstruction takes place within the context of contemporary African political life 
Makumba (2007:128), argues that, it is important for any society who wants to proceed 
meaningfully in politics to, first of all, take stock of its own identity by discovering its values 
which are the lifeblood for any human community. The values are normally expressed in beliefs 
and thinking about the human person, community, authority and the world (Makumba, 
2007:129). It is only when these values are identified that supplementary (foreign) values can be 
incorporated into the creation of a solid political structure (Makumba, 2007:129). The opposite is 
reckless; one cannot make foreign values the basis of one‘s political doctrine, only to incorporate 
in them worthy homegrown values as supplement (Makumba, 2007:129). It is better to begin 
with what is proper to the person and community and then allowing for the possibilities to be 
enriched from outside (Makumba, 2007:129).  The individual is never defined in isolation but in 
relationship to the other individuals within the community (Makumba, 2007:129).   Despite the 
communitarian sense of African communities, individual talents and contributions are 
recognized (Makumba, 2007:130). 
 
4.4.1 Argument 1: Wamba dia Wiamba’s critique of multi-party democracy  
Wamba-dia-Wamba (1992:29) sees the concept of democracy as problematic in the sense that 
democracy is taken as fashionable yet the concept of multi-partyism leads to authoritarian 
regimes rather than social and political emancipation of the people. This observation opens room 
for a critical examination of the idea of democracy, democracy must not be taken for granted but 
it must be brought under scrutiny.  There must be a shift from the politics in crisis to a new mode 
of politics (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:29). The politics in crisis is democracy because it has 
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failed to bring emancipation to African states.  Proposals for political change in Africa remain 
imprisoned in state centered conception of politics. Wamba-dia-Wamba argues for the 
decentering of politics from the state to the masses. Society must have autonomy as a way of 
limiting state powers. Democracy must be about the people‘s treatment of differences among 
themselves rather than democracy as a form of state. The parliamentary mode of democracy 
surbodinates political parties under state consensus. Political parties become state organizations 
competing for the distribution of positions rather than the people‘s reconstruction of the state  
(Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:30). According to Wamba-dia-Wamba, the competition for state 
positions reduces politics to a ―game of numbers‖ whereby more votes become the basis for 
legality and legitimacy (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:30). This mode of politics is not about civil 
liberties but it destroys freedom. The multi-party mode of politics is characterized by state-
centredness, oppressiveness and a tendency to freeze creativity and imagination  (Wamba-dia-
Wamba, 1992:31). People outside of a party do not exist politically.  
Wamba-dia-Wamba (1992:32) warns that in Africa, we must move away from the following 
tendencies: Firstly, nation building from above which is rooted in colonial legacy and insists on 
political unanimity seen as the basis for nation building (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:32). The 
process is seen as blocking people‘s creativity and mass enthusiasm. Wamba-dia-Wamba gives 
an example in which citizens of one state may be required to treat relatives from a neighboring 
country as refugees or enemies (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:32).  Secondly, Wamba-dia-Wamba 
(1992:32) warns against developmentalism. For Wamba-dia-Wamba (1992:32), 
developmentalism is the tendency to transfer economic, cultural, political and social models 
arrived at through outside controlled process of decision making. Authoritarian cultural 
imposition is the guiding principle. Thirdly, Wamba-dia-Wamba argues that Africans must 
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challenge traditions invented or imagined by colonialists while claimed to be African. These 
traditions are used to justify and enforce the post-colonial state which must be de-imprialised 
(Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:32). Fourthly, Wamba-dia-Wamba (1992:32) argues that we must 
move away from the process of moving away from traditional society and internalizing the 
colonial state. 
Wamba-dia-Wamba (1992:33) argues that we must democratize the knowledge process which is 
now completely dominated by the outside. In Wamba-dia-Wamba‘s view, we must have control 
over our cultural creations, de-marginalise the masses, unblock their creativity and allow them to 
be the centre of history making (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:33). The multi-party system has 
failed to induce self-emancipation of the people and has tended to keep people in poverty, misery 
and ignorance. People must have political consciousness that takes the form of state antagonism. 
Revolutionary capacity must not be within the powers of the state but the masses (Wamba-dia-
Wamba, 1992:34). Internalization of the state by the people and state orientation in handling 
political differences among the people provokes self-censorship and blocks political 
consciousness (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:34).  
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Wamba-dia-Wamba (1992:34) recommends the indigenous way of political thinking where 
―every speaking person of the community is called upon to discuss the affairs of the 
community.‖ At national level, this can be reconstructed into national conferences where limits 
are given to the authoritarian state (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:35). The indigenous way of 
thinking accords thinking to the people, ―In Africa too, people think and this is the sole material 
basis of thought‖ (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:36). Authoritarian thinking assumes people to be 
unthinking, silences them and forces them to comply (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992:36). Traditions 
that acknowledge the capacity of people to think must be reactivated and extended (Wamba-dia-
Wamba, 1992:36). Wamba-dia-Wamba‘s argument is important for this study because it 
challenges Western democracy models that have external control and it argues for community 
participation and democratisation of political knowledge. This can be achieved by a critical and 
innovative study of indigenous insights as found in African proverbs in general and Shona 
proverbs in particular. 
 
4.4.2 Argument 2: Revisiting political culture and democratization in Africa 
 
No political culture, no matter how high or low, is meaningful and civilized when it does not put 
at its very foundation the well-being of its people (Omotola, 2008:60). This implies that the 
political culture of democracy must be rooted in the existential circumstances of the African 
people.  Democracy becomes irrelevant if  it disempowers the people, the very object of culture 
and democratization (Omotola, 2008:60). Democracy becomes inconsistent with its intended 
objectives.  According to Omotola (2008:60), ―a major problem that confronts African 
scholarship and policy makers is basically how to reclaim the concepts of political culture and 
democratization in a way that captures African realities.‖ This makes democracy culturally and 
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contextually relevant. This seems the most viable option if the democratization process is to be 
meaningful in terms of being people-driven and development-oriented. A viable path to this is to 
recapture the historicity of African societies, which helps to lay bare how the structure of power 
politics in the international system has continuously crippled the emergence of a democratic 
developmental state in the continent (Omotola, 2008:60).  This historicity can be captured 
through a critical examination of the African indigenous political culture with the aim of taking 
useful elements in the political development of Africa. 
4.4.3 Argument 3:  African political authenticity and liberation 
According to Ramose (2009b:413), the indigenous conquered people of Africa must construct an 
epistemological paradigm of their own as a means of expressing their authenticity to attain true 
liberation.  This can be done by picking up useful elements from the African past. Tradition must 
function as a source from which to extract elements that will help in the construction of an 
authentic and emancipative epistemological paradigm relevant to the conditions of Africa at this 
historical moment (Ramose, 2009b:414). What is authentically African springs from African 
political culture and gives an alternative way of thinking about politics.  
Ramose identifies four options on how the indigenous epistemological paradigm may be 
accommodated vis-à-vis the foreign colonial paradigm. The first option consists in overthrowing 
the indigenous social organization (Ramose, 2009b:416). However, Ramose quickly warns that it 
would be imprudent and philosophically unjustified to reject African tradition completely and 
replace it with an alien culture of the European conqueror (Ramose, 2009b:416). African 
tradition would remain as a source of paradigmatic reconstruction (Ramose, 2009b:417). It 
would not make logical sense to argue for the retrieval and preservation of African tradition if 
indeed there were nothing at all to retrieve or preserve (Ramose, 2009b:417). If there is 
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something to retrieve and preserve, it is both logically sound and empirically justified to talk 
about African tradition (Ramose, 2009b:417). 
The second option consists in abandonment of the European pattern but the problem is that the 
alien European culture has become an intrinsic part of contemporary African lifestyles (Ramose, 
2009b:417).The consequence is that the alien culture cannot be overthrown altogether (Ramose, 
2009b:417). Ramose (2009b:417) suggests the way forward as follows, ―it is therefore, an 
imperative of practical realism to situate the alien culture of the European conqueror in 
fundamental dialogue with African tradition.‖ The aim of this dialogue would be to determine if 
the radically opposed epistemological paradigms might be reconciled (Ramose, 2009b:417). If 
reconciliation is problematic and elusive, then voluntary peaceful co-existence between the two 
should be expelled (Ramose, 2009b:417).  
The remaining options, reconciliation and coexistence, are not mutually exclusive and might be 
pursued concurrently (Ramose, 2009b:417). Most post-colonial sovereign states have finally 
accepted western-style democracy symbolized by plural political parties as the best form of 
political organization in Africa  (Ramose, 2009b:417). Western style democracy results in 
political monologue leading to a solipsistic life in the midst of a suppressed African indigenous 
political culture (Ramose, 2009b:418). To speak of the conqueror‘s political discourse without 
engaging in such discourse in dialogue with traditional African culture is to assume at the very 
least that the latter is unlikely to make any meaningful contribution to solving the continent‘s 
political problems (Ramose, 2009b:420).Traditional African political culture can still speak 
authoritatively in finding emancipative African solution to African political problems (Ramose, 
2009b:420).  
151 
 
Ramose identifies insightful aspects of African indigenous political culture. The first of these 
elements is respect for persons. He quotes the Sotho proverb that goes motho ke motho ka batho 
which means to be human is to affirm one‘s humanness by recognizing the same quality in others 
and on that basis, establishing humane relations with them (Ramose, 2009b:420). To be a human 
being botho, means to have a polite and respectful attitude towards other human beings (Ramose, 
2009b:420). The individual human being is a subject of intrinsic value. Motho (a human being) is 
truly human only in the context of actual relations with other human beings (Ramose, 
2009b:420). The relational context always reveals the potentialities of the individual (Ramose, 
2009b:420).  
Traditional political culture recognizes oneness rather than unity of being (Ramose, 2009b:421). 
Oneness is used because one human being is deemed to be the same thing as another human 
being and one human being is seen only in relation to another human being (Ramose, 
2009b:421). This is a way of expressing equality. Reciprocity becomes pivotal in the sphere of 
human relations (Ramose, 2009b:421). Reciprocity crystallizes into solidarity in the sphere of 
political relations (Ramose, 2009b:421). This is an example of innovative reconstruction of 
elements based on indigenous political culture. Adversarial politics, the hallmark of western style 
democracy is foreign to African traditional political culture (Ramose, 2009b:421). Adversity 
promotes social and political instability against people who are supposed to be one. This foreign 
trait retards political progress in Africa. Traditional culture allows free and open discussion of 
issues with a view of arriving at a common solution (Ramose, 2009b:422). The advantage of 
consensus is that it checks unconstructive partisanship and divisiveness. A solution arrived at 
through consensus is seen as a joint achievement. This means that people participate in decision 
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making and they own the decision as a group. Everyone is given the chance to talk. The kgotla
32
 
was a form of free and serious discussion aimed at making laws and finding communal solutions 
to problems (Ramose, 2009b:422). Africans would prefer to live time and not live in time 
(Ramose, 2009b:423). Openness to being is readiness to expect the unexpected and deal with 
such eventuality when it arises (Ramose, 2009b:423). If people are guided by traditional 
principles of oneness, consensus, openness and humility, then true liberation of Africa might not 
be too far (Ramose, 2009b:426). This indigenous trajectory suggested by Ramose paves way for 
the use of Shona proverbs in identification of elements that are useful for giving insights to 
contemporary African political culture.  
 
4.5 Ubuntu and Politics 
 
According to the South African Government Gazette (1996:18) Ubuntu is seen as: 
 
―The principle of caring for each other‘s well-being and a spirit of mutual 
support…Each individual‘s humanity is ideally expressed through his or her 
relationship with others and theirs in turn through a recognition of the individual‘s 
humanity. Ubuntu means that people are people through other people. It also 
acknowledges both the rights and the responsibilities of every citizen in 
promoting individual and societal well-being.‖ 
 
The significance of the above citation is that the South African government has adopted 
the philosophy of ubuntu as the basis of well-being, support and recognition of human 
dignity. Ubuntu is also understood in the context of rights and responsibilities and the 
advantage of this approach is that cultural aspects are promoted and not alienated in the 
                                                          
32
 Public meeting, headed by the chief, for discussing community issues through dialogue and 
consensus. 
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name of human rights. Koster (1996:111) observes that ubuntu fosters cooperation, 
solidarity and supportiveness. A person‘s well being is considered as inseperable from 
the well being of others. Lienberg and Sindane  (2000:38) affirm that ubuntu gives 
humanity to the individual in direct relationship to fellow human beings. Ubuntu must be 
expressed in the political aspects of life (Tambulasi and Kayuni, 2009:429). Ubuntu is the 
basis of African communal cultural life and expresses Africa‘s principle of caring for one 
another and the spirit of mutual support (Elichi et al, 2010:81). Even if no single view of 
ubuntu exists, it represents the richness of cultural diversity in Africa (Prozesky, 2009:9). 
 
Nussbaum (2003:2) links ubuntu with politics as she comments, ―ubuntu is the basis of our 
communal cultural life. It expresses our interconnectedness, our common humanity and 
responsibility to each other that deeply flows from our deeply felt connection.‖ There is 
emphasis on groupness and sameness (Cobbah, 2006:35) and respect is the guiding principle 
within the family and the society at large (Cobbah, 2006:36). 
 
Ramose (2005; 96) comments on the political relevance of ubuntu as he writes, ―to be human is 
to affirm humanity by recognizing the humanity of others, and on that basis, establish humane 
relations with them.‖ The principle that can be derived from the above view states that, ―the 
individual human being is an object of intrinsic value in his own right‖ (Ramose, 2005:96). The 
second principle of ubuntu that is important for political thought is, ―a human being is truly 
human, only in the context of actual relations with other human beings‖ (Ramose, 2005:96). The 
relational context has important elements of African indigenous political culture. The first 
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element is the recognition of oneness. One human being is deemed to be the same subject, a 
human being in relation to another human being. This hinges upon equality and reciprocity in 
human relations. The second element is consensus in political authority and in decision making 
by councilors. The third is the principle of sharing that covers entire human relations. It refers to 
sharing of joys and sorrows of life, the goods of the earth and personal property (Ramose, 
2005:96). It places an obligation to come together to find common solutions to issues.  
In stressing the authenticity and liberating potential of ubuntu, Louw (2001:29) writes, ubuntu 
calls on Africans to be true to themselves. It calls for the liberation of Africans, not so much 
from the colonizing gaze of others, but from colonization: 
―persons depend on persons to be persons. The goal of morality according to this 
ethical vision is fullness of humanity; the moral life is seen as a process of 
personal growth. And just as participation in community with others is the 
essential means to personal growth, so participation in community with others is 
the motive and fulfillment of the process. Everything that promotes personal 
growth and participation in community is good, everything that prevents is bad‖ 
(Shutte, 2001:30). 
According to Metz (2009:336) the African moral theory or ubuntu offers a useful way of 
evaluating political choice.  A moral theory is a fundamental principle that accounts for what 
right actions, as opposed to wrong ones, have in common. Ubuntu places harmonious or friendly 
relations at the heart of right action. In this regard, Metz (2009:236) borrows from Mbiti 
(1969:108) and adopts the dictum that a person is a person through other persons. The 
relationship under consideration values cohesive relationship. Tutu (1999:35) identifies 
harmony, friendliness and community as great social goods. Anger, resentment and aggressive 
competitiveness are seen as corrosive to this social good (Khoza, 2005:58). Harmony is valued 
for its sake and not as a means to some other social good. 
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Shutte (2009:376) sees the community as the foundation of political life. According to Shutte 
(2009:376), people‘s natural dynamism for personal growth urges them into relationships with 
others, in the family, in the sphere of education and in politics. Human community is a natural 
development from simple family life. As the community of humans grows bigger the need to 
organise arises (Shutte, 2009:377). When the community is united and organised by laws, it has 
entered the sphere of politics and the community becomes political (Shutte, 2009:377). The 
authority in a political community must come from people who are its members (Shutte, 
2009:377). Members of a given community rely on their political paradigm for political 
organisation. If members of a political community rely on their paradigm, it means that they are 
in control of their political principles and ideas as opposed to a situation where foreign political 
models dominate. Political authority must come from the people themselves because they are 
self-determining (Shutte, 2009:377). Political self-determination implies the use of indigenous 
systems of government. An authority imposed on a community from outside would contradict 
and prevent self-determination (Shutte, 2009:278). It would contradict self-determination 
because it opposes the use of local political ideas and it would prevent self –determination 
because it requires the use of foreign models for its implementation. What is important from the 
perspective of ubuntu is to see that political community and government as a natural progression 
of human nature. This means that political activities are conscious and deliberate creations. If 
ubuntu in government means respecting people‘s freedoms, it must also mean requiring their 
responsibility (Shutte, 2009:379). A humane political government depends on the qualities of 
those in government (Shutte, 2009:380). The fundamental reason for government as well as its 
ultimate goal, is to promote people‘s common good. Government should create social conditions 
for the flourishing of people‘s common good. In a political community a life with ubuntu, 
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government will reflect this (Shutte, 2009:381). Ubuntu facilitates reciprocity between the 
people and those in authority by giving a platform for mutual respect. People will trust those in 
authority because of their personal qualities and not simply their power (Shutte,2009: 381). 
Those in authority will have the freedom to judge as honestly as they judge best because they 
genuinely aim to govern for the common good (Shutte, 2009:381). Government should provide 
personal growth and community for its people (Shutte, 2009: 381). 
The aim of political life is to focus its available resources and power to create conditions that 
favour nation building (Shutte, 2009: 381). This means that political activities should focus on 
the principles of ubuntu as test for effectiveness. Ubuntu tends to focus on oneness even if 
cultural and compositions are varied. This means that ubuntu can unify people whose cultural 
beliefs are varied. Individuals can value each other for the sake of their common humanity. 
Ubuntu commits people to one another‘s personal growth and their shared community. Ubuntu 
has the capacity to unite people from different cultural backgrounds is a trait of ubuntu. The aim 
of ubuntu is to form friendship that transcends differences of origin and culture (Shutte, 
2009:383). Ubuntu challenges people to love and include in their loving. It challenges people to 
open more widely, to other and alien influences, for the right motives and in the right spirit, is 
not to lose one‘s identity but to enhance it and develop a person (Shutte, 2009:383).  
Shutte (2009:384) argues that human nature contains a natural dynamism towards political 
community. It is now impossible for a single country to provide complete and integrated 
environment for the personal growth of its people without reliance on other countries. The 
development of political community should take place at the level of the whole world for any 
political community to be a reality (Shutte, 2009:385). Worldwide political structures regulate 
the political lives of different countries in the world. Ubuntu can heal political divisions even at 
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global level. The principle of subsidiarity is limited at the international level for the following 
reasons; first, it is too small to provide adequate environment in every sphere for personal growth 
and community. Secondly, it is too small to provide economic and military security and thirdly, 
it is too large for people to identify truly in a personal and patriotic way (Shutte, 2009:385). 
 
From the above views, it is clear that ubuntu provides the foundation of ethical ideals, 
epistemological insights and ontological assumptions for respectable political authority. Ubuntu 
sustains good governance, communality, togetherness and oneness in political aspects. Ubuntu 
can be used to refute individualistic tendencies that lead to greediness, corruption, dictatorial 
tendencies that affect African countries. 
4.6 The Shona Political System 
Gombe (1998:194) asserts that madzimambo (kings) were the symbol of authority in Shona 
indigenous political culture. Each king had a territory in which he delegated political duties to 
subordinates such as madzishe (chiefs), masadunhu (sub-chiefs) masamana (village heads). 
Kings were responsible for political administration; they were seen as the axis of legal and moral 
norms, holding people together in a political community. The council of heads of clans under the 
king acted as the rulers and lower down were the chiefs at the various levels of society; all of 
them assisted in the social and political administration of society.  Gombe (1998:194) made the 
following observation:  where these rulers are found, they are not simply political heads: they are 
the mystical and religious heads, the divine symbol of their people's health and welfare.  
Below the king was the ishe (chief) who represents the head of the political organization of 
indigenous Shona society which gives political, juridical, and executive power he can exercise in 
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council with other chiefs and officials within part of a king‘s territory. The Shona society 
accorded the ishe a considerable amount of respect, although his powers are not meant to be 
absolute due to a hierarchy of power relations in conducting human affairs in the community. 
Hence this hierarchy of power relations tilted in favour of the ishe but it did not translate to an 
un-checked power. Thus the power arrangement in traditional Shona political setting was such 
that it provided checks and balances.  A structure that gave power to some bodies of persons to 
exercise on behalf of others was checked.  
4.7 Proverbs and Shona Political Discourse 
 
Proverbs are regarded as repositories of the Shona people‘s collective social, political and 
cultural wisdom and as analytic tools of thought. Proverbs have the capacity to provide a 
politician with what is dearly needed in any political talk, adding power, authority, clarity and 
expressiveness to political discourse (Orwenjo, 2009:124). This capacity arises from two factors. 
First, the ability of proverbs to crystallize complicated and long messages into a short sentence, 
consisting of only a few words, thereby precluding the need for circumlocution which could 
easily distort the original message. Second, due to the fact, especially in African societies, that 
proverbs are communally owned as repositories of communal wisdom and knowledge arising 
from a community‘s age old experiences, and are continually transmitted from one generation to 
another. Thus, proverbs are regarded as pieces of conventional wisdom and when used, the 
community easily accepts their truth value, appreciates them and identifies with them. 
Challenging the appropriateness of proverbs is like challenging the wisdom of the entire society.  
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4.7.1 Political significance of Coexistence and Relatedness 
 
The proverb ishe vanhu can be understood in four senses. First the proverb expresses oneness or 
identity between the chief and the subjects. The identity lies in sameness in dignity as human 
beings. There must be mutual recognition of equality and of dignity between the chief and the 
subjects.  Secondly ishe vanhu makes reference to mutual respect between the chief and the 
subjects. Thirdly, ishe vanhu can be understood negatively to mean that without people, the 
chief‘s political rule cannot be possible. Fourthly the proverb expresses humane relations 
between the chief and the subjects. The basis of political rule among the Shona is respect. The 
chief must establish humane relations with the subjects so that the subjects will reciprocate the 
good relations. The primary sense of vanhu in the proverb is the community. The chief should 
consider common good before making decisions and this can be done through consultation. 
Consultation takes place through dialogue between the chief and representatives of the chief. In 
the Shona indigenous political organisation, the chief is there because of his or her subjects and 
without subjects the ontological significance
33
 of the chief is negated. Social ontology is the root 
of the chief‘s existence. In the Shona political situation, the chief possesses executive, judicial 
and legislative powers. These powers are significant if and only if the chief is recognized by his 
or her subjects (Moyo and Ncube, 2010: 39). The being of the chief depends on the being of 
others. This includes the living dead and the living subjects. If the ontological significance of the 
                                                          
33 The ontological position speaks to the primary assumptions that people (within given cultures) 
make about the nature of reality. In African systems of thought, the ontological viewpoint 
stresses that to understand reality is to have a complete or holistic view of society. The view 
stresses the need for a harmonious co-existence between nature, culture and society. There is the 
idea of mutual interdependence among all peoples such that the existence of the individual is 
only meaningful in relation to the community that she or he is part of. 
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subjects is undermined, the chief‘s ontological significance is undermined also. For the Shona, 
the proverb ishe vanhu (the chief gets recognition through subjects) shows the intrinsic 
relationship between the chief and the subjects. There is no atomistic individualism on the part of 
the chief but his or her existence depends on the recognition of the social ontology of the 
subjects. The subjects are ontologically prior to the chief. The subjects (vanhu), can be 
categorized into councilors and ordinary people.  Regarding knowledge, the chief depends on 
councilors for the exercise of administrative, judicial and executive powers and this shows the 
epistemic dimension of the above proverb. As a result, the chief is identified with his or her 
councilors. The existence of the chief‘s powers is sustained by the prudent advice of councilors 
(Gombe, 1998:53). The proverb, ishe makota (the chief is his councilors) is used to emphasise 
this crucial point. It can be argued therefore that the legal powers of the chief depend on the 
strength of the chief‘s advisors. 
 
 Ishe varanda (the chief is his or her subjects) is a proverb that recognizes the close relationship 
between the chief and his/her subjects. The close relationship is found in several dimensions but 
the closeness that is significant at this juncture is a moral one. The moral closeness is analyzable 
in terms of the intrinsic goodness and value of persons. For the Shona, the concept of munhu is 
normative because it is value laden. Every human being has intrinsic value and as a result, the 
subjects, even if they have little political power, should be treated with respect owing to their 
intrinsic value. If the subjects are accorded respect, they will reciprocate to the goodness of the 
chief. A morally upright ruler will therefore receive respect from the subjects. The moral 
teaching in the proverb is that a chief does not assume a higher moral ground but puts himself at 
the same level with the subjects because they share an equality of intrinsic value. 
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Among the Shona, the proverb, ishe vanhu can be seen in the consultation of a chief before a 
development project is done in an area that is believed to be sacred. Before a cellphone booster is 
constructed in a sacred area, for example, the chief is consulted and the chief will have to further 
consult fellow advisors for the way forward. The reason why the chief is consulted before a 
project is done is that the chief is believed to be both a political and religious leader. The chief 
gets in touch with local spirit mediums (masvikiro) to provide the necessary steps usually in form 
of rituals. If such steps are omitted, the development project may be a failure and when it fails, 
the blame is usually given to the chief and his or her advisors.  
4.7.2 Political Significance of Others 
 
Chieftainship skills are learnt from others within and outside the territory. The social dimension 
of knowledge is seen in the maxim ushe hunokokwa kune vamwe (chieftainship is learnt from 
others). The epistemic skills of others who have held similar positifons
34
 are used to develop a 
sound epistemology of governance among  chiefs. Critical examination of past and current 
practices allows the chief to pick out what is valuable and dispose what is of little significance in 
governance. The word ‗others‘ has two ontological levels, the first is the vadzimu, the second is 
the living. In the Shona political system, the chief was supposed to travel extensively to enter 
into agreements with other chiefs and get ideas from other chiefs. Through the journeys the chief 
learnt from the practice of other cultures and a critical mind was required to select what was 
appropriate. Without travel, therefore the chief‘s experiential knowledge is static. The chief‘s 
knowledge becomes proportional to the travels made. Ushe hwunokokwa kune vamwe gives an 
epistemological emphasis to experience. Since politics is a practical human activity that requires 
                                                          
34
 These are limited few members of the community 
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skills, the Shona emphasize the role of experience in political administration. Through 
experience, political leaders are likely to gain wisdom and the Shona advice leaders to learn from 
others who have the experience so that one may avoid making the same mistake that will have 
been made by earlier leaders. At the same time successes of other political rulers may be used to 
improve one‘s way of leadership 
 
4.7.3 The political role of truth 
 
The concept of reconciliation in the Shona context is aimed at restoring harmony within the 
community. Harmony is analogous to a web that ties up the whole community and when it is 
disturbed, the whole community is disturbed. In other words, the whole community feels the 
ripple effects of violence. The first stage of reconciliation requires truth telling. In the Shona 
context, truth telling is not just an epistemological demand but a moral responsibility as well. 
The Shona have developed proverbs that show this point well. One proverb is chokwadi 
hachiputsi ukama (truth telling does not destroy relations). The concept of ukama (relations) ties  
up the community. Ukama stands for the conviction that reality is relational. It means not only 
that people will only find their true identity in relationship with other people, both those now 
alive and those who live in the spirit world, a belief in the watchful presence of the living dead 
being present in African traditional cultures, but - importantly - with nature as well. As such, 
ukama can be seen as a highly inclusive concept applying to all that exists (Murove, 2004:198). 
Truth telling as a moral requirement opens up for honesty and dialogue thereby removing the 
possibility of hypocrisy, illusion and pretence. Sweeping some crimes under the carpet does not 
only destroy relations but it also contradicts ubuntu. The political moral teaching of the above 
Shona proverb is therefore to call for honesty in dealing with cases of political violence in 
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particular. Truth telling cements relations in the community. On the contrary, falsity and 
hypocrisy are damaging. In the Shona context peace should be built starting from grassroots 
levels. This implies that peace building in the small scale starts in the neighbourhood before it 
gets to the larger community. Mutual understanding and friendly relations are the moral seeds for 
peace. Friendship, based on ubuntu, is the basis of mutual understanding and allows people to 
live in harmony and peace in the community.  
 
In the Shona moral reasoning, peace building is not an individual effort but it is a co-operative 
affair. The concept of peace building logically implies otherness and interpersonal involvement. 
As a result, peace building is not an individual exercise but it is a community affair. This 
understanding is in line with ubuntu ethics that places emphasis on community relations. The 
South African philosopher Augustine Shutte has given a handily concise interpretation of the 
ethic implied by ubuntu in a recent book, explaining this concept as ―the insight that persons 
depend on persons to be persons‖ (Shutte, 2001:25). He adds: ―The goal of morality according to 
this ethical vision is fullness of humanity; the moral life is seen as a process of personal growth‖ 
(Shutte, 2001:25).  Just as participation in community with others is the essential means to 
personal growth, so participation in community with others is the motive and fulfillment of the 
process. Everything that promotes personal growth and participation in community is good, 
everything that prevents is bad (Shutte, 2001:30). 
4.8 Objections and replies 
 
Standard objections have been made against the use of political proverbs in the following 
manner; firstly, political proverbs have been considered as conservative since they are rooted in 
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the past. Against this objection, it can be argued that while is true that political proverbs have 
roots in the past, it does not necessarily follow that their application is also limited to the past 
since the past has a bearing, to some extent, on the present. The humane elements which are seen 
in the proverbs can be used for contemporary political stability. In addition the worldview in 
which the proverbs were formulated is still in usage today. The Shona worldview from which the 
proverbs arise is understandable and more applicable to the Shona. 
The second objection is that Shona political proverbs are narrow in application since they are 
only understandable among the Shona. This objection may be true but the narrowness is seen in 
terms of other languages besides Shona. Within Shona groups, there is a wide application and 
there is potential for cross cultural application outside the Shona. In a pluriversal world, it is 
prudent to consider views from different cultures so as to come up with a balanced understanding 
of political issues. 
The third objection is that Shona political proverbs are inconsistent with democratic models of 
governance. This objection rests on the problematic assumption that there are democratic models 
from a particular culture that must be taken as ‗the models‘. It is necessary to point out that 
democratic models do not arise in a vacuum but from a given culture. If it is acceptable, the 
Shona political proverbs are expected to be consistent with Shona democratic models and there is 
no reason of measuring them against foreign models. Still democratic models must be as many as 
possible within cultures and no single model should override other cultures. 
The fourth objection is that proverb based political insights may be considered as a source of 
political authoritarianism since proverbs are based on past authorities. Authoritarianism may be 
defined as the tendency to concentrate power on one person or a few individuals. Shona proverbs 
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are not necessarily authoritarian but they are sources of critical reflection. While it may be true 
that the proverbs are based on authority, it does not necessarily follow that they are authoritarian. 
This means that elements of authority may be extracted from proverbs and used positively 
without sliding into the extreme use or reliance on authority. 
The fifth charge is that of anachronism. Anachronism is the tendency to rely on something that is 
outlived in its correct chronological place. With reference to proverbs, the charge states that 
Shona political proverbs were formulated within past political settings and their application to 
contemporary political settings is problematic. It can be argued that human consciousness and 
reflection cannot be fixed within a rigid timeframe. Ideas that have been expressed through 
proverbs with the aim of improving the moral qualities of persons may continue to have force 
and application even in contemporary times. The authenticity of the worldview in which Shona 
political proverbs arose results in the continued application of the proverbs. Political principles 
based on proverbs are understandable within the political situations in which they arise and they 
remain useful. 
The sixth objection is that Shona political proverbs are based on supernaturalism. Shona 
proverbs rely on vadzimu and ―God‖ for political order. This objection may be seen as confusing 
an extreme view – supernaturalism, with a moderate position of a religious appeal to the deity. 
An appeal to vadzimu and ―God‖ is a positive cultural practice among the Shona. The objection 
assumes the correctness of a reductionistic political framework that divorces politics from both 
the deity and the community of the dead. Such an objection is question begging because it 
assumes the correctness of a non-Shona worldview  in a Shona worldview. 
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The last objection is that Shona political proverbs are inconsistent with globalization. If 
globalization is defined as the tendency of cultures and philosophies to spread throughout the 
world, surely, Shona proverbs may be inconsistent with globalization because of their local 
focus. Inconsistency with globalization is unproblematic since globalization arises in a culture 
that is foreign to the Shona culture and whose values are incompatible with  Shona political 
philosophy. This inconsistency may be seen positively as evidence of cultural diversity within  a 
pluriversal world. 
4.9 Significance of Shona Political Philosophy 
 
Shona Political philosophy is significant insofar as it promotes constitutional obligations. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe 16 (1) states that, ―the state and all its institutions and agencies of 
government at every level must promote and preserve cultural values and practices which 
enhance the dignity, well-being and equality of Zimbabweans.‖ Shona political philosophy, as 
shown in the selected proverbs, contains principles that are consistent with dignity, well-being 
and equality.  
  
The use of Shona proverbs to articulate a Shona political philosophy gives a platform for 
intercultural dialogue. According to Wiredu (1995:1) if we approach the philosophic suggestions 
of other cultures (as, for example, those of the Orient) in the spirit of due reflection, being always 
on the lookout for any conceptual snares, perhaps we can combine insights extracted from those 
sources with those gained from our own indigenous
35
 philosophical resources to create for 
ourselves and our peoples modern philosophies from which both the East and the West might 
                                                          
35
 The Shona are just part of the indigenous people of Zimbabwe who include the Ndebele, the Venda, the 
Shangani, the Tonga, the Kalanga and the Nambia 
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learn something. Indigenous knowledge (IK) is a significant resource which could contribute to 
the increased efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the development process (Gorjestani, 
2000:1).  
 
Shona political philosophy takes the history and culture of the Shona people into account. 
Indigenous peoples should be encouraged in their vision of an integrated political development 
system that encompasses the development of human capabilities, capacities and skills; 
appropriate infrastructure that does not displace people; recognition of pluralistic systems 
respecting other cultures and civilizations; promotion and provision of a democratic space to 
continue practicing indigenous ways of life; and the pursuit of self-determined development 
(Lasimbang, 2008:45). The political history of the developed countries of today shows that the 
development process involves much more fundamental phenomena. These include wholesale 
economic, social and administrative reforms, perceptible changes in the attitude of the people to 
work, to savings and investment and to life generally and a widespread acceptance of the 
discipline in private and national lives which are the prerequisites of development (Asante, 
1991:4). Where these reforms and changes have taken place economic development has 
proceeded very rapidly. Until developing countries come to realize that development touches all 
aspects of a society and the individual's attitude to it they will continue to mistake indices of 
development for its process (Asante, 1991:5). 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has defended a pluriversal understanding of political philosophy that has relevance 
to the African historical and cultural context.  Political models that obtain in Africa have been 
discussed with the aim of showing the model that applies to the Zimbabwean context. The 
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chapter has argued that ubuntu is the political foundation of solidarity, oneness and mutual 
support in politics. The political philosophy of the Shona, as contained in their proverbs, is also 
based on the Shona social ontology which gives priority of the community over the individual. 
Shona political philosophy stresses coexistence and relatedness (ukama) within the community. 
Administrators respect the significance of others for the meaning and function of their political 
roles. Shona political philosophy maintains that authority should be guided by respect, good 
governance, solidarity and peace. These values are not only important for social harmony but for 
economic activities as well and this leads to Shona philosophy of economics in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: SHONA PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter argues that, African philosophy of economics in general and Shona philosophy of 
economics in particular, must be rooted in the respective cultural paradigms. An African 
philosophy of economics must articulate the metaphysics, epistemology and ethics of African 
culture. It must critique the narrowness and fallacies of Eurocentric economic philosophy using 
the richness of cultural intellectual resources. For Mbembe (2001:7), Western disciplines have 
undermined the very possibility of understanding African economic thought. In spite of the 
countless critiques made of theories of social evolutionism and ideologies of development and 
modernisation, the academic output of these disciplines continues to be negative to Africa 
(Mbembe, 2001:7). Human beings and nature must be seen as interconnected, dependent and 
related rather than divorced, independent and isolated. The Africans‘ desire to maintain 
cohesiveness and cooperation with nature, self, and others has been mistaken for docility 
(Nyasani, 1997:113), complacency and passivity (Shalita, 1998: 10).  Economic philosophy must 
be rooted in the realities of African life as observed by Wiredu: 
 
―no society could survive for any length of time without basing a large part of its 
daily activities on beliefs derived from the evidence. You cannot farm without 
some rationally based knowledge of soils, seeds and climate; and no society can 
achieve any reasonable degree of harmony in human relations without the basic 
ability to assess claims and allegations by the methods of objective investigation‖ 
(Wiredu, 1980: 42). 
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 The consequence of adopting an African philosophy of economics is twofold; it provides room 
for economic life to be assessed in terms of African metaphysical belief system and it offers a 
conception of ethically justifiable economic behaviour and activity. Much classical economic 
theory was developed to explain the particular case of the European capitalist economy and 
immediately raises questions about the usefulness of this theory for understanding other 
economies outside Europe (Gregory, 1982: 6). Arguing for a multi‐cultural or inter‐cultural 
intellectual approach, Amato (1997:75) dismisses the view that religious‐inspired ideas and 
accounts of social reality are necessarily regressive. On the contrary, he argues, philosophical 
reason is not independent of mythic or religious life of the people. He thus sees this view as 
likely to perpetuate the stereotypes towards other intellectual discourses, while simultaneously 
upholding the Western intellectual discourse‘s claims. Philosophy, as it now exists in various 
continents, cultures and countries, is demonstrably tied in some respects to the particularities of 
their languages and social formations (Wiredu, 1997:29). It stands to reason, therefore, to expect 
that if Africans take adequate cognizance of their own languages and cultures in their 
philosophical meditations, they might formulate philosophical options that are in some respects 
different from those, for example, of the Western culture within which ways of philosophical 
thought such as phenomenology and analytic philosophy have had their home (Wiredu, 
1997:30). 
 
Gyekye (1997a:25) points out, 
― the postcolonial era not only signified an end to the period of dictation, forcible 
imposition of a variety of alien values and institutions, (but also) a period of 
autonomous self‐expressions on the part of the formerly colonized people, as well 
as of self‐assertion, sober reflection on values and goals, and the gradual weaning 
away from the self‐flagellating aspects of colonial mentality acquired through 
decades of coloniality.‖  
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Gyekye‘s observation suggests the need for self-expression, self-assertion and sober reflection by 
using African philosophy to understand economic activity in present day Africa. Philosophy as a 
critical reflective activity does not go on in a social vacuum. This is because the stuff of 
reflection comes from the worldview of one‘s community, or other communities, or the 
philosophical reflections of other people from in or outside one‘s community (Agbakoba, 
2009:552) 
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section, drawing from cultural 
revivalists, anti-revivalists and the critical approach, examines the African philosophy of 
economics debate. It shall be argued that an African philosophy of economics is necessary to 
avoid the weaknesses of the Eurocentric paradigm in economic philosophy. The second section 
defends three conceptions of African philosophy of economics to articulate authenticity and 
cultural relevance in approaching economic issues. The third section explores Shona philosophy 
of economics as reflected in three selected proverbs. Themes of human dignity, respect for hard 
work and the need for moderation in the desire for money are discussed in the context of the 
Shona philosophical paradigm. The last section discusses the significance of using Shona 
philosophy of economics in terms of providing a platform for dialogue and criticism in the face 
of pluriversal perspectives of economic philosophy. 
 
5.1 Definition of terms 
 
In the words of Alfred Marshall (1961: xv), economics or economic theory is mainly concerned 
with human beings who are impelled to change and progress. His definition of economics, which 
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he equates with political economy, corresponds to the examination of ‗that part of individual and 
social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the 
material requisites of wellbeing‘ (Marshall, 1961: 1). Philosophy of economics is the branch of 
philosophy that studies the metaphysical foundation of economic claims, the epistemic status of 
economics and the values implied in economic activity. African philosophy of economics is the 
study of economic behaviour on the basis of the African epistemological paradigm. The Shona 
term for economics is  ongororo yezveupfumi meaning the study or reflection upon economic 
activity. Shona philosophy of economics would be pfungwa dzamu dzezveupfumi. Shona 
philosophy of economics draws from the African philosophical ideas in general and focuses on 
the philosophical reflections of Shona people regarding production, consumption and transfer of 
wealth. 
 
 5.3 Debate on the relevance of African indigenous philosophy of economics 
 
The relationship between economics and indigenous philosophy has been a central theme of 
postcolonial African philosophy. Kebede (1999:45) identifies two schools of thought in the 
question of African development. The first is ethnophilosophy that has a twofold target (1) to 
critique the Western conception of development and (2) to rehabilite African cultures for 
authentic African development (Kabede 1999:45). Proponents of ethnophilosophy include 
Tempels, Senghor, Ngugi wa Thiong‘o and Fanon. The second school of thought is professional 
philosophy that argues that African philosophy must place development in the transition from 
particularism to a pluriversal culture . It aims at liberating Africa from marginalization so as to 
embrace global concerns in the economic development debate. However, Kebede‘s analysis 
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overlooks a third alternative, the critical trend that challenges both ethnophilosophy and the 
antirevavalist school. The critical school is developed by Gyekye and Oladipo. 
While African philosophers have examined this theme from many angles, several basic questions 
have become the focus of ongoing debate and discussion: What is the relevance of indigenous 
African economic values to the challenges of contemporary capitalism and globalization?  Do 
indigenous economic modes of thought and behavior constitute resources or impediments to the 
economic development in Africa? A critical examination of such questions reveals three distinct 
positions, namely cultural revivalism, antirevivalism and the critical trend.   
5.3.1 Cultural revivalism 
 
The first perspective, which Kwame Gyekye calls ―cultural revivalism‖ (Gyekye 1997b36: 233), 
basically defends an African indigenous cultural thought system. According to this perspective, 
the key to effectively addressing contemporary African economic problems lies in reclaiming 
and revitalizing indigenous economic philosophy that has been degraded and marginalized by 
colonialism. Colonialism violently disrupted African philosophy of economics that stresses 
sharing, communality, dignity and respect for individuals. It imposed Eurocentric economic 
thinking that is individualistic, fragmentary, selfish and exploitative. In the postcolonial era, the 
task of African philosophers is to decolonize the African mind. While revivalists are critical 
about calls for Western models of development for Africa, dismissing their argument invites the 
continued imposition of European capitalistic thinking.  It is important to realize that they do not 
typically view their own project as inconsistent with development. For revivalists, African 
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 Gyekye continues the debate in Beyond Cultures: Perceiving a Common Humanity, by responding to 
critics and by clarification of seemingly obscure issues. 
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economic philosophy must embrace African culture and values for serious economic progress to 
be made.   
 
Cultural revivalism is historically bound in the colonial era. It emerged as a reaction to European 
discourses about African identity and culture (Ciaffa, 2008:123). Colonialism was supported by 
literature that showed European superiority (Ciaffa, 2008:124). Tempels‘ work provided a key 
stimulus to cultural revivalism (Ciaffa, 2008:125). Tempels (1960:35) asserts that the Bantu 
possess a comprehensive philosophy of life. The key element of Bantu philosophy is that the 
pluriverse consists of vital forces that exist in a hierarchical relation with each other beginning 
with ―God‖, the Supreme vital force, ranging through the intelligent spirit, including ancestors 
into the world of the living (Tempels, 1960:77). Bantu understanding of reality is just different 
from that of the Europeans but is not necessarily less rational.  ―Let us try above all to 
understand Bantu philosophy, to know their beliefs and what is their rational interpretation of the 
nature of visible and invisible things‖ (Tempels 1960:35).  Their ideas on the nature of the 
pluriverse are essentially metaphysical knowledge, which constitutes them an ontology (Tempels 
1960:35-36).  Before we set out to teach Africans about our philosophy, let us try to master 
theirs. It is legitimate to set out the task of their philosophy (Tempels 1960:38).  Tempels 
proceeds to elucidate Bantu ontology, Bantu wisdom, Bantu psychology, Bantu ethics. The 
purpose of Tempels‘ work lies in ―illuminating colonial practice and missionary evangelization 
tomorrow‖ (Tempels 1960:15). 
Tempels‘ work challenged existing literature about the African mind. As a result, Tempels work 
got resistance from colonial authorities but it was embraced by African intellectuals who saw the 
work as an opportunity to explore and revitalize the African past as a basis for their struggle 
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against colonialism. There are dependent and reciprocal relationships existing between the 
cultural situation and the economic situation in the behaviour of human societies. Culture is 
always the life of society, more or less direct expression in the kinds of relationships that prevail 
in that society. In line with the revivalist argument, Ngugi (1972:13) argues that we must reclaim 
our past and the very condition of successful and objective reclamation is the dismantling of all 
colonial institutions, and especially capitalism as patterns of social and economic development. 
For Ngugi (1972:13) African nations should completely break from their colonial past. It was an 
attempt to repudiate the truth of cultural adequacy that Europe created ―the myth and fiction‖ 
that Africa was culturally sterile so that Europeans could more justifiably impose their political 
culture on the continent and exploit it economically. This act of sabotage as Ngugi sees it, is 
committed the active collaboration with the Christian church so that in Kenya, while the 
European settler robbed people of their land, the missionary robbed people of their soul. 
According to Ngugi (1972:13) ―a completely socialized economy, collectively owned and 
controlled by the people: a complete and total liberation of the people, through the elimination of 
all exploitative forces is necessary for a national culture.‖ Concerning capitalism, Ngugi 
(1972:81-82) wrote; ―The European stifled all possibility of a continuous culture on the part of 
the colonized by denying them a common culture, deprived them of economic and political 
power leading to a situation where the African still looked to the white world for a pattern of life 
even after political independence.‖     
 
Cabral (1973:110) reinforces the revivalist argument when he argues that culture plays an 
important role on the ideological plain as an element of resistance to foreign domination. 
―Liberation struggles are preceded by an increase in the expression of culture, consolidated 
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progressingly into a successful or unsuccessful attempt to affirm the cultural personality of the 
dominated people, as a means of negating the oppressor‘s culture.‖ Cabral (1973:110) argues 
that liberation welfare should go beyond the immediate goal of the struggle for independence to 
a greater aim of restoring a people to their own history and avoid the mis-development of 
neocolonialism. For Cabral (1973:42), in culture lies the responsibility for assuring the prospects 
for evolution and progress of the society in question. Central to Cabral‘s ideas is the premise that 
in peasant villages African culture is substantially undamaged (Cabral, 1973:64). 
Onyewuenyi (1991:39) argues that, ―the African has an unwritten timeless code of behaviour and 
attitudes which have persisted over centuries.‖ Africans must not yield to laws and institutions 
that are ―divorced from our philosophy, from the nature of beings as we understand them… from 
our view of the world‖ (Onyewuenyi, 1991:45). The goal of revivalism is to mobilize African 
cultural norms to address contemporary problems. African problems are due to cultural and 
spiritual corruption initiated during the colonial era. Indigenous beliefs and practices have been 
swallowed by systems of thought and social organization that are impediments to African 
wellbeing. The solution lies in rediscovering and resuming our proper selves through the study of 
African civilizations (Owomoyela 1991:181). African cultures possess scientific knowledge as 
evidenced by the use of medicinal herbs, advanced agricultural techniques and methods of food 
preservation  (Owomoyela 1991:174). Egyptian civilization provides metallurgy, astronomy and 
mathematics. The call for Africa to become more scientific overlooks these accomplishments 
and amounts to the call for Africa to duplicate European models of science. 
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 Senghor accepted the idea that Africans and Europeans are different. According to Senghor 
(1995:117), the Negro is a man of nature. The Negro is more sensuous and responsive to the 
environment (Senghor, 1995:117). The European sees the world as a scientist or engineer while 
the African is participatory. Senghor critiqued the alleged white superiority and argued that 
Africans did not lack reason, but showed a different form of reason (Senghor, 1995:121).  
5.3.2 Critique of Cultural Revivalism 
 
Cultural revivalism raises important points about the importance of the cultural past in providing 
a philosophical foundation for economic norms and values. However, a blind acceptance of such 
norms and values may be problematic. Ethnophilosophy is an endorsement of Western 
anthropological discourse in Africa. This endorsement is seen by Kebede (1999:45) as the apex 
of self contradiction. The affirmation of difference reproduces the anthropological view of 
irrational and mythical Africa (Kebede, 1999:48). It supports the colonial reasoning about 
Africa. As a result, Kebede (1999:45) sees the retrival of African tradition as a continuation of 
Africa‘s subordination to the West. 
Tempel‘s contribution sets the pace for African cultural revivalism but he controversially 
subordinates the role of African philosophy to missionary tasks. This gives an instrumental value 
that is outside the interests of African themselves yet such a philosophy must pave way for 
economic independence and emancipation. 
Ngugi‘s analysis focuses on economic independence and this is an important point raised in the 
study of African philosophy of economics. However, Ngugi‘s call for a complete break with 
Western culture raises practical difficulties. The new culture cannot be eliminated but it requires 
reflection and reconstruction. The challenges of the present cannot be solved by abandoning the 
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colonial culture since it is part and parcel of contemporary Africa. A complete rejection of 
foreign culture becomes a practical impossibility. 
Cabral‘s claim that restoration of history is a requirement is important for African philosophy of 
economics since history becomes the source of important lessons for the present and the future. 
However, the use of history must be carefully done to avoid nostalgic tendencies and 
oversimplification of issues. The past should be reflected upon so that modifications for the way 
forward may be done with a critical awareness of shortcomings and pitfalls. 
Several lines of criticism have been advanced against negritude. Negritude is a collective name 
under which Haitians, West-Indies and Negro-Americans group their ineffable desire to retrieve 
from their distant past something of beauty which they could embellish the present (Niekerk, 
1970:98). Their poems are ones of revolt, anger, bitterness, and reminiscences of trade in human 
flesh across the Atlantic; but also of longing for recognition as a human being (Niekerk, 
1970:99). The poems have an underlying theme of suffering (Niekerk, 1970:99). The poems are 
mixed with references to Senghor‘s deep attachment to Europe and France (Niekerk, 1970:100). 
The values which the authors of negritude have held up to the world as typically negro or 
African are values of a world which these authors no longer belong or could not even 
conceivably belong (Niekerk, 1970:101). An example of such value is ancestor worship. The 
return to the sources (African past) is nothing more than literary fiction (Niekerk, 1970:103). The 
sources provided inspiration and nothing else (Niekerk, 1970:103). The poems are silent about 
philosophy that could only exist on paper without a relationship to real life (Niekerk, 1970:106). 
What is depicted by the authors of negritude is true of the first negritude authors and poets but no 
longer true today (Niekerk, 1970:107). Senghor‘s philosophy of negritude has been based on 
assumed premises (Niekerk, 1970:112). Negritude has infact, already died a natural death and its 
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message to contribute something of lasting beauty to the world, yet will remain the guiding star 
of generations of African poets to come (Niekerk, 1970:112).  
Sogolo (1993: 202) sees negritude as a basic affirmation of negro values and a reaction to the 
imposed inferiority upon the Africans. For Sogolo (1993:202), negritude moved from the rebuttal 
of the European portrait, beyond the affirmation of equality with the European into a claim of 
superiority. Negritude is an anti-racist stand whose objective is to rescue the African from 
European racialism (Sogolo 1993: 202). However, ―the affirmation of cultural superiority of the 
African over the European commits no less a crime than that of European racialist‖ (Sogolo, 
1993: 202). Negritude turns out to be a form of anti-racist racialism. In Sogolo‘s view, negritude 
romanticizes the past of the African world. Sigolo objects to the glory of the African past for the 
following reasons, first, the belief in human sacrifices and secondly, the belief that twins should 
be killed is dysfunctional. For this reason, the demand of negritude for a revival of the totality of 
the African past is morally questionable.  Furthermore (Sogolo 1993:204) argues that the 
nolstagic feelings we have for the past may blind our eyes to the realities of the contemporary 
world. The impact of modern science and technology cannot be thrown away in favour of pre-
scientific values. However, Sogolo (1993:204) maintains that negritude as an intellectual 
doctrine with all its weaknesses still provides the African culture with a base for constructing 
social and political institutions that meet the needs of contemporary Africa. 
For Soyinka (2003:621), negritude was emphasized as a liturgy of racial exorcism and, for the 
victims of French colonial alienation, it provided the vessel of the exorcist creed, extolling the 
recovery of identity. According to Soyinka (2003:621), a tiger does not need to proclaim its 
tigritude but it simply attacks. Soyinka sees it as irrelevant for negritude to emphasize on 
blackness since this is just a reaction to white supremacy. Negritude is supposed to address 
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issues that affect Africans rather than focusing on issues of identity. This means the doctrine falls 
prey even of the very object it wishes to attack. Soyinka (2003:622) sees it as a form of ―anti-
racist racism.‖ As a result of its internal inconsistency, negritude failed to be a philosophy of 
relevance to colonial and post colonial African realities (Soyinka, 1999:99). Soyinka questions 
Senghor‘s anchorage of the poem ―The Prayer for Peace‖ on Roman Catholic Forgiveness. 
While this may be considered as a fallacy of ad hominem circumstantial in the sense that 
Soyinka attacks Senghor on the basis of his Catholic background, instead of concentrating on the 
flaws of negritude as such, Senghor can also be accused of endorsing Catholic doctrine without 
subjecting it to critical reflection. Soyinka (1999:113) sees Senghor‘s stance on forgiveness of 
the white race in general and the French in particular, as ―inhuman heart of forgiveness.‖ For 
Soyinka, it is inhuman because it is ―near super human or transcendental‖ especially when 
Senghor asks for ―the setting of France upon the Father‘s right hand.‖ Senghor understands of 
the Africans as people of intuition, rhythm and ancestrial
37
 strength as laven for reconciliation in 
the dough of humanity is neither real nor applicable to the self and the community (Soyinka, 
1999:132). 
Makumba (2007:121), views negritude as ―a proposed theory of black racial consciousness and 
the creation of African collective identity.‖ It is a solution to the problem of degradation of the 
African race created by colonial ideology but it is critiqued for its culturalism. Culturalism is the 
tendency of seeing a particular culture as wholly good. For Makumba, poems, folklore and songs 
are insufficient for shaping African culture (Makumba 2007:121). Negritude remained uncritical 
and failed to be radical enough to shake off the racist status quo (Makumba, 2007: 123). The 
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 The use of the term ancestral uncritically is an endorsement of colonial mentality Soyinka 
wishes to dislodge. As pointed out earlier in chapter 2, the term ‗living dead‘ is more appropriate 
as it captures the African understanding of life after death. 
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weakness of negritude lies on the fact that it thrives on the same fallacy of colonial culture
38
 as it 
hoped to counter. The fallacy lies in begging the question or assuming what has to be proved. 
Negritude remains contradictory and irrelevant as long as it rests on internal weaknesses. For 
Makumba (2007:123), an irrelevant philosophy cannot rest satisfied with responding to apparent 
problems or symptoms of problems. Unless African philosophy has the African situation for its 
object, such a philosophy is of no use and it serves to alienate Africans more and more from 
themselves (Makumba, 2007:123).  
5.3.3 Anti-revivalism 
 
 Hountondji offers a multifaceted critique of ethnophilosophy.
39
 Ethnophilosophy is the view that 
African philosophy exists in the form of a collective worldview and that the task of 
contemporary African intellectuals is carefully to document this worldview so that it might be 
pressed into the service of practical aims. Hountondji (1996:60) argues that ethnophilosophy 
rests on mistaken assumptions about African peoples and about the nature of philosophy. In the 
end, he believes that ethnophilosophy impedes rather than facilitates efforts effectively to 
address the challenges of the present. Hountondji (1996:60) mantains that ethnophilosophy 
perpetuates a false and ultimately insulting view of African peoples. African intellectuals 
perpetuate ―the myth of primitive unanimity‖ when they write about  ―négritude,‖ ―timeless 
codes of behavior,‖ or ―the African worldview,‖ (Hountondji 1996: 60). The myth holds that 
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 Namely, the ―special logic‖ controlling the mutual perception shapes the cultural logic of a 
stereotypical picture drawn from a prejudice and double edged destructive racist perception 
 
 
 
39
 Although ethnophilosophy is not the same as cultural revivalism, ethnophilosophy is the 
source of myths, proverbs, taboos, stories and songs from which cultural revivalists construct 
philosophy. An attack of ethnophilosophy becomes an indirect attack of the cultural revivalist 
project. 
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African persons are fundamentally united in their views about the most important matters in life. 
This idea originated in colonial discourse about Africa, and Hountondji (1996:60) argues that it 
is not enough simply to put a positive spin on the traits that define African identity. The very 
idea of a global African mentality or worldview distorts the richness and cultural diversity of 
African peoples. Ethnophilosophers might see such unifying concepts as a basis for needed 
solidarity, but Hountondji (1996:60) sees them as a distinct liability, since they fail to take into 
account real differences among Africans in addressing the complex problems that beset the 
continent. In a discussion of unanimism,  Kwame Appiah highlights precisely this point when he 
remarks: ―Africans share too many problems and projects to be distracted by a bogus basis for 
solidarity‖ (Appiah 1992:26). Hountondji himself emphasizes a more ominous side of the 
distraction noted by Appiah. Specifically, he argues that ethnophilosophy serves as a powerful 
tool for authoritarian governments who wish to divert the population‘s attention away from the 
realities of exploitation and oppression. In a characteristically acerbic passage, Hountondji 
writes: 
 
―At a time when the gap between oppressor and oppressed is widening throughout 
our continent and political differences are becoming more radical, the 
ethnophilosopher claims that we have always been . . . and always will be 
unanimous. On every side we see terror tightening its stranglehold on us . . . ; 
every word spoken spells danger and exposes us to untold brutality . . . ; insolent 
neocolonial state apparatuses parade in triumph, leaving a trail of intimidation, 
arbitrary arrest, torture and legal assassination and poisoning genuine thought at 
its source. And the official ideologue smiles, content, and declares: ―Alleluia, our 
ancestors have thought!‖ (Hountondji 1996:170)  
 
As Hountondji (1996:170) sees it, in authoritarian states, slogans about African authenticity and 
attendant celebrations of African cultural traditions function as a ―powerful opiate,‖ which serves 
to ―mystify‖ the masses and deaden them to the bleak realities of everyday life.    
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The problem with this use of the term ―philosophy‖ can be seen when it is contrasted with the 
way the term is used in reference to the Western tradition. To define philosophy as a collective 
worldview is to obscure the proper meaning of the term: Philosophy is a critical activity, not a 
passive holding of beliefs by either individuals or social groups (Hountondji, 1996:171).  
 
 5.3.4 Critique of anti-revivalism 
The argument advanced by antirevivalism amounts to an evasion of the kind of critical thinking 
that is urgently needed to address the problems that exist within African societies. What is 
needed is a careful analysis of the ways in which traditional beliefs might impede modernisation, 
and the ways in which they might provide useful insights. Hountondji‘s suggestion of a clean 
break with the past is problematic since the past can provide elements for innovative 
reconstruction for contemporary problems. Hountondji‘s definition of philosophy as ―a critical 
activity, not a passive holding of beliefs by either individuals or social groups‖ is objectionable 
for two reasons. First, the definition is too narrow to accommodate definitions of philosophy that 
come out of different cultures in the pluriversal world. Secondly, to deny the philosophy held by 
individuals or groups is to miss the whole point in cultural philosophy. Again the holding of 
beliefs by groups cannot be described as ―passive‖ because there is some critical reflection upon 
experience made to arrive at such a beliefs. 
 
5.3.5 The Critical Trend 
 
The critical trend comes in as an examination of both revivalism and antirevivalism in the 
African philosophy of economics debate. The approach mainly sees both revivalism and 
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antirevivalism as fallacious in the sense that each position sees total acceptance or total rejection 
of the cultural past as the way forward in contemporary African philosophy of economics. Such 
thinking is based on the fallacy of false dichotomy that assumes two alternatives as exhaustive 
without taking into consideration a third possibility that accepts positive elements while rejecting 
negative elements from the cultural past. 
 
Oladipo (1995:34) argues for a cultural synthesis of elements from both the African past and 
ideas from Western culture. A selection of elements is a critical exercise since it takes positive 
aspects while putting aside negative views. This approach becomes relevant for this study which 
focuses on selected Shona proverbs in search of important philosophical elements for the study 
of contemporary economic problems. While it is important to admit that it is no longer possible 
to rely entirely on ideas of the cultural past, it is important to consider that it is not possible to 
reject this culture entirely. Africa today is in a state of development and this requires changes in 
the physical environment and the mental outlook of the people (Oladipo, 1995:34). It should be 
noted that the realization that change is inevitable does not entail the belief that a total break with 
the past is possible or that the road to freedom in Africa lies in assimilation of African culture to 
western culture (Oladipo, 1995:34). Certain aspects of the cultural past require modification as 
we participate in the quest for development and the past has a role in this quest (Oladipo, 
1995:35). Development is a process of social reconstruction in which the past survives in the 
present though in modified form (Oladipo, 1995:35). Our origin defines the essence of our being 
which can be modified under the impact of various influences, but which remains part of our 
being and which we cannot outgrow or leave behind (Oladipo, 1995:35). The past survives in the 
present (Oladipo, 1995:35). For Oladipo, (1995:35) ―this is not to say that this past is static and 
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unchanging as revivalists would want to convey, but it changes‖ (Oladipo, 1995:35). If the past 
survives in the present, then an adequate understanding of the present depends, in part, on having 
an adequate knowledge of the past (Oladipo, 1995:35). Since an adequate knowledge of the past 
depends on reasonable grasp of ideas which our people lived by and how they informed their 
daily activities, then a critical study of indigenous conceptions of the past is essential (Oladipo, 
1995:34). According to Oladipo (1995:35) ―such studies [of the cultural past] would enable us to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of past conceptions and the need of transformation they 
need to undergo in order to enable us to cope with the challenges of today.‖ African scholars 
should study and reconstruct indigenous conceptual schemes with a view of determining their 
suitability for contemporary life. We can develop without compromising our identity. The need 
to improve conditions does not entail self-alienation (Oladipo, 1995:35-36). There is need to 
explore all aspects of our culture namely, indigenous thinking, Christianity, Islam and Western 
ideas (Oladipo, 1995:36). Exploring ideas would mean readiness to extract the best from each 
with a view of attaining a synthesis that would be relevant for contemporary existence  (Oladipo, 
1995:36). The quest for development cannot be successful if all we do is strive to return to our 
old ways of life or pursue change along lines established by foreigners (Oladipo, 1995:34). 
Oladipo (1995:36) observes; 
―The challenge of this quest requires recognition and maintaining two mutually 
supportive forces namely (1) examination of the past with a view of discovering 
aspects of it that are useful for contemporary existence and preserving our identity 
(2) observing the present and contemplating the future with a view to appropriate 
best practices in scientific and intellectual resources of mankind.‖ 
A careful and balanced use of these two forces can strengthen our interaction with other cultures 
(Oladipo, 1995:36). This approach appears to escape the pitfalls of both revivalism and 
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antirevivalism while paving a way forward that is both plausible and critical. The critical 
approach presented by Oladipo is reinforced by Gyekye in the argument that follows. 
Gyekye (1997b:237) argues that, the perception of the normative status of the value of the 
African cultural past in the contemporary world results in ―tensions, confusions, uncertainties, 
ambivalences and inconsistencies.‖ For  Gyekye (1997:237b), confusions and inconsistencies 
stem from the failure to delineate or distinguish between positive and negative features of 
African culture. It is this failure that leads revivalists to collapse the two features into something 
entirely valuable while leading the antirevivalists to collapse them into something entirely 
worthless. According to Gyekye (1997b:237), neither the revivalists nor the antirevivalists are 
entirely correct in their claims. In his critical approach, Gyekye (1997b:237) makes a distinction 
between extreme or unrestricted revivalist position and  extreme or unrestricted antirevivalist 
position. An extreme revivalist position is nostalgic about the African past. It sees the heritage of 
the past as perfect and constituting a viable context of contemporary life (Gyekye, 1997b:237). 
An extreme antirevivalist position sees the heritage of the past as useless for contemporary life 
(Gyekye, 1997b:237). Both positions are seen by Gyekye (1997b:238) as ―mistaken, implausible, 
and unjustifiable because they appear to unnecessarily overstate their case.‖ The antirevivalist 
position is inconsistent with empirical findings ―for scholars have documented the virtues of the 
African past‖ (Gyekye, 1997:237b). If an argument goes against established facts, then it is 
uncogent or unsound. It is implausible to argue for the rejection of the whole complex of 
creations of the cultural past (Gyekye, 1997b:238). An indiscriminate rejection of the entire 
cultural past is an absurdity (Gyekye, 1997b:238). There are cultural values, ideas, practices and 
institutions that have never been allowed to completely sink (Gyekye, 1997b:239). 
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According to Gyekye (1997:239b), ―to reject the position of unrestricted antirevivalism, 
however, is not by any means to embrace the position of the revivalist.‖ The reason is that not 
every aspect of the cultural past ought to be revised. Every society has a culture but not every 
society is developed. Elements of culture must function adequately to attain the goals of 
development (Gyekye, 1997:240b). Aspects that are impediments to development must be 
dropped. The revivalist assumption that all characteristics of a culture can constitute themselves 
into a viable framework of development is mistaken. A critical examination of the cultural 
setting of development should be done (Gyekye, 1997b:240). For Gyekye (1997b:241);  
―By advocating for a return to and maintenance of the entire cultural past and not 
showing any awareness of the negative features of the culture that are deleterious 
to the course of development, the revivalist have taken a position that is 
misguided and counterproductive in matters of development and progress of their 
societies.‖ 
Unrestricted cultural revivalist and the extreme unrestricted cultural antirevivalism must be 
rejected on the grounds that both positions are infected by unnecessary hyperbole (Gyekye, 
1997b:241). Both positions are affected by sweeping, hasty, premature and lopsided judgements 
about the negative and positive features of African culture (Gyekye, 1997b:243). ―Any 
judgement about the total relevance or the total irrelevance of cultural values of the past to 
contemporary cultural setting is bound not only to be premature but also to be a distortion of the 
truth‖ (Gyekye, 1997b:243). A wholesale condemnation or exaltation of the culture of a people 
would be unrealistic and could easily be falsified if investigations into the complexities of the 
culture result in one‘s rejection or appreciation of some features of it.  
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Hountondji, (2002:23) revises his earlier position
40
 and sees the problem of indigenous 
knowledge as marginalisation and ―it goes its own way, side by side with the new knowledge 
system.‖ This situation gives a relationship that Hountondji (2002:23) calls ―mute juxtaposition 
and mutual ignorance.‖ Indigenous knowledge ―lies in the margins of science‖ and ―we must not 
close ourselves into heritage without a critical approach‖ (Hountondji 2002:24). This situation 
creates exclusivism in knowledge and its consequences are undesirable. To move out of such a 
stagnant position, Hountondji (2002:36) suggests ―we should invent new ways in which 
knowledge can be better shared by the North and South in all its phases, be at the phase of 
production, accumulation and capitalisation or of application.‖ The exchange of knowledge will 
result in free and critical evaluation of ―anything that can be useful for us in the intellectual 
heritage available in the world‖ (Hountondji, 2002:36). This opens up ―critical reappropriation of 
indigenous knowledge systems‖ (Hountondji, 2002:36). ―We must find ways of reformulating 
traditional knowledge in terms of the imported knowledge and vice-versa, we must integrate the 
traditional into the modern in a way that allows the development of new forms rationality, 
enlarged and more comprehensive than the forms prevailing today‖ (Hountondji 2002:36). The 
research draws from Oladipo and Gyekye and later Hountonji‘s critical positions to argue for an 
African philosophy of economics in the next section. 
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 The change of position by Hountondji can be seen as a progression of thought rather than a 
contradiction of  his own position. The researcher shall make a distinction between early 
Hountondji and later Hountondji in the analysis of tradition and modernity. 
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5.4 Why an African Philosophy of Economics?  
 
The work shall draw from Gyekye‘s argument against economism and Okere‘s critique on the 
meaning of science to justify the necessity of an African Philosophy of Economics. Economism 
and an inadequate conception of science contribute to a flawed understanding of economic 
thinking in Africa. According to Gyekye (1994:45), the Western epistemological paradigm sees 
economic thinking in terms of exaggerated emphasis on measurable indexes of wealth and 
identification of economic development with the capacity of national economy to generate an 
annual increase in its gross national product of above 5%
41
. Principles and categories of Western 
epistemological paradigm are used. The above Western views are described by Gyekye 
(1994:46) as ―economism.‖ Economism denigrates the values and knowledge system that sustain 
African indigenous economic organization (Gyekye, 1994:46). Gyekye sees economism as 
misplaced and narrow because it overlooks historical, cultural and economic situations in the 
philosophical conception of economic development (Gyekye, 1994:46). Economism falsely 
categorises people into wealthy and poor, developed and underdeveloped that are misleading in 
the African economic worldview (Gyekye, 1994:46). Gyekye sees the divisions as false because 
they leave out a third category of ‗average wealth‘ and ‗developing‘ in each category 
respectively.
42
 For Gyekye (1994:46) economism is lopsided, inadequate and unrealistic because 
                                                          
41 The depiction of development in terms of mere satisfaction of needs rather than validation of 
beliefs largely explains the underdevelopment of Africa. By not being a program of 
corroboration of beliefs, development fails to be animated by a competitive, insatiable, and 
creative spirit (Kabede, 2004:107). 
 
42 A further criticism leveled at this perspective was directed at its tendency to draw dichotomies 
such as ―open/closed‖ and ―modern/traditional‖, whereby the West is seen as having open and 
modern societies and Africa as having closed and traditional societies. Peter Amato (1997) is one 
of those in the forefront advancing this criticism. In his article entitled ―African philosophy and 
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if fails to accommodate the complex nature of human society and culture. ―Economism is 
fallacious because it identifies economic development with development yet a species cannot be 
identical with its genus.‖ The unrealistic assumptions, the narrowness and fallacies of 
economism justify the need for an African Philosophy of economics that meaningfully 
accommodates the African paradigm, historical and economic circumstances that are necessary 
for an adequate conception of African economic thinking. 
For Okere (2005:21), the desire to know is natural in all human beings and all cultures have 
developed their forms of knowledge. Okere‘s observation opens room for African philosophers 
to question the reliance on borrowed knowledge to explain the African economic situation. 
Science remains ―only one of the many legitimate forms of knowledge and the West as only one 
of its producers‖ (Okere, 2005:20). Okere (2005:22) identifies three distinct definitions of 
science. The first is ―a special activity or mode of being where human beings relate to reality 
from the perspective of truth‖ (Okere, 2005:22).  This conception of science is a definition of 
knowledge. In the second definition, science is understood as ―the building of bodies of systems 
of truth about specified regions of reality following well defined methods‖ (Okere, 2005:22). 
The third understanding sees science as the study of matter using mathematical applications 
(Okere, 2005:22). The third definition is the most restrictive and it has gained the greatest 
prominence. In the third definition, science is restricted to a fraction of reality and to one 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
modernity‖, Amato dismisses such dichotomies within the Western intellectual thought as simply 
rhetorical and having a tendency to undermine African philosophy while allowing Western 
 culture to subsume others in a ―homogenous, self‐serving narrative‖ (Amato, 1997: 75). The 
main pitfall of this discourse, he argues, is its failure to acknowledge the role and contribution 
that different intellectual cultures may play in producing overlapping conceptualizations of social 
reality and human nature. Hence, there is a need for a shift from putative universal horizon to 
differentiated horizons of different cultures and writers, which allows for a mutually free 
discourse (Amato, 1997: 75). 
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pathway of human knowledge (Okere, 2005:22). Science is plural and not one (Okere, 2005:22). 
While the restricted conception of science has produced technological success, it becomes ―more 
a science of the materially useful and less a science in the quest for truth, it becomes a know-how 
rather than a knowledge‖ (Okere, 2005:22). The restricted understanding of science is used for 
measuring the economic success of cultural groupings while neglecting their moral and spiritual 
attitudes towards economic thinking. The marginalization of metaphysical and epistemological 
perspectives in economic thinking justifies the need of a genuinely African philosophy of 
economics. Philosophy of economics must be understood to be broader and deeper than the 
narrow and restrictive mathematical focus.  
5.5 African Philosophy of Economics 
 
African philosophy of economics can be defined as the critical use and application of indigenous 
African epistemological paradigms for economic behaviour, transformation and growth. The 
term ‗critical‘ is important because the African epistemological paradigm has to be examined to 
select elements that may be appropriate to the contemporary African economic condition. 
African philosophy of economics provides the metaphysical basis of wealth and well-being. In 
addition, it offers ethical criteria for evaluating economic behaviour and justification of 
economic actions that are seen as good for the community. The application must be critical and 
reflective enough to pick important elements while rejecting aspects that may retard progress. In 
the section that follows, three distinct but related arguments for the meaning, purpose and 
application of African philosophy of economics shall be examined. 
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5.5.1 Argument 1: African economic philosophy as a critique of capitalism 
 
Murove (2009:221) argues that, African philosophy of economics is incompatible with the 
capitalist spirit. Contemporary attempts by African scholars to devise a modified system of 
economic philosophy inclusive of African indigenous values are aimed at making capitalism 
conceptually relevant to the African cultural realities. This can be acceptable as a starting point 
but beyond that Africans need to think of their economic system that is appropriate for their 
needs and informed by African philosophical ideas. Such a philosophy will avoid the pitfalls of  
capitalism. Capitalism revolves around individualism and personal gain as opposed to 
communitarian economic relations of African philosophical thought
43
.  
Gyekye (1997:155) observes that the pursuit of wealth in Africa has a metaphysical foundation 
since the munificence of ―God‖ is the basis of human well-being. The metaphysical foundation 
has important implications for economic behaviour in Africa. Economic behaviour has to pass 
the ethical test. Material success and well-being are constantly evaluated from an ethical 
perspective.  
Moyo (1999:51) reinforces Gyekye‘s argument when he contends that among Africans, wealth is 
seen as coming from ―God‖ and the living dead. To prosper is to live in harmony with others and 
the living dead. This entails that wealth must be clean without being mixed with any evil deed 
because that is inconsistent with the expectations of both the living dead and ―God‖. Material 
possessions are seen as deriving from the living dead and by implication; they must be shared 
with others in the community as a way of expressing solidarity (Murove, 2009:231). The 
                                                          
43
 Wiredu (2009:16) understands personhood as ―something that one can gain and later lose.‖ 
There is a discomfort that arises with this view of personhood. ―The discomfort arises out of a 
clash of oral intuitions reflecting the deep difference between African communalism and 
Western individualism‖ (Wiredu, 2009:16). 
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obligation to share means one cannot be individualistic or live in isolation from the living dead 
and the needy since that will be viewed as anti-communal that fits the life of a witch or a sorcerer 
(Moyo, 1991:52). The witch or sorcerer is seen as anti-communal because they disrupt peace and 
harmony by doing evil acts that result in the suffering of members of community. Material 
possessions come from providence and there is an ethical obligation for individuals to refrain 
from selfishness. Ranger (1989:299) asserts that, among the Shona, Mwari is believed to own the 
country‘s resources. Drought and epidemics are seen as Mwari’s disapproval in people‘s 
participation in the new capitalist cash economy. For Murove (2009:231), in a socio-cultural 
context where material goods are understood to be under the sanction of the deity, those ethical 
norms approved by the deity come to determine economic behaviour. The Weberian economic 
qualities of thrift and frugality are inconsistent with African economic behaviour (Murove, 
2009:231). In the African context, sharing is very important among neighbours and whoever 
does not share withholds life from another. Sharing keeps human contact close and that is why 
Africans can afford big feasts for friends and relatives. Relations should be considered as more 
important than material possessions. African economic behaviour places emphasis on 
celebrations as a way of expressing communal solidarity. African economic behaviour is based 
on subsistence without over-accumulation of wealth (Murove, 2009:232). The African belief 
system allows for contentment and uniformity in the community. Goodness, kindness and 
decency are seen as examples of economic behaviour set by the living dead. Economic progress 
is seen as good if it benefits the community and it is bad when it exploits members of the 
community. Virtues of collectiveness such as group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, 
human dignity and unity should be made integral to African philosophy of economics (Murove, 
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2009:232). Communality and well-being are central to African economic thinking and 
indigenous values might allow a new culturally relevant economic system in Africa.  
 
5.5.2 Argument 2: African economic philosophy as a means of economic transformation 
 
Nussbaum (2009:238) defends ubuntu as an African economic paradigm that is capable of 
catalyzing the transformation of business and economic practice in Africa. The concept of 
catalyst is important because ubuntu becomes a philosophy that brings change without it being 
changed in the process. African economic thinking must embrace ubuntu in the way business is 
run (Nussbaum, 2009:239). Ubuntu should be included in economic thinking because it is 
―deeply communal and spiritual‖ (Nussbaum, 2009:239). With modification, African indabas 
(participatory community meetings) can have important roles in economic thinking as vehicles 
for dialogue and economic transformation. Indabas accord dignity and value for every member 
that participates in the debate without sidelining the views of others. Business is seen as a 
community rather than a structure of power (Mtembu, 2002:221). A community provides room 
for interdependence and teamwork while a structure of power becomes the basis of authoritarian 
thinking and intimidation of weaker members. Ubuntu encourages relations, community and 
team building in the economic sphere. Business articulates the need for people to recognize their 
common humanity (Nussbaum, 2009:245). Recognition of common humanity is important 
because each person shall be considered as significant within the economic system. 
Prior to Nussbaum‘s views, Allee (2003:135) had observed: 
―We are beginning to redefine ourselves not as masters of the pluriverse but as 
global citizens sailing a precious blue planet through the cosmos together. This 
awareness of interdependence, of a common humanity is experienced in the 
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business sector with greater frequency. And yet we are just beginning to 
acknowledge the emotional and spiritual losses associated with our inattention to 
unconscious shared inhumanity.‖  
Allee‘s observation underlines the need to address emotional poverty using African indigenous 
economic thinking that places emphasis on emotions and spirituality. If emotions and spirituality 
are part and parcel of the human being in the African context, their exclusion in economic 
philosophy creates an alienated and inauthentic economic being.  
According to Nussbaum (2009:245), ―one of the repercussions of a new business paradigm 
infused with ubuntu would be to free Western workplaces from the tyranny of soulless technical 
professionalism and the culture of emotional denial.‖ This will help to transform economic 
thinking into the realistic and practical levels. In Eurocentric corporate culture, people are 
expected to ―leave their feelings and their spirituality at home‖ (Nussbaum, 2009:245). In Africa, 
feelings and spirituality would naturally be part of the work context (Nussbaum, 2009:245). The 
culture of reciprocity within work or community is deeply embedded within African culture 
(Nussbaum, 2009:246). Work goes beyond physical labour to imply fulfillment of family or 
communal obligations.  
African economic philosophy can influence corporate culture and governance in the following 
ways: spiritual collectiveness is prized over individualism. This determines the communal nature 
of life where households live as interdependent neighborhood. Humility and helpfulness to 
others is more important than criticism of them. African culture values co-existence with other 
people. There is inherent belief in trust and fairness. There is high standard of morality and 
optimism  based on the belief in the supreme being who is believed to be the creator of mankind 
(King Report, 2002:1-5). 
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Ubuntu would foster the human qualities of humility over arrogance, co-operation over 
domination and generosity over greed, not only within but between companies and their 
relationship with stakeholders in other countries (Nussbaum, 2009:249). Ubuntu helps to place 
inclusive dialogue and discussion at the heart of economic agendas (Nussbaum, 2009:249). It 
promises a humane future for the good of all (Nussbaum, 2009:249). Ubuntu encourages 
generous and co-operative consciousness that recognizes communality of groups. Ubuntu results 
in compassion that eliminates criminality, terrorism, poverty and greed in the sharing of 
economic resources. Ubuntu could become one of the best methods for creating sustainability 
and social security (Nussbaum, 2009:250).  Africans believe that the only wealth is that which is 
shared and is made visible to the community (Nussbaum, 2009:250). If economies were to 
harness ubuntu values more purposefully, there would be more formal and informal mechanisms 
to create social and economic policies and institutional strategies (Nussbaum, 2009:250). Wealth 
would be shared more visibly by ensuring that all people had access to basic services 
(Nussbaum, 2009:249). Ubuntu would provide an integrating philosophy to inform and 
transform business relationships between seemingly separate categories of profit and people, 
politics and economics, material and spiritual (Nussbaum, 2009:250). Ubuntu would seek to 
create conditions where relationships are mutually reinforcing, productive, fair and co-operative 
within and between companies and their links with national and global networks (Nussbaum, 
2009:250). Ubuntu paradigm provides ethical principles to corporate leaders and consumers 
(Nussbaum, 2009:250-251). Ubuntu potentially transforms the meaning of business, the manner 
of trade and investment, the nature of profit and the character of economic relations. The 
potentiality is seen in the ubuntu’s encouragement of networks and teamwork within business 
relations.  
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While capitalist thinking is based on the extraction model where oil or coal is extracted from the 
ground, labour from employees, capital from local community, sales from customers or market 
shares from the market with the net effect of depletion of natural and human resources; ubuntu is 
other-oriented, process oriented, and stresses on communal responsiveness and responsibility 
(Nussbaum, 2009:251).  In the ubuntu model, stakeholders and community are enriched by 
business exchanges so that business transactions become mutually affirming and productive so as 
to serve the needs of humanity. Value systems promote economic sustainability. Ubuntu is wiser, 
more caring and collaborative when compared to capitalism. Compassion and care pave way for 
a holistic economic philosophy that provides a new understanding of humanity and 
interconnectedness. Ubuntu encourages corporate social responsibility where profits made in 
economic activity are ploughed back to the community for the benefit of the community.   
5.5.3 Argument 3: Critical selection of African indigenous values in economic growth 
 
Dandala (2009:260) maintains that ubuntu cannot be reduced to a methodology but it is a 
statement about being. The way one relates to other people and one‘s surroundings is critical to 
determining one‘s beingness (Dandala, 2009:260). Ubuntu requires learning and sharing for it to 
be cultivated among economic transactions. The fundamental values of African economic 
thinking can trigger African economic growth. Economic growth depends on the community and 
family.  
According to Dandala (2009:260), economic growth in the African context is seen in the 
expression ―cows never die.‖ The expression is based on the cow loaning practice called ukusisa 
in Zulu or kuronzera in Shona. In the practice, a fellow member of the community who is poor is 
assisted out of poverty by being lent a cow (Dandala, 2009:260). The practice protects the 
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dignity of the poor person. The poor person is politely asked to look after the cow and when the 
poor person obliges, the cow will provide milk, manure and draught to the poor person. After 
some years, the owner will reclaim the cow but the poor person will be entitled to one or two 
calves as seed capital for his or her new herd. This is a way of sharing wealth that is positive and 
affirming ubuntu. It is dignified, productive and embedded in African culture. The method of 
sharing wealth strengthens individuals and the community and the model can be used by 
companies to share wealth. Ubuntu forbids management from exploiting workers for unfair gain 
and encourages sharing to ensure teamwork is rewarded (Dandala, 2009:275). The process of 
sharing wealth does not only encourage economic growth but it also involves key African values 
such as dignity, community and self-respect. In the cow example, a sense of responsibility 
towards the cow is expected. ―It would be shameful for a person looking after a cow to let it die. 
Even if the cow is stuck in the mud, a man who values his cows would urge his herders to rush 
and slaughter it before it dies‖ (Dandala, 2009:275). For a cow to die out of negligence, it would 
mean the owner was uncaring. In the African context, ―there is no natural death of a cow. A cow 
never dies but it must be slaughtered‖ (Dandala, 2009:275). A slaughtered cow can bring quality 
beef to the owner for sharing with relatives and friends or it can bring economic gain  from 
selling the beef. Cows are seen as symbols of wealth that require responsible care. Ubuntu 
should allow economic growth based on the African value system by ―implementation of its 
principles, creativity and formation of partnerships‖ (Dandala, 2009:276). 
5.6 Shona Philosophy of Economics 
 
Shona philosophy of economics is based on the Shona metaphysical belief system that 
acknowledges the existence of both the supreme being Mwari and vadzimu (the living dead). For 
the Shona, pfuma (wealth) is a result of the providence of both Mwari and vadzimu. Any 
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acquisition of wealth should be consistent with the expectations of Mwari and vadzimu. Mwari 
and vadzimu are seen as wishing good for the community. This metaphysical belief provides 
room for ethically sound ways of thinking about wealth. 
According to Gombe, (1998:150) indigenous Shona people have long developed a variety of 
systems to govern their communities. Their indigenous and local economic systems ensured 
sustainable utilization of resources, social responsibility and harmonious relationships through 
cooperation. Gombe (1998:151) identifies reciprocity and social responsibility as main principles 
of Shona indigenous economic systems. The principles result in sharing among indigenous 
communities. Shona communities seek to meet the basic needs of all their members through the 
sharing of food, labour or implements. Gender relations and division of work in some 
communities are well defined and, in special cases called nhimbe (working together). 
 
A third principle is the sustainable use of resources. The lifestyles of Shona indigenous 
communities are relatively simple, in line with their practice of sustainable use of natural 
resources (Gombe, 1998:205).  Locally available materials are used for crafts and tools, 
discourage wasteful use of resources, and practice zoning for different land uses. They have 
regulatory mechanisms in place to ensure sustainability. These mechanisms involve the 
participation of every member of the community in the use of natural resources. In addition, the 
chiefs, kraal heads and village police officers ensure that every member of the community abides 
by the rules by enforcing laws that attract fines to those who violate the laws.  
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5.7 Shona Philosophy of Economics as expressed in selected proverbs
44
 
 
The research shall select Shona proverbs to examine the dignity of poor persons, the significance 
of hard work and the social problems associated with the extreme desire for money. In each of 
the themes, the role played by Shona metaphysics and ethics shall be shown so as to develop a 
Shona philosophy of economics. The selected proverbs reinforce the earlier observation that 
Shona philosophy of economics has a metaphysical basis and any economic activity is seen as 
good if it is ethically justified by both the living dead and the living members of the community. 
Furthermore, dignified economic activity must also be of benefit to those yet to be born through 
nhaka (inheritance of wealth).  
Three themes that include the dignity of the poor person, the importance of hard-work and 
moderate desire for money have been chosen to exemplify Shona philosophy of economics. The 
themes have been selected because they show the philosophy of ubuntu that is critical to 
greediness and individualism while articulating an indigenous philosophy of economics. The 
themes rely on metaphysics and ethics of the Shona which place importance on the human 
subject in economic thinking. Dignity appears to unite the three themes since dignity of persons; 
dignity of work and dignity of attitudes are shown. The internal thread of dignity helps Shona 
                                                          
44 Bodunrin (1984:12-13) contends that proverbs could serve a philosophical function for the 
African philosopher. He writes: ―There is no a priori reason why proverbs,...could not be proper 
subjects for philosophical enquiry.... The African philosopher cannot deliberately ignore the 
study of the traditional belief system of his people. Philosophical problems arise out of real life 
situations.‖ For Bodunrin no African or non-African philosopher should ignore Africa‘s belief 
systems because from them emerges the stock from which African philosophy is built. Whether 
these philosophies are written or not, they are thoughts of a people.  
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economic philosophy to guard against exploitation of persons, unethical acquisition of wealth 
and greediness in the use of money. In the spirit of the critical trend, these proverbs have been 
used in a way that reconstructs the positive elements in contemporary times. 
 
5.7.1 The Dignity of the poor person 
 
The philosophy of ubuntu enables the Shona to accord dignity to persons who may be under 
disadvantaged economic situations. The proverb that goes murombo munhu (a poor person is a 
human being) shows this point (Hamutyinei and Plannger, 2013:33). Dignity of persons is 
considered as an intrinscic value that arises from the sacredness of the human being due to the 
metaphysical belief in Mwari who is seen as the creator of human beings. The Shona also believe 
that the poor person can one day come out of his or her poverty if he or she makes a genuine 
appeal to vadzimu (the living dead). Vadzimu may sympathise with the poor person and help can 
come through living persons within the community such as friends or relatives. As a result, 
economic thinking should respect the ontological status and significance of the individual. A 
human being, among the Shona, should always be taken as a subject and never as an object. 
Poverty is considered as a phase of history that affects individuals but it has no capacity to 
diminish intrinsic value. Recognising the dignity of persons may not entail going back to the past 
as revivalists may wish to claim, but it is a critical appraisal of a useful element that can be used 
to transform and reconstruct economic philosophy. 
A Shona practice that shows the dignity of persons is the practice of nhimbe (working as a team). 
While the practice of nhimbe (doing work together), is not specifically targeted for poor persons 
among the Shona (Gombe, 1998:151) it benefits the poor person more and it is done 
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indiscriminately to confirm the proverb murombo munhu. Nhimbe covers many agricultural 
activities that include ploughing, weeding, harvesting and shelling grain. Administration of 
nhimbe is centralized and it is done by the village head to ensure that two nhimbe related 
activities are done on separate days and spaced sufficiently to allow room for individual tasks 
(Gombe, 1998:151). A poor person who may not have cattle for draught may benefit in a 
dignified manner from nhimbe
45
. Fellow villagers who own cattle come to the assistance of the 
poor person by ploughing all his or her fields in one day. The practice allows the poor person to 
invest in farming and get food security for the family in a dignified manner. To ensure that poor 
villagers are not ashamed, nhimbe can also be carried out for rich villagers. Regardless of the 
economic status of the beneficiary of nhimbe, fellow villagers who do the work must be supplied 
with abundant food and drink in form of doro (beer) or sorghum drink (maheu). 
Another practice which is done among Shona women is sharing seeds as a way of economic 
empowerment. The seeds shared are for crops that are reserved for women such as groundnuts, 
                                                          
45 According to Wiredu (2015:6) the Akan proverb obra ye nnoboa (life is mutual aid) is 
expressed practically when members of a community help each other in tasks of agricultural 
production such as clearing the ground or scooping heaps of coacoa beans. For such help to be 
obtained, it was necessary to inform fellow villagers of the time, place and nature of work to be 
done (Wiredu, 2015:6). Invited members of the community would carry out the task with speed 
and enthusiasm using their own tools for the work. The act of helping others would be 
reciprocated in future when a member who has participated in helping a fellow villager would 
also need help in future. Although Wiredu (2006:6) points out that the practice of mutual aid 
may be losing power because of commercialization of agriculture and urbanization, he still 
insists that the people of Ghana in general, and the Akan people in particular, help each other in 
daily life in countless ways. Wiredu (2015:6) adds that a Ghanaian in a large city or in the 
countryside still gets out of his or her way to help a Ghanaian or a foreigner who may be in a 
difficult situation. The point made by Wiredu shows the cross-cultural nature of African proverbs 
and the communalistic foundation of African ethics.   
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round nuts, sorghum, millet, cow peas and sweet potato cuttings. If one woman discovers a high 
yielding variety of any of the mentioned crops, she may identify a poor fellow woman within the 
village and assist her with the high yielding seed. The purpose of the sharing is to ensure that the 
poorer woman gets food for her family and surplus for sale. This also reduces the poor woman‘s 
dependency on other villagers and she is saved from shame and embarrassment. This practice is 
still prevalent in Shona rural areas of Zimbabwe and it confirms the proverb murombo munhu. 
5.7.2 The importance of hard work 
 
The Shona proverb kupfuma kunowanikwa nedikita (riches come through hard work) emphasizes 
the economic value of work (Hamutyinei and Plannger, 2013:327). Diligence is valued among 
the Shona because it is considered as an ethically acceptable way of acquisition of wealth. By 
prescribing hard work as a means of getting rich, it means the Shona are aware of other methods 
of acquisition of wealth that are unethical and non-dignified such as theft, robbery, magic and 
exploitation of fellow human beings. A variant of this proverb is chekuba hachipfumisi (A stolen 
thing cannot enrich a person) which means that for the Shona, wealth must pass the ethical test. 
Hard work is pleasing to the living dead and Mwari while theft is believed to be contrary to the 
ethical expectations of vadzimu. There is dignity and respect in hard work. This dignity applies 
to both the worker and fellow members of the community. Unethical means of wealth acquisition 
disturb the peace of the community and such wealth may bring problems rather than benefits to 
the community. For the Shona, wealth should benefit the living and those yet to be born while 
being acceptable in the eyes of the living dead.  
Shona practices that show respect for hard work include kudetemba mutupo the use of praise 
poems, kushuma to encourage hard workers and kupembera celebrating achievements. Praise 
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poems are usually recited by women in Shona culture to thank anyone who will have worked 
hard. The hard worker may be a child, a relative or friend regardless of gender. In the past, praise 
songs were used to thank hunters and fruit gatherers but currently praise poems can be used for 
thanking anyone who has exhibited hard work in farming, fishing and even domestic work. To 
children, praise poems are effective tools of encouraging hard work and prosperity. Among the 
Shona, it is immoral to pass through a place where people are working without passing a 
comment that praises hard work. The comments that respect and dignify work are known as 
kushuma. Among the Shona, kushuma may not only involve comments that praise hard work but 
it may also include assisting the workers for a few minutes for free. If a member of the Shona 
community comes across other members weeding for example, it is morally appropriate to 
politely get the hoe from the eldest members of the team, weed for a few minutes while 
encouraging them to continue working hard and then proceed with one‘s journey. The gesture is 
an affirmation of the extent to which the Shona value hard work. Hard work is seen not just as an 
economic means of survival, but also as an ethically acceptable means to prosperity that comes 
without disgusting vadzimu, disturbing social peace and threatening suffering for those yet to be 
born. The Shona see it fit to hold elaborate celebrations kupembera as a way of recognizing and 
blessing the fruits of hard work. If a Shona person invests in hard work and acquires a university 
degree, a car, or a house, the person invites friends and relatives to celebrate by offering food and 
drink. The celebration must not be seen merely as a party where eating and drinking are done but 
also as an occasion where members gathered articulate principles of Shona philosophy of life 
through speeches. Elder members may use the achiever as an example for the youth to follow by 
articulating the importance of hard work in the Shona philosophy of life. 
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5.7.3 The social problems of extreme desire for money 
 
The Shona have seen the ills of capitalism in their society particularly regarding human attitudes 
towards money.
46
 For the Shona, money itself may not be intrinsically bad but human attitudes 
towards money that are inherited from greed, selfishness and consumerism lead the Shona to 
adopt a careful attitude in their philosophy of economics. The proverb, mari ine chitema, mai 
vakatengesa mwana (money is associated with evil, it caused a mother to sell a child) affirms the 
bad side of the extreme love for money (Hamutyinei and Plannger, 2013:417). For the Shona, 
money is seen as the root of evil and members of the community are encouraged to live within 
their means and be contented with the little they have to avoid temptations associated with the 
use of money. In the Shona community, mai (a mother) is a symbol of care and love to the child 
and other family members. There is an emotional bond between a child and its mother, there is a 
connectedness based on love. However, greed and selfishness motivated by capitalism can break 
the bond between mother and child resulting in the mother exchanging the child for cash. Such 
evil is strongly condemned by the Shona and it is a representation of other evils associated with 
                                                          
46 In Zimbabwe‘s pre-colonial era, money was absent and economic transactions were done using 
barter trade (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe website, 2015). International trade evolved around 
exchange of copper, gold, ivory for glass beads, pottery and cloth. In domestic trade, practical 
objects such as knifes, axes and hoes were exchanged for grain, cattle and marriage agreements 
(Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe website, 2015). The use of money started with colonialism in 1890 
with English and South African coins as the legal tender. In 1932, the first Rhodesian coins were 
used and in 1940 the first Rhodesian notes were used. Indigenous Shona people were mainly 
employed by white settlers as domestic workers and farm labourers and they gradually became 
familiar with the use of money. As circulation of money increased after the adoption of the 
Rhodesian dollar, critical reflection on the positive and negative use of money began. While 
similar reflections could have taken place historically, the context in which this thinking took 
place among the Shona is influenced by capitalistic tendencies that prevailed among the Shona in 
the colonial period. 
 
206 
 
greed and selfishness such as theft, robbery, fraud and use of zvikwambo (goblins) in the attempt 
to get rich. Among the Shona, evil acts done for the desire of getting money are disrespectful 
both to Mwari and vadzimu (the living dead). These evil acts done in the attempt to get rich  do 
not only disgust the vadzimu, but they also disturb peace, justice, unity, togetherness, oneness the 
ideals of hunhu (humanness) within the community of the living. More seriously, if the desire for 
money results in the spilling of human blood, it is believed that there is a potential danger of 
ngozi (avenging spirit) that can bring suffering to members of the extended family of the 
murderer and this can also affect those yet to be born through the belief that ngozi can wipe out 
members of the existing extended family in the present and in the future. Aware of these deadly 
consequences, the Shona encourage a moderate attitude to money especially among the youth. 
Elders carefully monitor the behaviour of the young and they avoid spoiling them with more than 
necessary pocket money to avoid kuparirwa (bringing trouble to members of the extended 
family) that may occur due to the love of money. The Shona discourage a life of extravagant 
spending and possession of material goods beyond the necessary levels
47
 so as to avoid social ills 
that may develop because of kukara mari (the extreme desire for money).  
5.8 Possible objections and replies 
 
The first charge that can be made against Shona economic philosophy is that economic ideas that 
are based on proverbs are unscientific. This objection may be considered as based on a narrow 
understanding of science. This narrow understanding sees science as emanating from a particular 
culture and must be used as a standard of evaluation to other cultures. This narrowness is both 
                                                          
47Even though ubuntu contradicts caplitalism by its emphasis on the good of the community 
instead of profits, this humane approach allows the community as a whole to benefit as opposed 
to capitalistic greed that focuses on individual benefits.  
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misplaced and fallacious. It is misplaced because it is inapplicable in the Shona cultural 
―scientific‖ thought. It is fallacious because it is question begging.  
The second objection is that Shona proverbs are unlikely to trigger economic transformation 
within the society. It can be argued that Shona proverbs can influence economic thinking and 
behaviour within the Shona culture.  Furthermore, it is possible for proverbs to cross cultures, 
and the unlikelihood to transform other societies may be unrealistic. Transformation in other 
societies is possible at least potentially through dialogue with other cultures.  
The third objection is that Shona economic philosophy is suitable for agrarian, small scale and 
sedentary economies. The objection is based on fallacious reasoning. From the fact that Shona 
economic philosophy is practiced by small agrarian economies, it does not follow that the 
applicability ends there. The humane elements contained in Shona economic philosophy can be 
extended to other parts of Zimbabwe, Africa and the world. Suitability is a relative concept that 
requires justification and analysis. 
The fourth objection is that Shona economic philosophy fails to escape conservative implications 
and its suitability to contemporary times is compromised. Against this objection, it may be 
argued that it may be true that Shona economic proverbs indeed contain some conservative 
implications because proverbs were formulated in the past. However, if proverbs were 
formulated in the past, it does not necessarily follow that the proverbs are unsuitable for 
contemporary times since the moral and spiritual elements addressed by the proverbs are still 
part of humanity even in the present day.   While it may be true that the economic circumstances 
facing humanity have changed, the moral demands towards economic activities may still remain 
the same or they may be stronger in this day and age. 
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5.9 Significance of  Shona Philosophy of Economics 
 
Indigenous knowledge is a very sensitive issue, related with cultural identity and ethnicity of  
stakeholders (Gupta, 2011:61). It reflects the dignity and identity of the local community (Gupta, 
2011:61). Shona philosophy of economics gives self-identity, dignity and authenticity among the 
Shona. Article 3 of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples indicates 
that ―Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.‖ The economic development aspect is important for this study since it is consistent 
with Shona economic philosophy. Self-determination allows the Shona to link economic 
development with that worldview so that economic development is seen in the context of other 
development dimensions like the spiritual and moral development. Article 5 of  United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples highlights that ―Indigenous peoples have the 
right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural 
institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the State.‖ The right to maintain and strengthen economic 
institutions allow the Shona to critique other paradigms for the purpose of borrowing positive 
elements and reject issues that are inconsistent with their cultural philosophy of economics. 
African philosophy is necessarily the philosophical work carried out by African thinkers in 
African sociological milieus but the content of such work could be any combination of locally 
generated ideas and locally adapted external ideas (Keita, 2000:123) 
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The use of indigenous knowledge based economic thinking allows the use of indigenous 
knowledge and opens a  platform for dialogue with other paradigms. Guri and Hiemstra (2009:1) 
argue for inclusive development that accepts the African epistemological paradigm and other 
paradigms of economic thinking. According to Guri and Hiemstra (2009:5) endogenous 
development is defined as development from within, based mainly though not exclusively on 
locally available resources, values, institutions and knowledge. Economic development involves 
revitalising ancestral and local ways of knowing and learning, and addressing their current 
relevance (Guri and Hiemstra, 2009:5). Endogenous development aims to empower local 
communities to take control of their own development process. External resources that best fit 
the local conditions are selected by the communities (Guri and Hiemstra, 2009:5). 
 
In addressing the organizational crisis in Africa as a result of the neglect of Africa‘s indigenous 
institutions and ways of organization, the concept of endogenous development becomes relevant 
(Guri and Hiemstra, 2009:5).  The argument for engaging the rural ―un(western)educated‖ 
population is not that the western forms and criteria for organizing people should be dropped in 
favour of only the indigenous forms of organization of Africa. The argument is for creating an 
interface between people representing different paradigms (Guri and Hiemstra, 2009:5). Hence 
for Africa to attain global competitiveness, the gaze should be to mobilize Africa‘s total human 
capital using both African and western lenses (Guri and Hiemstra, 2009:5). This requires that 
development institutions develop the capacity for working with people from the perspectives of 
their indigenous institutions, ways of organizing and facilitating economic activity (Guri and 
Hiemstra, 2009:5). 
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The use of Shona proverbs to articulate a Shona philosophy of economics opens the possibility 
of intercultural dialogue. There is certainly considerable scattered information on the cognitive 
or ‗emic‘ categories utilized by societies outside the West to describe the types of ‗economic‘ 
relationships that establish their webs of societal relations (Wiredu, 1995:1).  Indigenous 
knowledge (IK) is a significant resource which could contribute to the increased efficiency, 
effectiveness and sustainability of the development process (Gorjestani, 2000:1).  
 
Shona philosophy of economics takes the history and culture of the Shona people into account. 
Indigenous peoples should be encouraged in their vision of an integrated economic development 
system that encompasses the development of human capabilities, capacities and skills; 
appropriate infrastructure that does not displace people; recognition of pluralistic systems 
respecting other cultures and civilizations; promotion and provision of a democratic space to 
continue practising indigenous ways of life; and the pursuit of self-determined development 
(Lasimbang, 2008:45). The economic history of the developed countries of today shows that the 
development process involves much more fundamental phenomena. These include wholesale 
economic, social and administrative reforms, perceptible changes in the attitude of the people to 
work, to savings and investment and to life generally and a widespread acceptance of the 
discipline in private and national lives which are the prerequisites of development (Asante, 
1991:4). Where these reforms and changes have taken place economic development has 
proceeded very rapidly. Until developing countries come to realize that development touches all 
aspects of a society and the individual's attitude to it they will continue to mistake indices of 
development for its process (Asante, 1991:5). 
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Another significance of a Shona philosophy of economics lies in its rootedness in the African 
mind. A philosophical system that fosters Africa‘s development, be it cultural, spiritual, 
religious, economic, or political, must be a reflective one. That reflective philosophical system is 
wrapped in philosophical presuppositions of the African personhood, made whole in the 
community in which the African lives (Nyasani 1997:51). The assumptions are that there are 
particular  processes of thought that are African; and that some Africans organize and categorize 
their world from a strictly indigenous socio-cultural milieu (Nyasani 1997:51). 
  
5.10 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has drawn from cultural revivalists and their critics to examine the African 
philosophy of economics debate. It has been argued that an African philosophy of economics is 
necessary to avoid the weaknesses of the Eurocentric paradigm in economic philosophy. The 
chapter has also defended three conceptions of African philosophy of economics to articulate 
authenticity and cultural relevance in approaching economic issues. Furthermore, the chapter has 
explored Shona philosophy of economics as reflected in three selected proverbs. Themes of 
human dignity, respect for hard work and the need for moderation in the desire for money are 
discussed in the context of the Shona philosophical paradigm.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The research has investigated the epistemological tension between indigenous knowledge 
systems particularly Shona proverbs and the Western knowledge system that tends to 
marginalize African knowledge. It has been argued that, the relegation of Shona knowledge 
systems is both unjustified and unacceptable. It is unjustified because it is based on assumptions 
rather than facts. It is unacceptable because it fails to accommodate other forms of knowledge in 
the spirit of pluriversal thinking. Eurocentric epistemology tends to unjustly marginalize African 
knowledge systems in general and Shona knowledge systems in particular. The research has 
argued that, the marginalization of Shona proverbs is based on prejudice and misconceptions 
rather than facts. It has been established that Eurocentric epistemology is based on false premises 
and false conclusions thereby rendering its arguments for the dismissal of alternative 
epistemologies as unsound. A multifaceted critique that is based on deconstruction and 
reconstruction, decolonial thinking, Afrocentricity, indigenous knowledge based analysis, and 
anti-dualistic approach has been advanced. Deconstruction has been used to displace absolutist 
and rigid claims of positivist epistemology and arguments that favour the historicity and 
particularity of knowledge perspectives have been advanced. Decolonial thinking has been 
employed to topple the false epistemic hierarchy that had been constructed by the Western 
epistemological paradigm. Afrocentric thinking stands as a radical critique to Eurocentric 
epistemology and it dismisses the alleged universalism in order to provide a cultural footing to 
the African epistemological paradigm. Africanisation calls for the placing of the African 
worldview at the center of analysis and it has argued for the use of African indigenous 
approaches for addressing African problems and challenges. The indigenous knowledge based 
approach advocates for locally based knowledge systems that are not violent and imposing on the 
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recipients but come from grassroots to meet the needs of the communities from which 
knowledge systems develop. Anti-dualistic epistemological perspectives argue for pluriversal 
epistemology and acknowledge the relatedness of the knower to the community. The criticism of 
the Western epistemological paradigm has been used to pave way for pluriversal thinking. 
Pluriversality accommodates historically marginalized epistemology including Shona knowledge 
systems from which selected proverbs used in the research are based. The research has argued 
that some Shona proverbs are sources of insights and elements that can be reconstructed in the 
contemporary world to fill epistemological gaps that have been created by colonialism 
particularly in the areas of environmental philosophy, legal philosophy, political philosophy and 
philosophy of economics. 
 
The philosophy of ubuntu has been employed in the research to facilitate the transition from a 
broad African epistemological paradigm to the particular epistemological paradigm of the Shona 
from where selected proverbs have been derived.  In the area of environmental philosophy, 
ubuntu is the foundation of connectedness, dependence and interdependence with the 
environment as evidenced in preservation, conservation and care of the environment. In Shona 
legal philosophy, ubuntu is the basis of oneness and connectedness among members of the 
community and law is established for the achievement of social harmony and peace. Regarding 
Shona political philosophy, the research has argued that ubuntu is the basis of community 
relations and solidarity that are ingredients for peace within the community. In philosophy of 
economics, ubuntu is the platform of human dignity and respect that are necessary for humane 
economic affairs within the community.  
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Shona proverbs provide alternative ways of thinking about the environment. The environment is 
linked to the community and conservation and preservation of resources is done for the good of 
the community. In the Shona community, there are three levels of being namely the living, the 
living dead and those yet to be born. Environmental philosophy, as conceived by the Shona, 
considers these three levels of being. There is a web of interrelationships between the three levels 
in relation to the environment. The research has examined various conceptions of the 
environment and it has argued for an African conception of the environment which places 
emphasis on relationality, interconnectedness and interdependence where the human element is 
seen as part of the environment. The debate on the possibility of an African environmental 
philosophy has been explored and the research has defended an African environmental 
philosophy. The research has shown that ubuntu philosophy is the basis of African philosophy. 
An environmental philosophy based on ubuntu respects all aspects of the environment, 
recognizes the dependence of human beings on the environment, sees the land as sacred and 
affords responsibility for future generations by encouraging the preservation and conservation of 
resources. The researcher has defended Shona environmental philosophy that captures the 
experiences and reflections of the Shona peole on their physical environment. Three proverbs 
that address themes of preservation, conservation and human dependence on the environment 
were examined. Preservation of the environment is important among the Shona given the semi-
arid conditions that characterise most regions occupied by the Shona in Zimbabwe. Preservation 
maintains the status of the environment and the original sate of the environment becomes the 
standard for comparing the ideal situation with worse off scenarios in the context of the 
environment. Conservation of the environment enables careful and responsible exploitation of 
water sources, forests, grassland and wildlife. The realisation that human beings are part and 
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parcel of the environment gives an opportunity for co-existence with components of the 
environment. If the physical environment is damaged, human life is under threat as well. The 
significance of Shona proverbs in the context of global environmental responsibility has been 
shown. 
 
Legal philosophy proverbs provide the importance of law in the community for the achievement 
of peace and harmony. Law is established to facilitate good relationships rather than creating 
offenders and victims. Shona philosophy of law places individuals first. The law is established to 
serve individuals and not the other way round. Even if human beings are found on the wrong side 
of the law, their dignity is kept since Shona philosophy of law makes an important distinction 
between a crime (mhosva) and an individual (munhu). The law addresses the crime while 
attempting to maintain individual dignity as much as possible for the purpose of rehabilitating 
the individual in future. The research has argued for the reality of an African conception of law 
that is based on the philosophy of ubuntu. The Shona philosophy of law draws from the broad 
African perspective that cherishes the philosophy of ubuntu. Ubuntu provides the basis of a 
coherent philosophy of law among the Shona. Shona philosophy of law exploits proverbs that 
show the metaphysical and social dimension of law. Both the living and the living-dead are 
involved when the law is violated because it is believed among the Shona that the extended 
family system suffers the effect of violating the law. Among the Shona, law must be 
subordinated to human beings and as a result, law is used to protect the dignity of persons. Even 
if one is accused of wrong doing, the dignity of the individual must be protected under the trial 
processes. In addition to protecting individuals, law is used among the Shona to serve the 
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interests of the community as a whole. Peace is the most valued ideal that facilitates the 
realisation of other values among the Shona. Law serves as an instrument for peace. 
 
 
Shona political philosophy focuses on humane relationships between the ruler and the subjects. 
These relationships are based on respect and mutual recognition of intrinsic value. Political 
philosophy aims at community harmony and peace. Truth telling is considered an important 
virtue in Shona political philosophy. Truth telling helps to manage conflicts that may arise within 
the community for the good of every member of the community. The study has defended a 
pluriversal understanding of political philosophy that has relevance to the African historical and 
cultural context.  Political models that obtain in Africa have been discussed with the aim of 
showing the model that applies to the Zimbabwean context. The research has argued that ubuntu 
is the political foundation of solidarity, oneness and mutual support in politics. Under Shona 
political philosophy, it has been argued, on the basis of selected proverbs, that co-existence and 
relatedness are the basis of mutual respect owing the recognition of dignity and equality before 
political institutions. The political significance of others has been shown especially in the 
epistemic role of critical exchange of ideas and opinions and widening the scope of political 
knowledge. Among the Shona, truth telling is a valued political practice because it gives the 
platform for forgiveness and reconciliation within the community. Harmony and progress are 
also achievable if there is commitment to truth within the community. 
Philosophy of economics provides the principles of respect for persons and exercise of 
moderation in the face of capitalist greed. Human life is given priority and persons are 
considered to be intrinsically valuable despite external conditions of poverty. For the Shona, a 
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poor person may one day emerge out of his or her conditions and for this reason, he or she 
deserves to be treated with respect. The research has drawn from cultural revivalists and their 
critics to examine the African philosophy of economics debate. It has been argued that an 
African philosophy of economics is necessary to avoid the weaknesses of the Eurocentric 
paradigm in economic philosophy. The research has also defended three conceptions of African 
philosophy of economics to articulate authenticity and cultural relevance in approaching 
economic issues. Furthermore, the research has explored Shona philosophy of economics as 
reflected in three selected proverbs. Themes of human dignity, respect for hard work and the 
need for moderation in the desire for money are discussed in the context of the Shona 
philosophical worldview. Still, the significance of using Shona philosophy of economics in terms 
of providing a platform for dialogue and criticism in the face of pluriversal perspectives of 
economic philosophy has been discussed. 
While the above lines of reasoning are attempts to apply insights from Shona proverbs to 
contemporary issues in applied philosophy, such reasoning may be considered objectionable by 
critics. Firstly the use of proverbs is considered weak because of the conservative implications of 
the proverbs. Against such thinking, it has been shown by Wiredu (1980: 1) that, while culture 
may adopt technologies and scientific advancement from the West, the moral underpinnings of a 
culture that address  themes of human dignity and respect are classic and timeless. They are 
classic because they remain relevant and applicable. They are timeless because they cannot be 
fixed in a particular historical epoch. The use of Shona proverbs is significant because proverbs 
are understandable to the local community; proverbs promote indigenous knowledge systems 
development. Shona proverbs are based on people‘s thought system and experiences. Proverbs 
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are rooted in the Shona people‘s historical and cultural setting. Proverbs critically reflect upon 
historical events to give a cautious position.  
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